Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to "Put.io" sharing website.
Detects DNS queries to an ".onion" address related to Tor routing networks
Detects DNS queries to "ufile.io", which was seen abused by malware and threat actors as a method for data exfiltration
Detects DNS requests to Cloudflared tunnels domains.
Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Detects DNS queries to domains commonly used by threat actors to host malware payloads or redirect through URL shorteners.
These include platforms like Cloudflare Workers, TryCloudflare, InfinityFree, and URL shorteners such as tinyurl and lihi.cc.
Such DNS activity can indicate potential delivery or command-and-control communication attempts.
These include platforms like Cloudflare Workers, TryCloudflare, InfinityFree, and URL shorteners such as tinyurl and lihi.cc.
Such DNS activity can indicate potential delivery or command-and-control communication attempts.
Detects DNS query requests to "update.onelaunch.com". This domain is associated with the OneLaunch adware application.
When the OneLaunch application is installed it will attempt to get updates from this domain.
When the OneLaunch application is installed it will attempt to get updates from this domain.
Detects DNS queries to a TeamViewer domain only resolved by a TeamViewer client by an image that isn't named TeamViewer (sometimes used by threat actors for obfuscation)
Detects DNS queries to domains associated with Katz Stealer malware.
Katz Stealer is a malware variant that is known to be used for stealing sensitive information from compromised systems.
In Enterprise environments, DNS queries to these domains may indicate potential malicious activity or compromise.
Katz Stealer is a malware variant that is known to be used for stealing sensitive information from compromised systems.
In Enterprise environments, DNS queries to these domains may indicate potential malicious activity or compromise.
'This query identifies matches based on domain IOCs related to Star Blizzard against Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device network connections'
This rule detects DNS queries to domains associated with legitimate remote access software (e.g., TeamViewer, Go2Assist, LogMeIn, AmmyyAdmin, RustDesk, Quick Assist, Remote Utilities, Tailscale, Twingate, NetSupport Manager) when those queries originate from a non-browser application. Adversaries often leverage these legitimate tools to establish command and control (C2) channels or maintain persistence on compromised systems, as they may be allowed by application control policies. The rule includes extensive filters to exclude common web browsers and other legitimate system processes that might legitimately query these domains, aiming to reduce false positives.
This query will count the number of devices in Defender ATP based
on their DNS suffix. For a full list of devices with the DNS
suffix, comment out or remove the last line.
on their DNS suffix. For a full list of devices with the DNS
suffix, comment out or remove the last line.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
This query will break down hostnames into their second and third level domain parts and analyze the volume of connections made to the destination to look for low count entries. Note that this query is likely to be rather noisy in many organziations and may benefit from analysis over time, anomaly detection, or perhaps machine learning.
Detects a DNS query initiated from a "wscript" process for domains matching a specific pattern that was seen being used by SocGholish for its Command and Control traffic. This pattern often involves a hexadecimal string followed by two subdomains and a top-level domain.
Detects a DNS query to 'azurewebsites.net' originating from a process that is not a recognized web browser. Threat actors have frequently used 'azurewebsites.net' for malware hosting and data exfiltration. This rule aims to identify suspicious communication patterns where non-browser applications might be attempting to communicate with known malicious infrastructure hosted on Azure.
Detects DNS queries to legitimate TeamViewer domains originating from an application that is not identified as TeamViewer. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to obfuscate their use of remote access software by renaming the executable or using a different process to initiate the connection.
This rule detects DNS queries made to domains frequently used by threat actors for hosting malware payloads or for URL redirection via shortener services. The identified domains include those associated with platforms like Cloudflare Workers, TryCloudflare, InfinityFree, and URL shorteners such as tinyurl and lihi.cc. Such DNS activity can be an indicator of potential malware delivery attempts or command-and-control (C2) communications.
The analytic identifies DNS queries to domains associated with the 3CX supply chain attack. This activity is significant because it can indicate a potential compromise stemming from the 3CX supply chain attack, which is known for distributing malicious software through trusted updates. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish a foothold in the network, exfiltrate sensitive data, or further propagate malware, leading to extensive damage and data breaches.
URLs clicked in Email
This rule detects attempts to access domains that have been registered within the last 30 days. It correlates network HTTP or generic network connection events with WHOIS data to identify recently created domains. The rule leverages WHOIS enrichment to determine the creation time of the accessed domain and flags any access to domains created within the specified 30-day window.
This rule detects various network enumeration commands commonly used by adversaries for reconnaissance, as identified in the CISA Living off the Land report. It specifically looks for commands like 'arp -a', 'curl www.ip-api.com', 'dnscmd /enumrecords', 'dnscmd /enumzones', 'ipconfig /all', 'netsh' commands related to firewall and portproxy, and 'netstat -ano'. Additionally, it detects DNS queries for 'www.ip-api.com', which can be indicative of C2 frameworks like Covenant attempting to check for internet connectivity or external IP addresses.
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