Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
Detects DNS lookup queries and HTTP POST beaconing attempts directed at known Sauron Loader C2 fallback infrastructure. The rule tracks specific domains associated with the malware's encrypted registration and command-and-control behavior.
Detects DNS lookup queries and HTTP POST beaconing attempts directed at known Sauron Loader C2 fallback infrastructure. The rule tracks specific domains associated with the malware's encrypted registration and command-and-control behavior.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards known domain names associated with the Sauron Loader command-and-control infrastructure. This rule identifies outbound communication attempts using hardcoded beaconing domains.
This rule detects network and email activity associated with a list of known suspicious or 'ghost' domains. It monitors email sender and recipient addresses, email URL links, and DNS query logs for matches against the predefined domain list, identifying potential spearphishing or command-and-control communication.
Detects endpoint DNS resolution for the 'mysignins.microsoft.com' domain. This domain is frequently used in Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks to facilitate user interaction with legitimate Microsoft portals while the attacker intercepts session tokens.
Detects network communication associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan, specifically identifying DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the SilkParasite actor's NodeEdgeRAT malware, including DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to the identified command-and-control infrastructure 'hoster-kg.com'.
This rule detects DNS queries for domains associated with the SilkParasite campaign, which leverages typosquatting to impersonate Central Asian government, energy, and telecommunications entities for potential malicious activity.
Detects network traffic and DNS queries associated with the SilkParasite command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. This rule monitors for established RDP-over-TLS connections using non-standard, high-numbered ports and identifies associated DNS lookups for known C2 hostnames.
This rule detects activities associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware family by monitoring for known malicious file hashes on endpoints and network communication with domains linked to its command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
Detects Python processes (python.exe, python3.exe, pythonw.exe) performing DNS resolution for Microsoft identity, device login, or Graph API endpoints. This activity is consistent with automated tooling, such as python-requests, performing device-code flow polling or API token authentication within an environment.
Detects the Microsoft Edge browser executable running from an anomalous path (C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\) or exhibiting suspicious network behavior (to a known malicious domain 'deadhub.org' or IP address '193.23.118.155'). This behavior is indicative of a masquerading attempt to hide malicious activity by mimicking a trusted browser binary.
This rule set detects network communication patterns associated with the AnonyMousKIT phishing kit, specifically targeting the exfiltration of captured user credentials to the Telegram Bot API and communication with known phishing panel infrastructure. It monitors for DNS lookups of 'anomkit.shop', established TCP connections to the associated backend relay, and HTTP requests containing specific credential-related keywords directed towards the Telegram API.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries directed towards specific malicious domains or domains matching a pattern hosted on pages.dev, a service frequently abused for hosting malicious infrastructure such as phishing pages or command-and-control beacons.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries directed towards specific malicious domains or domains matching a pattern hosted on pages.dev, a service frequently abused for hosting malicious infrastructure such as phishing pages or command-and-control beacons.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents and DnsEvents for connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses associated with phishing campaigns. It alerts on any network communication or DNS resolution attempt targeting these indicators, providing visibility into potential user interaction with phishing infrastructure.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents and DnsEvents for connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses associated with phishing campaigns. It alerts on any network communication or DNS resolution attempt targeting these indicators, providing visibility into potential user interaction with phishing infrastructure.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents and DnsEvents for connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses associated with phishing campaigns. It alerts on any network communication or DNS resolution attempt targeting these indicators, providing visibility into potential user interaction with phishing infrastructure.
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