Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header requests to known phishing domains mimicking Passkey or Single Sign-On (SSO) authentication services. These domains attempt to deceive users into providing credentials or performing unauthorized authentication actions.
Detects DNS queries and HTTP Host header traffic to known SilverFox malware impersonation domains. These domains utilize .com.cn TLDs and typosquatting techniques to masquerade as legitimate software or service providers.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known typosquatted and malicious domains associated with the SilverFox campaign. These domains impersonate legitimate software (e.g., SteelSeries GG, Bcut, DeepSeek) to lure users into downloading malware via SEO poisoning and deceptive downloads.
Detects network activity associated with the QUICAgent backdoor, including QUIC C2 traffic using a self-signed 'RAT System' certificate, direct connections to a known C2 IP address (104.64.211.22), and DNS queries for the hardcoded C2 domain 'register.mediumser.com'.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
Detects network communication with domains and IP addresses known to be associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (specifically those masquerading as legitimate HBO Max or macOS related updates). The rule applies a strict correlation between observed malicious IP traffic and specific DNS requests to reduce noise from IP address reuse or threat intelligence feed probes, while also excluding known security-related processes.
Detects high-volume DNS queries for subdomains of 'twilio.com' originating from a single source IP within a short 5-minute window, indicative of subdomain enumeration or reconnaissance.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the cdnsuicaches[.]com domain. The rules identify the initial DNS query, the subsequent TLS SNI connection, and the retrieval of malicious JavaScript containing the 'cookie-captcha-complete' overlay signature. This behavior is indicative of a browser-based social engineering attack.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the cdnsuicaches[.]com domain. The rules identify the initial DNS query, the subsequent TLS SNI connection, and the retrieval of malicious JavaScript containing the 'cookie-captcha-complete' overlay signature. This behavior is indicative of a browser-based social engineering attack.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for known indicators of compromise associated with the Casbaneiro/Ousaban banking trojan. It identifies activity across network connections (IPs and domain patterns), DNS queries for specific C2 domains, and the presence or execution of known malicious file hashes (e.g., PDF lures, HTA, AutoIt scripts, and payload binaries).
Detects network connections or DNS queries to known suspicious domains associated with command and control infrastructure.
This rule detects internal network activity (DNS queries, network connections, and security logs) communicating with domains associated with the GhostCode phishing kit. These domains are typically used to host credential harvesting pages or phishing infrastructure.
Detects anomalous DNS traffic patterns indicative of command-and-control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. The rule identifies suspicious queries containing long, high-entropy subdomain labels that suggest payload encoding, as well as the use of TXT records for unauthorized data transmission.
Detects potential DNS tunneling or Command and Control (C2) communication patterns. The rule calculates subdomain entropy to identify unusually long or randomized subdomain labels, monitors for excessive DNS query volume per client, and flags the use of specific record types (TXT, NULL) often associated with C2 frameworks like dnscat2 or iodine.
This rule identifies potential DNS tunneling activity (often used for C2 or data exfiltration) by analyzing DNS queries for anomalous patterns. It looks for high-entropy or excessively long subdomain labels, frequent use of suspicious record types like TXT or NULL, and high query volume to a single parent domain with low diversity in resolved IP addresses.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling activity used for Command and Control (C2). It monitors DNS query traffic for indicators such as excessively long or high-entropy subdomain labels, the use of specific record types often used in tunneling (TXT and NULL records), and high volumes of DNS requests to a single parent domain from a specific host within a 10-minute window.
Detects instances where the system DNS process (dns.exe) on a domain controller performs recursive DNS resolution towards a set of external IP addresses associated with suspicious infrastructure (AS202412). The rule correlates this activity with recent network connections from common web browsers or system utilities (msedge.exe, svchost.exe) on the same host to identify potential proxying of malicious DNS queries.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
This rule detects two suspicious indicators related to SloppyRAT activity: an outbound network connection using the legacy Finger protocol (TCP port 79), which can be abused by binaries like 'finger.exe' for payload staging, and DNS queries resolving to the known SloppyRAT staging domain 'finger.linked4x.com'.
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