Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule is meant to help analysts quickly spot a high-confidence indicator related to Google ShinyHunters SaaS Defense Guidance. It is written to be easy to understand and to keep false alarms low by focusing on a very specific match: a DNS lookup to a specific domain mentioned in the report. A match does not automatically prove an attacker is currently active, and it does not prove a file was executed, but it does mean the event is important because it lines up with a public threat intelligence source. When this triggers, start by identifying the host, user, and timeframe involved, then decide whether the activity is expected for that system. If it is unexpected, preserve the related logs and any files, and look for nearby events that could explain how the indicator appeared, such as a download, a new process, or a new connection. If the same indicator appears on multiple systems, treat it as a scoping signal and expand the investigation window. Use the reference link (https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/defense-against-shinyhunters- cybercrime-saas) to document where the indicator came from and to support incident notes and reporting.
Detects DNS queries for domains that match the pattern used by the PLASMAGRID malware's Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA). This malware, delivered by the Coruna iOS exploit kit, uses a DGA seeded with "lazarus" to generate 15-character domains with a ".xyz" TLD for command and control fallback.
Detects network connections to known command-and-control (C2) and distribution domains associated with the Coruna exploit kit campaigns. This includes the domain used in the Ukrainian campaign by UNC6353 and the larger set from the financially motivated UNC6691 group.
COLDRIVER ROBOT chain - DNS lookup for TI delivery/C2 domains
This rule set detects various activities associated with the Dohdoor malware campaign (UAT-10027). It includes detection for known malware hashes, suspicious network communication patterns such as DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to Cloudflare with specific user agents, staging URL patterns, and odd-cased infrastructure domains. Additionally, it identifies endpoint activities like curl downloading batch/command files and DLL sideloading attempts using specific DLL names and LOLBins executed from common public writeable directories. The intent is to provide strong leads for investigation into potential Dohdoor infections.
Detects outbound network traffic or DNS queries to the Yandex Cloud Functions domain (functions.yandexcloud.net). This domain was used as a C2 relay by the 'ambar-src' malicious npm package, indicating potential command and control activity.
This rule is meant to help analysts quickly spot a high-confidence indicator related to Google Residential Proxy Network Disruption. It is written to be easy to understand and to keep false alarms low by focusing on a very specific match: a DNS lookup to a specific domain mentioned in the report. A match does not automatically prove an attacker is currently active, and it does not prove a file was executed, but it does mean the event is important because it lines up with a public threat intelligence source. When this triggers, start by identifying the host, user, and timeframe involved, then decide whether the activity is expected for that system. If it is unexpected, preserve the related logs and any files, and look for nearby events that could explain how the indicator appeared, such as a download, a new process, or a new connection. If the same indicator appears on multiple systems, treat it as a scoping signal and expand the investigation window. Use the reference link (https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/disrupting-largest- residential-proxy-network) to document where the indicator came from and to support incident notes and reporting.
DPRK EtherHiding (UNC5342) - DNS lookup for blockchain explorer APIs (multi-provider)
Detects non-browser processes making DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) queries to Cloudflare's DNS service. This specific behavior is used by the Dohdoor backdoor to resolve its C2 domains while evading traditional DNS monitoring. The rule specifically looks for connections to Cloudflare's DoH service (1.1.1.1 or cloudflare-dns.com on port 443 with the /dns-query path) from processes that are not common web browsers. The fidelity is significantly increased by the optional check for the 'insomnia' User-Agent, which is characteristic of the Dohdoor malware.
This rule detects activity related to the EmEditor watering hole attack, specifically looking for PowerShell execution making requests to known malicious lookalike domains and network connections to the associated infrastructure. A match suggests a potential download of malicious code during what appeared to be a legitimate install or update. Investigation should focus on identifying the host, user, source of activity, and legitimacy of the install source, followed by evidence preservation, credential reset, and a search for follow-up malicious activity.
This rule detects PowerShell commands used to encode data (like hostnames) into hexadecimal strings and exfiltrate it via DNS queries to known Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domains. This technique is used by attackers to bypass egress filtering and confirm system compromise, as seen in the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling or data exfiltration by identifying high volumes of DNS queries with unusually long subdomains from a single process on a device. It aggregates DNS connection inspection events, extracts the subdomain length, and then summarizes the count of queries, unique domains, and average subdomain length within a 10-minute window. An alert is triggered if the query count exceeds 100 or if more than 50 unique domains are observed, combined with subdomain lengths greater than 30 characters.
Detects instances where 'nslookup.exe' is initiated by 'explorer.exe'. This activity can be indicative of an adversary performing DNS queries for reconnaissance or command and control (C2) staging, especially when not part of a legitimate administrative script or user action. The rule excludes a common false positive related to conhost.exe.
This rule detects activity associated with the RenEngine campaign, which utilizes HijackLoader to deliver Lumma Stealer and ACR Stealer. It identifies malicious activity through three main methods: 1) Endpoint detection of known MD5 hashes associated with the malware, 2) Network traffic (proxy/DNS/netflow) to distribution sites used by the campaign, and 3) Network traffic (proxy/DNS/netflow) to known Lumma Stealer C2 domains.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to a list of domains identified as phishing campaign infrastructure. These domains are associated with a 'Signal Phishing Campaign' and are likely used for malicious purposes such as credential harvesting or malware distribution. The rule checks for these domains in `RemoteUrl` or `DestinationHost` fields across various network-related logs.
Detects abuse of uncommon DNS record types for tunneling (CNAME, MX, NULL)
Detects a high count of DNS queries from a single source IP to a specific query name, indicating potential C2 beaconing.
This rule detects the execution of `nslookup` and `findstr` together in a command line, specifically looking for non-private IP addresses. This combination can indicate an adversary attempting to discover remote systems or exfiltrate data by encoding it within DNS queries, often seen in DNS tunneling or data staging activities.
Detects suspicious command lines executed via the Windows Run dialog that combine DNS lookup commands commonly seen in ClickFix-style staging activity.
An expansion of https://detections.ai/rules/019c774e-8cbc-70b0-91d6-3d2fb93c5a00
An expansion of https://detections.ai/rules/019c774e-8cbc-70b0-91d6-3d2fb93c5a00
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-clickfix-attack-abuses-nslookup-to-retrieve-powershell-payload-via-dns/
Detects DNS queries to known OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) domains like oastify.com, oast.pro, and oast.fun where the subdomain is unusually long (over 50 characters). Long subdomains may indicate encoded data exfiltration, a technique observed in the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-1731 to bypass egress filtering.
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