Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections and DNS queries to command-and-control (C2) domains associated with malicious Chrome extensions. These extensions are known to steal sensitive data such as ChatGPT and DeepSeek conversations, as well as other browsing data. The rule specifically targets known malicious domains to identify C2 communication and potential data exfiltration.
SleepyDuck Malware Etherhiding
Cortex XDR
This rule detects network connections to specific RPC addresses and a contract address associated with the SleepyDuck malware's Etherhiding technique. It filters for DNS queries containing known RPC domains and HTTP/network activity containing a specific Ethereum contract address. This indicates potential communication with the malware's command and control infrastructure for persistence.
Detects network communication patterns
Detects PowerShell making DNS requests for domains associated with less-reputable/uncommon TLDs. This behavior is not typical for legitimate administrative scripts and can indicate an attempt to download a payload from a malicious source.
Detects DNS queries to domains using common AWS typosquatting patterns such as 'awscloud', 'compute-aws', or billing/security lures.
This rule detects the use of bitsadmin to download specific Python scripts ('libsystemhealthcheck.py' or 'libcryptopydatasize.py') from the 'inspectguarantee.org' domain. This activity is associated with the COLDDRIVER (Star Blizzard) threat group, which uses BITSAdmin for ingress tool transfer.
Dynamic Dns Lookup
YARA-L
Detects DNS queries to known Dynamic DNS (DDNS) providers. Attackers often leverage DDNS services for command and control (C2) infrastructure to evade IP-based blocklists by frequently changing the IP address associated with a domain.
Detects Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) exploitation attempts. This includes network connections to known malicious IP addresses, DNS queries for attacker-controlled domains, process creations involving suspicious command-line arguments (often related to downloading or executing scripts/binaries), and file hashes of known malicious artifacts. The exploit activity is linked to C2 communication, data exfiltration, and potentially cryptomining activities.
Detects network traffic to domains associated with the TAG-160 cluster's phishing campaigns, which primarily target the logistics sector.
This rule detects DNS Command and Control (C2) activity associated with the Linux/BPFDoor malware. It specifically looks for DNS queries containing a magic value "X:" followed by a dot "." at the beginning of the query, indicating a potential C2 communication channel used by BPFDoor. The rule also includes a byte test to ensure the query length is greater than 20 bytes and a threshold to limit alerts to 3 occurrences within 300 seconds from the same source.
This rule detects network connections to or DNS requests for known malicious IP addresses and domains associated with phishing campaigns. The domains often mimic legitimate services like Zoom, Microsoft, and Google, indicating potential credential harvesting or malware distribution attempts.
Detects network connections to domains known to be used as infrastructure for an ongoing, highly evasive Evilginx phishing campaign targeting SSO portals.
This detection rule identifies hosts where data archiving using 7-Zip is closely followed by network traffic to the temp.sh file-sharing service. This correlation suggests a potential data staging and exfiltration sequence, a TTP observed in the Lynx Ransomware campaign.
This rule detects potential DNS command and control (C2) activity from the AK47C2 backdoor. The backdoor communicates by sending long, hex-encoded strings as subdomains to a C2 server, specifically targeting the domain 'update.updatemicfosoft.com'. The detection logic looks for DNS queries to this specific domain where the subdomain is longer than 40 characters and consists of hex characters, optionally prefixed with 's', '1', '2', or 'a'.
This rule detects potential DNS command and control (C2) activity from the AK47C2 backdoor. The backdoor communicates by sending long, hex-encoded strings as subdomains to a C2 server, specifically targeting a typosquatted domain of 'updatemicfosoft.com'. The rule identifies these communications by checking for the specific C2 domain, a subdomain length greater than 40 characters, and the subdomain consisting of hex characters with optional prefixes 's', '1', '2', 'a'.
Detects DNS or HTTP communication to known FlexibleFerret malware infrastructure domains.
Detects the Visual Basic Compiler (vbc.exe) initiating DNS queries. This is highly anomalous behavior, as vbc.exe is a compiler and should not be making network connections. This technique is used by malware like Lokibot for defense evasion after process injection.
Detects DNS queries made by the finger utility, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices.
In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
Investigating such DNS queries can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors for command and control (C2) communication.
In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
Investigating such DNS queries can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors for command and control (C2) communication.
ET MOBILE_MALWARE Klopatra CnC Domain in DNS Lookup (guncel-tv-player-lnat .]com)
NKN is a networking service using blockchain technology to support a decentralized network of peers. While there are legitimate uses for it, it can also be used as a C2 channel. This rule looks for a DNS request to the ma>
Detects DNS queries for domains known to be associated with Clop ransomware command and control (C2) or data leak site operations.
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