Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network communication (DNS queries and TLS connections) to known actor-controlled Slack workspace subdomains, as well as the presence of a specific hardcoded public key in Slack API traffic, suggesting the use of Slack as a Command and Control (C2) channel.
Detects anomalous DNS queries with high-entropy or encoded labels that exceed 40 characters in size, potentially indicating DNS tunneling used for Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects process execution patterns and DNS requests associated with the GHAPPIER malware staging infrastructure. The rule monitors for specific command-line arguments involving known malicious scripts, temporary files, and deployment infrastructure (e.g., Vercel) often used for delivering or executing malicious payloads via node.js environments.
Detects network activity associated with NetSupport Manager remote access software, specifically targeting DNS lookups, TLS SNI connections, and direct TCP beaconing to a known-malicious infrastructure IP. This rule is designed to identify unauthorized use of legitimate remote support tools for command and control purposes.
Detects instances where the system DNS process (dns.exe) on a domain controller performs recursive DNS resolution towards a set of external IP addresses associated with suspicious infrastructure (AS202412). The rule correlates this activity with recent network connections from common web browsers or system utilities (msedge.exe, svchost.exe) on the same host to identify potential proxying of malicious DNS queries.
Detects instances where the system DNS process (dns.exe) on a domain controller performs recursive DNS resolution towards a set of external IP addresses associated with suspicious infrastructure (AS202412). The rule correlates this activity with recent network connections from common web browsers or system utilities (msedge.exe, svchost.exe) on the same host to identify potential proxying of malicious DNS queries.
Detects DNS queries for randomized subdomains (8-12 character alphanumeric labels) prepended to specific thematic .de parent domains. This pattern is characteristic of phishing infrastructure rotation and device-code phishing campaigns where adversaries dynamically generate domains to evade detection.
Detects DNS queries indicative of OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) infrastructure usage by the LucidPawn dropper, specifically targeting domains associated with dnslog.ink and digimg.store. This pattern suggests potential beaconing or exfiltration attempts.
Detects DNS queries indicative of OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) infrastructure usage by the LucidPawn dropper, specifically targeting domains associated with dnslog.ink and digimg.store. This pattern suggests potential beaconing or exfiltration attempts.
Detects DNS queries indicative of OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) infrastructure usage by the LucidPawn dropper, specifically targeting domains associated with dnslog.ink and digimg.store. This pattern suggests potential beaconing or exfiltration attempts.
Detection of known Cloudflare Workers subdomains used as dead-drop resolvers for C2 communication by the QUICSILVER QUICAgent malware. The rule monitors for specific DNS queries to resolve these domains and subsequent HTTP GET requests used to retrieve C2 instructions.
This rule identifies potential malicious activity by detecting the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256 and MD5) on endpoints and monitoring for DNS queries or network connections to a known malicious staging domain (yapw.life). The detection correlates file execution, file activity, and network communication to identify stages of an attack such as malware installation or C2 communication.
Detects network activity associated with a VBScript-based dropper attempting to retrieve payloads from known malicious infrastructure (cdn.imageurlgenerator.com) or abusing legitimate file hosting services (filemail.com) to bypass traditional security filters.
Detects network activity associated with the GhostCode phishing kit, including HTTP requests to specific access-prefixed subdomains and DNS lookups for those domains. Additionally, it detects HTTP responses containing specific spoofed browser tab titles often used in these phishing campaigns.
Detects network requests (DNS queries or HTTP requests) to a predefined list of lookalike domains associated with the JWR phishing kit. These domains are designed to impersonate legitimate transport (LTA, OneMotoring, ERP) or courier/postal brands (Ninja Van, SingPost, Emirates Post) to deliver malicious payloads or credential harvesting pages.
This rule detects DNS lookups, email URL clicks, and network connections involving lookalike domains that mimic Singaporean government or infrastructure services (e.g., LTA, OneMotoring, ERP, Gov.sg). It employs a regex-based pattern match for common brand-keywords combined with high-risk top-level domains, identifying potential phishing activity associated with the JWR framework that utilizes algorithmically varied, single-suffix rotated lookalike domains.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
This rule monitors for network DNS queries containing keywords commonly associated with credential harvesting and identity verification lures, such as 'sso', 'mfa', 'passkey', or 'helpdesk'. It detects attempts to reach suspicious domains that may be used in phishing campaigns targeting corporate identity portals.
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