Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
Detects DNS lookups and subsequent HTTP requests to known domains associated with the Exvicy pop-under/loader malware. These domains are identified as malicious lures often used to initiate payload downloads.
Detects network indicators associated with the Exvicy ClickFix campaign, including HTTP callbacks to embed endpoints, DNS queries for the 'cloudflare-check.net' domain, direct connections to the identified C2 IP address (94.26.90.126), and HTTP responses containing fake 'Security Check' iframe content.
Detects interaction with known infrastructure associated with the PREY-0058 campaign, which utilizes Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing lures mimicking passkey or MFA registration pages to target Microsoft 365 and other SaaS applications.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to known infrastructure domains associated with the threat group UTA0565. It acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep to identify internal systems attempting to communicate with malicious command-and-control (C2) servers identified by typosquatting and registration-pattern analysis.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects network and DNS activity associated with the SideCopy threat group, specifically monitoring for connections to known C2 domains, C2 IP addresses, or the usage of port 5863 typically associated with the ReverseRAT backdoor.
This rule identifies potential malicious activity by detecting the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256 and MD5) on endpoints and monitoring for DNS queries or network connections to a known malicious staging domain (yapw.life). The detection correlates file execution, file activity, and network communication to identify stages of an attack such as malware installation or C2 communication.
This rule identifies potential malicious activity by detecting the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256 and MD5) on endpoints and monitoring for DNS queries or network connections to a known malicious staging domain (yapw.life). The detection correlates file execution, file activity, and network communication to identify stages of an attack such as malware installation or C2 communication.
This rule identifies potential malicious activity by detecting the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256 and MD5) on endpoints and monitoring for DNS queries or network connections to a known malicious staging domain (yapw.life). The detection correlates file execution, file activity, and network communication to identify stages of an attack such as malware installation or C2 communication.
This rule identifies potential malicious activity by detecting the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256 and MD5) on endpoints and monitoring for DNS queries or network connections to a known malicious staging domain (yapw.life). The detection correlates file execution, file activity, and network communication to identify stages of an attack such as malware installation or C2 communication.
Detects DNS resolutions of known SpiceRAT command-and-control hostnames to multiple distinct C2 IP addresses within a 30-day window. This behavior is consistent with automated C2 infrastructure rotation or the use of multiple redundant IP addresses for persistence.
Detects DNS queries and established TLS connections to free.pinggy.io, a service often used to establish unauthorized reverse tunnels to internal networks, bypassing perimeter security controls.
Detects network communication associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan, specifically identifying DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for known indicators of compromise associated with the Casbaneiro/Ousaban banking trojan. It identifies activity across network connections (IPs and domain patterns), DNS queries for specific C2 domains, and the presence or execution of known malicious file hashes (e.g., PDF lures, HTA, AutoIt scripts, and payload binaries).
Detects network traffic (DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS SNI) directed towards the domain 'htlwub00klocate.blogspot.com', which is associated with adversary staging activity.
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
HBO Max ClickFix attacks IOC Hunt
Cortex XDR
Detects network activity (DNS queries or direct IP communication) associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks targeting users under the guise of an HBO Max update or repair utility. The rule includes indicators for known malicious domains and IP addresses while incorporating filters to minimize false positives from security scanners, threat intel feeds, and automated crawlers by analyzing User-Agent strings and network source addresses.
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