Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
379 detections
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Detects potential local privilege escalation (LPE) attempts leveraging the afd.sys vulnerability by correlating LPEClient or FudModule artifact creation, image loads, or process execution with subsequent afd.sys driver loading or exploit guard blocking events within a 60-minute window.
Detects the writing and subsequent loading of driver files signed by a specific certificate holder (Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology), utilizing DeviceFileCertificateInfo, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents.
This rule detects suspicious driver loading from user-writable paths, kernel driver service creation, disabling of driver signing, loading of Linux kernel modules, and the usage of LD_PRELOAD for rootkit functionality.
Detects the loading of the 'truesight.sys' driver from non-standard or temporary locations. This activity is associated with a campaign where threat actors use a vulnerable version of this driver to terminate security products before deploying ransomware or RATs, a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).
Detects a sequence of events indicative of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks or security control impairment. It monitors for the loading of a rare driver (seen on 3 or fewer hosts), accompanied by either the creation of a kernel service or defense tampering activities such as disabling security monitoring or stopping security-related services.
The following analytic detects the insertion of a Linux kernel module using the insmod utility. It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing on process execution logs that include process names and command-line details. This activity is significant as it may indicate the installation of a rootkit or malicious kernel module, potentially allowing an attacker to gain elevated privileges and bypass security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistent access, and severe compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic detects the insertion of a Linux kernel module using the insmod utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include process names and command-line details. This activity is significant as it may indicate the installation of a rootkit or malicious kernel module, potentially allowing an attacker to gain elevated privileges and bypass security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistent access, and severe compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Windows System service install EventCode 7045 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration. This detection is a Windows Event Log adaptation of the Sysmon driver loaded detection written by Michael Haag.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or untrusted kernel driver followed by the termination of known security (AV/EDR) processes within a 10-minute window. This behavioral pattern is indicative of 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) exploitation often used by ransomware actors to bypass endpoint security controls.
Detects the loading of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys) on Windows systems. Attackers leverage this driver as part of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to perform privilege escalation by exploiting kernel-mode vulnerabilities.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) exploitation. The rule correlates the creation of a new service with kernel-mode drivers, the loading of a signed driver, and the subsequent termination or disabling of common EDR security processes within a short timeframe, suggesting the exploitation of the driver to bypass EDR defenses.
Detects the loading of suspicious kernel drivers (Sysmon Event ID 6) that are unsigned, have invalid/revoked signatures, or are located in user-writable directories (e.g., Temp folders). This rule aims to identify Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, where adversaries load vulnerable drivers to escalate privileges or bypass security controls.
The following analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration.
Detects the loading of known vulnerable kernel drivers commonly used for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, followed within 15 minutes by administrative attempts to stop, delete, or kill common security product processes or services.
Detects the loading of a legitimately signed but vulnerable driver from suspicious directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads) followed closely by the termination of critical security/EDR service processes. This sequence is indicative of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) exploitation used to disable security controls prior to ransomware deployment.
This rule detects the suspicious loading of known vulnerable drivers (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver - BYOVD) via the Windows service control manager (sc.exe) or event log 7045, followed by the immediate termination of major endpoint security software processes within a 300-second window. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to disable or tamper with security tools using kernel-level privileges.
Detects the installation or loading of a non-standard kernel driver followed by the termination of known security/EDR agent processes. This behavior is indicative of a 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attack, where attackers leverage kernel-level privileges from a vulnerable driver to bypass EDR protections and disable security tools prior to encryption or other malicious activities.
Detects the loading of the malicious NvFsFilter driver (a BYOVD technique often used by the Rapuncel infostealer) followed immediately by a mass burst of process terminations, indicating an attempt to disable security software.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities indicative of malicious driver installation. It identifies the creation of an irregularly named .sys file in temp directories, the use of curl.exe to retrieve symbols for a potentially malicious driver, and the subsequent registration/start of that driver as a Windows system service.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities indicative of malicious driver installation. It identifies the creation of an irregularly named .sys file in temp directories, the use of curl.exe to retrieve symbols for a potentially malicious driver, and the subsequent registration/start of that driver as a Windows system service.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
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