Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This detection rule identifies hosts where data archiving using 7-Zip is closely followed by network traffic to the temp.sh file-sharing service. This correlation suggests a potential data staging and exfiltration sequence, a TTP observed in the Lynx Ransomware campaign.
Detects the collection and staging of sensitive user data, such as credentials from keychains, browser profiles, and cryptocurrency wallets, by compressing them into an archive. This behavior is a key component of the DigitStealer infostealer's data theft process.
Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" cmdlet in order to compress folders and files. An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
The following analytic identifies the execution of RAR utilities to archive files on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as threat actors, including red-teamers and malware like DarkGate, use RAR archiving to compress and exfiltrate collected data from compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information to command and control servers, posing a severe risk to data confidentiality and integrity.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to archive files into a temporary folder. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically monitoring for the `Compress-Archive` command targeting the `Temp` directory. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to collect and compress data for exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data access and exfiltration, posing a severe risk to sensitive information and overall network security.
The following analytic detects the creation of archived files in a temporary folder, which may contain collected data. This behavior is often associated with malicious activity, where attackers compress sensitive information before exfiltration. The detection focuses on monitoring specific directories, such as temp folders, for the presence of newly created archive files (e.g., .zip, .rar, .tar). By identifying this pattern, security teams can quickly respond to potential data collection and exfiltration attempts, minimizing the risk of data breaches and improving overall threat detection.
This query detects the creation of archive files (ZIP, 7z, RAR) in common temporary or publicly writable directories (C:\Users\Public\, C:\ProgramData\, C:\Windows\Temp, C:\PerfLogs). The files are written by processes commonly abused in attacks, such as powershell.exe, cmd.exe, 7z.exe, winrar.exe, or explorer.exe.
The analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Organizations. The detection monitors GitHub Organizations audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.
One common technique leveraged by attackers is using archiving applications to package up files for exfiltration. In many cases, these archives are usually protected with a password to make analysis more difficult. This query identifies applications which leverage a command line pattern which matches the 7zip and WinRAR command line executables to create or update an archive when a password is specified. By detecting based on the command line we can avert attempts to dodge detection by renaming the application.
Happy hunting!
Happy hunting!
Identifies anomalous increases in Exchange mail items accessed operations.
The query leverages KQL built-in anomaly detection algorithms to find large deviations from baseline patterns.
Sudden increases in execution frequency of sensitive actions should be further investigated for malicious activity.
Manually change scorethreshold from 1.5 to 3 or higher to reduce the noise based on outliers flagged from the query criteria.
Read more about MailItemsAccessed- https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compliance/advanced-audit?view=o365-worldwide#mailitemsaccessed
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/OfficeActivity/MailItemsAccessedTimeSeries.yaml
The query leverages KQL built-in anomaly detection algorithms to find large deviations from baseline patterns.
Sudden increases in execution frequency of sensitive actions should be further investigated for malicious activity.
Manually change scorethreshold from 1.5 to 3 or higher to reduce the noise based on outliers flagged from the query criteria.
Read more about MailItemsAccessed- https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compliance/advanced-audit?view=o365-worldwide#mailitemsaccessed
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/OfficeActivity/MailItemsAccessedTimeSeries.yaml
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, "Exchange Server zero-days exploited in the wild".
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query detects 7-zip activity associated with this threat. 7-ZIP is a legitimate tool used for file archiving; however, unusual 7-ZIP activity combined with other evidence might indicate that an attacker is compressing data for exfiltration.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query detects 7-zip activity associated with this threat. 7-ZIP is a legitimate tool used for file archiving; however, unusual 7-ZIP activity combined with other evidence might indicate that an attacker is compressing data for exfiltration.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
This query can be used to detect instances of a malicious insider creating a file archive and then emailing that archive to an external "competitor" organization.
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_judgement_panda_gtr19.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
'This hunting query identifies GitHub activites where there are a large number of deletions that may be a sign of compromise.'
This query checks for attempts to delete data on multiple drives using cipher.exe. This activity is typically done by ransomware to prevent recovery of data after encryption.
The analytic detects the usage of a renamed 7-Zip executable using Sysmon data. It leverages the OriginalFileName field to identify instances where the 7-Zip process has been renamed. This activity is significant as attackers often rename legitimate tools to evade detection while staging or exfiltrating data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate data exfiltration attempts or other unauthorized data manipulation, potentially leading to significant data breaches or loss of sensitive information. Analysts should validate the legitimacy of the 7-Zip executable and investigate parallel processes for further suspicious activities.
This rule detects the execution of common archiving utilities (zip, gzip, tar) on Linux systems. Adversaries often compress data prior to exfiltration to reduce its size and make it easier to transfer. This rule specifically looks for the 'execve' system call with 'zip', 'gzip -k', or 'tar -c' as the primary command and arguments.
The following analytic detects the execution of 7z.exe, a 7-Zip utility, spawned from rundll32.exe or dllhost.exe. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent processes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to use 7-Zip for data exfiltration, often by renaming the executable to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data archiving and exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further system exploitation.
The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Enterprise. The detection monitors GitHub Enterprise audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.
This rule detects the execution of 'tar.exe' with command-line arguments indicative of creating a compressed archive. Specifically, it looks for the '-c' (create), '-r' (append or update), or '-u' (update) flags. This activity is often associated with adversaries compressing data before exfiltration.
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