Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This detection identifies potentially algorithmically generated domains (DGA) observed in Trend IA XDR telemetry. DGA domains are commonly used by malware families for Command and Control (C2) communications because they generate large numbers of pseudo-random domain names, making blocking and takedown efforts more difficult.
The detection focuses on domains that:
Have a moderate length (8-20 characters)
Contain numbers, which are common in many DGAs
Use frequently abused TLDs
Have low occurrence volume across the environment
Follow a simplified lexical pattern often associated with generated domains
The detection focuses on domains that:
Have a moderate length (8-20 characters)
Contain numbers, which are common in many DGAs
Use frequently abused TLDs
Have low occurrence volume across the environment
Follow a simplified lexical pattern often associated with generated domains
Detects endpoint network connections and correlates multi-stage communications associated with the ClickFix browser cache smuggling campaign, including initial payload retrieval and secondary stage/C2 communication across devices.
Detects DNS requests to major generative AI and Large Language Model API endpoints (such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Mistral, Groq, DeepSeek, and others) initiated by processes other than standard web browsers (e.g., chrome, msedge, firefox, safari). This behavior may indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, shadow AI usage, or automated tooling/scripts interacting with LLM APIs.
Detects outbound network connections from processes targeting a known hard-coded Potassium campaign C2 IP address (134.199.154.64), followed by fallback DNS resolver queries using standard public DNS servers by the same process.
Detects sandbox or training hosts performing DNS resolution followed shortly by outbound connections to public IP addresses on ports 80 or 443, which may indicate a firewall misconfiguration or unauthorized egress from isolated environments.
Detects execution of Node.js or Bun from a temporary directory performing DNS queries for public Ethereum JSON-RPC provider domains, a technique observed in supply chain compromise payloads such as Shai-Hulud and ChainDrop to resolve command and control endpoints.
Detects DNS queries to definitionupdates.microsoft.com or the go.microsoft.com fwlink redirect used for WD update downloads, when the querying process is not a Windows system component. BlueHammer utilizes these definition updates as part of its exploit chain.
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
Detects suspicious DNS queries to external service interaction domains often used for out-of-band interactions after successful RCE
Detects algorithmically generated domain names at the resolver. Malware families
using a DGA cycle through many candidate domains to find their live controller, so
the resolver sees a burst of long, random-looking names, most of which fail to
resolve.
Resolver-level visibility covers every device that uses the resolver, including
those with no endpoint agent — appliances, IoT and unmanaged hosts.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and len(query) > 30
| groupby srcip, query, recordtype, responsecode
using a DGA cycle through many candidate domains to find their live controller, so
the resolver sees a burst of long, random-looking names, most of which fail to
resolve.
Resolver-level visibility covers every device that uses the resolver, including
those with no endpoint agent — appliances, IoT and unmanaged hosts.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and len(query) > 30
| groupby srcip, query, recordtype, responsecode
Detects a host generating an unusual rate of failed DNS resolutions. A high NXDOMAIN
rate is the signature of a client searching for something that mostly does not exist
— DGA malware hunting for its live controller, or tooling enumerating subdomains.
This complements the DGA detection: entropy catches the shape of the names, NXDOMAIN
rate catches the behaviour regardless of how the names look.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(responsecode) like '%nxdomain%'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
rate is the signature of a client searching for something that mostly does not exist
— DGA malware hunting for its live controller, or tooling enumerating subdomains.
This complements the DGA detection: entropy catches the shape of the names, NXDOMAIN
rate catches the behaviour regardless of how the names look.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(responsecode) like '%nxdomain%'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
Detects one internal host repeatedly triggering DNS threat blocks. A single block is
routine background noise; the same host blocked repeatedly means something on it
keeps trying to reach hostile infrastructure, which indicates a persistent infection
rather than a passing click.
The block itself is not reassuring: it tells you the host is compromised, only that
this particular channel failed.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='THREAT_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
routine background noise; the same host blocked repeatedly means something on it
keeps trying to reach hostile infrastructure, which indicates a persistent infection
rather than a passing click.
The block itself is not reassuring: it tells you the host is compromised, only that
this particular channel failed.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='THREAT_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
IOC sweep for P7 DarkSword / Coruna: known file hashes, C2/exploit-host IPs, domains and URLs against Defender device file and network events. Tightened to public IPs, connection action types, exact hosts/subdomains and path-qualified URLs; the shared AWS IP is only matched with its C2 port.
Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
The following analytic detects a process located in a potentially suspicious location making DNS queries to known URL shortening services, specifically tinyurl.
URL shorteners are frequently used by threat actors to obfuscate malicious destinations, including phishing pages, malware distribution sites, or command-and-control (C2) endpoints.
While tinyurl.com is a legitimate service, its use in enterprise environments—particularly by non-browser processes or scripts—should be considered suspicious, especially if correlated with subsequent outbound connections, file downloads, process file path or credential prompts. Analysts should investigate the source process, execution context, and destination domain to determine intent and risk.
URL shorteners are frequently used by threat actors to obfuscate malicious destinations, including phishing pages, malware distribution sites, or command-and-control (C2) endpoints.
While tinyurl.com is a legitimate service, its use in enterprise environments—particularly by non-browser processes or scripts—should be considered suspicious, especially if correlated with subsequent outbound connections, file downloads, process file path or credential prompts. Analysts should investigate the source process, execution context, and destination domain to determine intent and risk.
The following analytic detects the execution of a DNS query by a process to the associated Telegram API domain, which could indicate access via a Telegram bot commonly used by malware for command and control (C2) communications. By monitoring DNS queries related to Telegram's infrastructure, the detection identifies potential attempts to establish covert communication channels between a compromised system and external malicious actors. This behavior is often observed in cyberattacks where Telegram bots are used to receive commands or exfiltrate data, making it a key indicator of suspicious or malicious activity within a network.
Detects DNS tunnelling, where data is encoded into queries and answers against a
domain the attacker controls. TXT records carry the most payload per query, so a
high volume of TXT lookups beneath one parent domain is the characteristic shape.
Tunnelling is slow, which means it is usually evidence of a long-running compromise
rather than a recent one.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(recordtype) = 'txt'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
domain the attacker controls. TXT records carry the most payload per query, so a
high volume of TXT lookups beneath one parent domain is the characteristic shape.
Tunnelling is slow, which means it is usually evidence of a long-running compromise
rather than a recent one.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(recordtype) = 'txt'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
Detects a DHCP-driven DNS update for a hostname not present in the asset inventory.
Dynamic DNS registration lets a device choose the name under which it is reachable,
and an attacker can use that to impersonate a service or make a rogue host appear
legitimate to anything resolving by name.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP'
and action in ('DNS_UPDATE_REQUEST', 'DNS_UPDATED')
| groupby macaddress, srcip, user, resultcode
Dynamic DNS registration lets a device choose the name under which it is reachable,
and an attacker can use that to impersonate a service or make a rogue host appear
legitimate to anything resolving by name.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP'
and action in ('DNS_UPDATE_REQUEST', 'DNS_UPDATED')
| groupby macaddress, srcip, user, resultcode
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
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