Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,605 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
495
433
214
119
105
Contributors
403
350
248
92
65
Categories
20,427
11,813
5,871
5,145
4,864
1,605
Platforms
860
775
236
213
66
Products / Services
469
348
348
319
208
MITRE Techniques
726
541
453
167
163
CVEs
6
5
2
2
2
IDS Classtypes
235
83
34
19
18
IDS Protocols
283
56
51
16
12
Detects periodic heartbeat beaconing activity to the domain 'tt.yeyoujs.com' over both encrypted TLS (SNI observation on port 9443) and DNS queries. This pattern is indicative of a command-and-control (C2) channel establishing or maintaining persistence.
This rule detects network traffic (DNS, TLS, HTTP, and TCP) originating from internal assets to known infrastructure associated with the QTFY proxy botnet/C2 framework. It identifies communication with specific C2 domains, proxy management systems, and associated malicious IP ranges.
Detects network activity (DNS lookups, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with proxy infrastructure (iproyal.com and lightningproxies.net) known to be used by the HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK threat actors to mask Telegram-based command and control traffic.
Detects network activity (DNS lookups, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with proxy infrastructure (iproyal.com and lightningproxies.net) known to be used by the HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK threat actors to mask Telegram-based command and control traffic.
Detects network activity associated with the KREMLIN browser extension communicating with a known command and control domain (luizestrelhashapr.online). The rule monitors DNS queries, TLS SNI connections, and HTTP WebSocket upgrade requests to identify potential C2 communication.
Detects network activity associated with the KREMLIN browser extension communicating with a known command and control domain (luizestrelhashapr.online). The rule monitors DNS queries, TLS SNI connections, and HTTP WebSocket upgrade requests to identify potential C2 communication.
This rule detects DNS queries or network connections originating from endpoints to a list of known malicious domains associated with various malware families (ClearFake, IClickFix, AMOS, Vidar, etc.). This helps identify potential C2 communication, malicious payload delivery, or infrastructure interaction.
This rule detects DNS queries and network connections to a curated list of domains identified as malicious. It correlates events from DNS logs and device network logs to identify potential command-and-control (C2) or malicious infrastructure interaction.
This rule monitors DNS and email traffic for domains ending in .shop that fuzzy-match against a predefined watchlist of corporate brand names. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns, brand impersonation, or typosquatting, where attackers use similar-looking domains to lure users into revealing sensitive information or credentials.
This rule monitors DNS and email traffic for domains ending in .shop that fuzzy-match against a predefined watchlist of corporate brand names. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns, brand impersonation, or typosquatting, where attackers use similar-looking domains to lure users into revealing sensitive information or credentials.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and email activity to identify communication or references to a set of known malicious domains associated with threat activity. It consolidates logs from device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry (URLs and sender domains) to detect potential compromise or phishing attempts.
Detects anomalous DNS activity characterized by either unauthorized DNS zone transfer (AXFR/IXFR) requests or aggressive subdomain enumeration patterns from external IP addresses. This rule monitors for high volumes of non-standard DNS queries or distinct subdomain lookups within a 15-minute window, which are common precursors to reconnaissance activities.
Detects network activity and email headers associated with the DoppelBrand campaign. The rule monitors DNS queries for specific IOC domains (service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) and inspects SMTP traffic for malicious MAIL FROM addresses and Reply-To headers targeting these domains.
Detects network activity and email headers associated with the DoppelBrand campaign. The rule monitors DNS queries for specific IOC domains (service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) and inspects SMTP traffic for malicious MAIL FROM addresses and Reply-To headers targeting these domains.
Detects DNS queries for 'd.clash-verge-upgrade.com', a domain identified as a Command and Control (C2) fallback transport mechanism for the ProRAM malware.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards domains identified as part of Storm-3121/Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These domains are themed around passkey management and single sign-on (SSO) services, likely intended for credential harvesting.
Detects outbound network connections to 'registry.npmjs.org' originating from 'node' or 'bun' processes. This behavior may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data, interact with malicious packages, or perform credential harvesting via npm tokens during execution.
Detects specific DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) requests made to Google resolvers containing suspicious domain patterns associated with potential C2 infrastructure (QuietRacket). This includes both the identification of the DoH API call for a specific TXT record and the preceding TLS session initiation to the DoH provider.
Detects DNS queries for 'd.clash-verge-upgrade.com', a domain identified as a Command and Control (C2) fallback transport mechanism for the ProRAM malware.
Detects network, HTTP, and DNS activity associated with the known three-tier delivery infrastructure (phishing sites, relay/dispatcher servers, and payload hosts) used by the threat actor UNC6671/SilverFox/Aurora. The rule distinguishes between high-confidence confirmed connections and low-confidence DNS-only events.
Detects network, HTTP, and DNS activity associated with the known three-tier delivery infrastructure (phishing sites, relay/dispatcher servers, and payload hosts) used by the threat actor UNC6671/SilverFox/Aurora. The rule distinguishes between high-confidence confirmed connections and low-confidence DNS-only events.
Page 31 of 77