Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects anomalous AI-assisted activity where multiple processes (specifically AI developer tools) appear to be chaining operations by writing to and reading from shared local directories (e.g., 'handoff', 'artifacts') followed by network requests to known AI service APIs. This pattern may indicate automated task chaining or unauthorized exfiltration of context/code to AI platforms.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
This rule detects network activity involving specific domain names (e.g., velvet-otter-glagceis.life) or HTTP request patterns associated with malicious JavaScript or trackers, which may indicate C2 communication or malicious script loading.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources (File Events, Certificate Info, Network Events, and DNS Events) to detect known malicious indicators, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs associated with malicious activity.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for known indicators of compromise associated with the Casbaneiro/Ousaban banking trojan. It identifies activity across network connections (IPs and domain patterns), DNS queries for specific C2 domains, and the presence or execution of known malicious file hashes (e.g., PDF lures, HTA, AutoIt scripts, and payload binaries).
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
Detects high-frequency DNS NXDOMAIN responses for domains exhibiting patterns indicative of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA), specifically fixed-length, high-entropy character strings. This behavior is commonly associated with botnets attempting to locate command and control infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries attempting to resolve domains associated with malicious LLM-as-a-service platforms, specifically targeting domains containing 'wormgpt', 'fraudgpt', or 'evilgpt'. These platforms are often used by adversaries to facilitate automated social engineering, malware development, or other malicious activities.
This rule detects network activity associated with the DarkMe RAT, specifically targeting outbound TCP connections or DNS resolutions involving known C2 domains by the rundll32.exe process. This activity is indicative of the malware's post-injection C2 registration and beaconing.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell, CMD, or PWSH command execution characterized by obfuscation techniques (such as Base64 encoding, decompression, or hidden command arguments) that are followed closely in time by network connections to public AI service domains (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Generative Language, Mistral, Cohere). The detection correlates process-start events with outbound network requests from processes other than standard web browsers, suggesting potentially unauthorized use of AI APIs for exfiltration or automated processing of command results.
This rule detects potential command and control or malicious file staging activity by correlating DNS TXT record queries (often used for data exfiltration or staging configuration) performed by common system utilities (nslookup, PowerShell) with the subsequent execution of files from suspicious directories (Downloads, Temp) within a 30-minute window on the same device.
IOC hunt across DNS, network, and file-hash telemetry for the Ledger Google Ads phishing campaign. Vercel redirect domains are matched by exact hostname (DNS query name / parsed URL host) rather than substring, eliminating false positives from unrelated strings that merely contain a look-alike domain fragment. GCS bucket and Google Sites path IOCs remain substring-matched since the bucket IDs and page slugs are already highly specific.
This rule detects potentially malicious Command and Control (C2) traffic utilizing DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to interact with public resolvers like Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. It identifies both high-frequency, repeated direct-to-resolver TLS sessions and specific HTTP requests to these resolvers that resolve domains associated with known C2 infrastructure, such as the ClickFix campaign.
This rule detects potentially malicious Command and Control (C2) traffic utilizing DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to interact with public resolvers like Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. It identifies both high-frequency, repeated direct-to-resolver TLS sessions and specific HTTP requests to these resolvers that resolve domains associated with known C2 infrastructure, such as the ClickFix campaign.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
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