Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network activity (DNS, HTTP, and direct IP connections) associated with known command-and-control infrastructure shared by SpiceRAT, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT malware, identified as part of the SilkParasite campaign.
Detects DNS queries to known malicious subdomains and direct TCP connections to an IP address associated with the SilkParasite, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT malware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with identified C2 infrastructure hosts and legacy domain registration points.
Detects outbound network requests from endpoints to known 'uncensored' or jailbroken LLM-as-a-Service domains (e.g., WormGPT, FraudGPT). These platforms are specifically marketed to threat actors for illicit purposes like generating malware, phishing kits, or exploit code, and identifying access to them serves as a leading indicator of adversarial activity.
Detects outbound network requests from endpoints to known 'uncensored' or jailbroken LLM-as-a-Service domains (e.g., WormGPT, FraudGPT). These platforms are specifically marketed to threat actors for illicit purposes like generating malware, phishing kits, or exploit code, and identifying access to them serves as a leading indicator of adversarial activity.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries directed towards specific malicious domains or domains matching a pattern hosted on pages.dev, a service frequently abused for hosting malicious infrastructure such as phishing pages or command-and-control beacons.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents and DnsEvents for connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses associated with phishing campaigns. It alerts on any network communication or DNS resolution attempt targeting these indicators, providing visibility into potential user interaction with phishing infrastructure.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents and DnsEvents for any network connection attempts or DNS queries directed towards the known malicious domain 'hyundaiservisiankara.com'. This pattern is indicative of a host attempting to communicate with an external C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
Detects DNS queries for domains resolving to specific Cloudflare nameserver pairs associated with the Exvicy malware distribution framework. The rule monitors for NS records pointing to 'randy.ns.cloudflare.com' and 'stevie.ns.cloudflare.com', optionally filtering by domains containing keywords commonly used in Exvicy-themed phishing or C2 infrastructure.
Detects anomalous DNS traffic patterns indicative of command-and-control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. The rule identifies suspicious queries containing long, high-entropy subdomain labels that suggest payload encoding, as well as the use of TXT records for unauthorized data transmission.
Detects anomalous DNS traffic patterns indicative of DNS tunneling, which is often used for command-and-control (C2) communication or data exfiltration. The rule identifies suspicious indicators such as abnormally long subdomain labels (potentially containing encoded payloads), misuse of TXT or NULL record types for data transport, and high-frequency queries to a single apex domain, while excluding common CDN providers to reduce false positives.
Detection of network traffic associated with VelvetCake (Konni) malware, identifying communication with known hardcoded C2 infrastructure, domain lookups, and exfiltration attempts via HTTP/TLS and raw TCP protocols.
Detection of network traffic associated with VelvetCake (Konni) malware, identifying communication with known hardcoded C2 infrastructure, domain lookups, and exfiltration attempts via HTTP/TLS and raw TCP protocols.
Detects network activity (TCP, DNS, TLS, HTTP) associated with the UNC6240 threat actor's infrastructure, specifically targeting communications with known malicious IP addresses and domains used in a campaign leveraging PeopleSoft-related lures.
Detects network activity (TCP, DNS, TLS, HTTP) associated with the UNC6240 threat actor's infrastructure, specifically targeting communications with known malicious IP addresses and domains used in a campaign leveraging PeopleSoft-related lures.
This rule detects network connections or DNS requests to domains specifically structured to impersonate MFA registration, passkey setup, or SSO login pages. These domain patterns are commonly associated with phishing campaigns intended to harvest credentials, session tokens, or bypass multi-factor authentication (AiTM phishing).
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to known infrastructure domains associated with the threat group UTA0565. It acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep to identify internal systems attempting to communicate with malicious command-and-control (C2) servers identified by typosquatting and registration-pattern analysis.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to known infrastructure domains associated with the threat group UTA0565. It acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep to identify internal systems attempting to communicate with malicious command-and-control (C2) servers identified by typosquatting and registration-pattern analysis.
This rule detects internal network activity (DNS queries, network connections, and security logs) communicating with domains associated with the GhostCode phishing kit. These domains are typically used to host credential harvesting pages or phishing infrastructure.
Detects outbound network traffic, including DNS lookups, TLS connections, and HTTP requests, directed towards IPRoyal or LightningProxies. These services are commonly used as residential or datacenter proxies and may be leveraged by adversaries for command-and-control (C2) communication, including traffic tunneling for services like Telegram.
Detects DNS queries for randomized subdomains (8-12 character alphanumeric labels) prepended to specific thematic .de parent domains. This pattern is characteristic of phishing infrastructure rotation and device-code phishing campaigns where adversaries dynamically generate domains to evade detection.
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