Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known phishing domains (typosquatted Microsoft login domains), DeadDrop Resolver domains, and suspicious HTML payloads served from common CDN/package hosting sites (e.g., unpkg.com, npmmirror.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, yarnpkg.com). These patterns are indicative of initial access attempts via phishing or the secondary stage of malware C2 communication.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where a process attempts to communicate over DNS over HTTPS (DoH) using common public resolvers (e.g., Google DNS) while simultaneously establishing persistence via Windows Registry 'Run' keys. It excludes common, legitimate applications known to use DoH, focusing on unexpected processes. The detection relies on correlating network events (DoH to known public resolvers) with registry modification events occurring within a 30-minute window of the network activity.
This rule identifies potential command and control (C2) activity by correlating DNS over HTTPS (DoH) requests initiated by non-browser or unsigned processes with subsequent network connections to a known malicious C2 domain (gw.proxyvector.cc) within a 15-minute window.
This rule identifies potential command and control (C2) activity by correlating DNS over HTTPS (DoH) requests initiated by non-browser or unsigned processes with subsequent network connections to a known malicious C2 domain (gw.proxyvector.cc) within a 15-minute window.
This rule detects DNS requests to common cloud-based infrastructure providers often used by adversaries for Command and Control (C2) operations, including AWS API Gateway, Azure App Service, Google Cloud Functions, and Cloudflare Workers. These domains are frequently leveraged to host redirectors, beaconing infrastructure, or malicious payloads.
This rule monitors DNS queries and network connection events for interactions with a list of domains associated with the Kali365 infrastructure. It flags activity by identifying both direct matches and subdomains associated with 'ssengineers.com' and 'clientengagenow.de', often used in phishing or C2 communications.
Detects DNS queries for a publicly enumerated subset of domains linked to
AnonyMousKIT by the cited research. The source condenses larger domain lists, so
this rule does not represent complete campaign-infrastructure coverage. A DNS
query records an observable lookup and does not prove that a network connection,
page load, or credential submission followed.
AnonyMousKIT by the cited research. The source condenses larger domain lists, so
this rule does not represent complete campaign-infrastructure coverage. A DNS
query records an observable lookup and does not prove that a network connection,
page load, or credential submission followed.
High-Entropy Subdomain AAAA Queries
Cortex XDR
Detects DNS queries using IPv6 (AAAA) records that contain high-entropy, long subdomain strings, which are indicative of DNS tunneling techniques. The rule specifically targets patterns similar to the HOLLOWGRAPH malware, which encodes data within subdomain labels to facilitate C2 communication.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) directed towards domains ending in the .vu Top-Level Domain (TLD). This is associated with NovaCookies phishing infrastructure which utilizes these TLDs for malicious redirection or staging.
Detects network connections, DNS resolutions, or TLS SNI values matching known TWINLOOT command-and-control infrastructure, including the attacker-registered domains sharepointx.th2ch.com and lpi-web.com and the failover IP 193.24.211.221. TWINLOOT is a modular Python implant that hides its C2 inside trusted Microsoft cloud services (Graph API, SharePoint Online, Teams TURN relay) while also relying on dedicated attacker-controlled infrastructure for direct TLS/WebSocket tunneling and failover.
Detects anomalous DNS activity characterized by either unauthorized DNS zone transfer (AXFR/IXFR) requests or aggressive subdomain enumeration patterns from external IP addresses. This rule monitors for high volumes of non-standard DNS queries or distinct subdomain lookups within a 15-minute window, which are common precursors to reconnaissance activities.
Detects network activity (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host) associated with the SynkLoader malware's command-and-control infrastructure using the domain 'dondermicapp.net'.
Detects network traffic associated with the BengalSEO campaign, specifically the retrieval of a rogue Matomo analytics script from 'stats.us3.org' and the presence of a specific Google Tag Manager ID (G-5Y9CZZF6WJ) in file traffic. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain or SEO poisoning attack aiming to track or redirect users.
Detects DNS queries for domains identified as part of the GoCaracal campaign, associated with the threat actor Dark Caracal. These domains are known to be used for the delivery and staging of SVG-based phishing attacks.
Detects DNS resolution and outbound network connection attempts to the hardcoded C2 domain 'aroclenetapp.net' associated with the SynkLoader StreamMaster reverse VNC module. This module is used to exfiltrate screenshots and capture keyboard/mouse input.
Detects DNS queries to Cloudflare Workers subdomains that mimic the QUICAgent beaconing pattern. Adversaries utilize these workers as dead-drop resolvers to retrieve updated C2 instructions or redirection information, effectively blending in with legitimate traffic to the workers.dev domain.
Detects DNS queries containing high-entropy domain labels that exhibit patterns common to Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). The rule triggers when a threshold of such suspicious queries is exceeded from a single source within a 60-second window, which is a common indicator of malware beaconing or C2 communication.
A host repeatedly queries the same DNS domain within a short period, which may indicate automated command-and-control beaconing.
This rule identifies potential DNS tunneling or exfiltration attempts by monitoring for high volumes of DNS queries, a high count of distinct subdomains, or the usage of unusual DNS record types (TXT, NULL) within Zscaler Internet Access logs.
The following analytic detects execution of powershell commands retrieved from a remote DNS TXT query response.
The use of the DNS TXT record for C2 is an uncommon method for malware that is resilient due to the need for DNS in normal networking
activities.
This can ensure that their C2 is not blocked by any firewalls.
The use of the DNS TXT record for C2 is an uncommon method for malware that is resilient due to the need for DNS in normal networking
activities.
This can ensure that their C2 is not blocked by any firewalls.
Detects DNS queries for suspicious subdomains on known Mirage2FA phishing kit domains ('cheacker.store' and 'volatilesour.store'). The rule identifies queries where the subdomain is Base64-encoded and decodes into an email-like format, which is a technique used by this phishing kit to track or validate victim-specific session tokens or email addresses.
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