Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS lookups or network connections from common web browsers to known malicious or suspicious domains (short.gy and chongdaotang.net), which are associated with legal-threat lure phishing campaigns designed for credential harvesting.
Detects DNS queries and network connection attempts to a set of known malicious domains associated with the threat actor UNC1151 (Ghostwriter). This rule monitors both DNS resolutions and direct network connection attempts to these indicators of compromise (IOCs), which are commonly used in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects network activity originating from popular web browsers (Chrome, Chromium, Edge, Brave) directed towards known malicious or suspicious browser extension domains. This rule flags beaconing, API requests, and remote configuration fetches associated with potentially malicious or unwanted browser extensions.
This rule monitors network logs (proxy, DNS, network) for connections to domains associated with the Unistream SDK. This SDK has been identified as a component of the BadBlocker malicious Chrome extension family, which facilitates unauthorized background activity. The rule serves as an indicator of potential command and control (C2) communication from a compromised host.
This rule monitors network logs for potential malicious activity by analyzing subdomain cardinality and identifying known phishing domains. It flags apex domains that exhibit high subdomain rotation (5 or more distinct subdomains within an hour), indicative of fast-flux DNS techniques, or that match a static list of known malicious/phishing infrastructure.
Detects network and DNS activity involving domains known to be used by the threat actor APT28 for command and control, specifically for hosting WebDAV payloads, malicious LNK files, and weaponized documents.
This rule detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication activity by identifying instances of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). It monitors DNS query responses for patterns consisting of 8 to 16 lowercase alphabetic characters followed by common TLDs (com, net, org, ru, cc, su). An alert is triggered if 5 or more unique suspicious domains are queried by the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects abnormally long DNS queries characterized by repetitive alphanumeric patterns, which may indicate potential DNS tunneling activity used for C2 communication or data exfiltration. The rule flags DNS requests exceeding 60 characters with repeating label structures.
This rule detects DNS queries to domains associated with tunneling tools (Ngrok, Tailscale) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (FleetDeck, TacticalRMM, Level.io, Pulseway, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, RustDesk, Atera, Remcos) known to be used by threat actors like Scattered Spider/Muddled Libra for covert persistent connectivity, remote access, and lateral movement. The rule categorizes the detected tools into 'Tunneling' or 'RMM'.
This rule monitors DNS queries and network connections for access to a set of known domain names associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. It correlates data from DNS events, device network logs, and virtual machine network connections to identify potential interactions with malicious phishing sites typically used to capture user credentials or session tokens.
This rule monitors DNS queries and network connections for access to a set of known domain names associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. It correlates data from DNS events, device network logs, and virtual machine network connections to identify potential interactions with malicious phishing sites typically used to capture user credentials or session tokens.
This rule detects anomalous DNS query activity that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. It monitors for three specific indicators: excessive query volume to a single domain family within a short timeframe, the use of abnormally long DNS subdomain labels, and the transmission of TXT record queries from endpoints not acting as designated DNS servers.
Detects explorer.exe making DNS requests to Discord or Telegram, which is anomalous and indicates potential process injection for data exfiltration. This behavior is associated with information stealer malware like Phantom Stealer.
Detects execution patterns associated with the Gamaredon group's spearphishing chains, specifically where PowerShell is invoked by common document or scripting applications (Winword, Excel, mshta, etc.) containing typical downloader flags (IEX, EncodedCommand). Additionally, it monitors for network connections from PowerShell to known dead-drop resolvers (e.g., telegra.ph, cloudflare workers) used by PteroOdd/Kazuar loaders.
Detects DNS resolutions for major AI/LLM provider domains (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic, Google AI) originating from processes that are not common, known browsers or development tools. This behavior is indicative of potentially malicious applications or malware using AI APIs for automated tasks, such as content exfiltration or sophisticated C2 communication.
Detects network activity and DNS queries associated with known TA4922 command-and-control infrastructure, including specific domains and IP addresses. It also employs behavioral analysis to identify beaconing patterns from processes that are not identified as standard web browsers or authorized system/application utilities.
Detects DNS resolution attempts or direct network connections to the domain 'vtps.us', which is associated with TA4922 command and control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects behavior associated with the IronWorm threat, including Tor-based command and control communication by unsigned binaries or Node.js processes, unauthorized DNS resolution of .onion domains, automated npm package management operations by Node.js, and git configuration modifications attempting to impersonate common developer automation identities.
Detects anomalous, high-volume DNS query activity where a process attempts to resolve 20 or more unique domains within a 2-minute window. The query patterns match strings that are 8-20 characters long with common top-level domains, excluding known web browsers and standard network diagnostic utilities. This behavior is indicative of malware using Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) for command and control or secondary communication channels.
Detects malicious activity associated with npm supply chain compromise, including execution of known malicious npm lifecycle scripts, DNS queries to suspected C2 domains, and unauthorized access to sensitive developer credential files (such as .npmrc, .aws/credentials, and SSH keys) by Node.js processes.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with the MetaKit software, including DNS lookups to the 'metakit.fireant.vn' update server and the execution of 'setup.exe' processes spawned by parent processes associated with 'metakit'. This pattern is indicative of potential supply-chain execution or suspicious software update behavior.
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