Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious DLL loads by the Windows Print Spooler service from its backup driver folders. This behavior is indicative of exploitation attempts related to vulnerabilities like PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527) where an attacker can force the spooler service to load arbitrary DLLs, leading to privilege escalation or remote code execution.
This rule detects when a USB device is plugged in or unplugged by monitoring specific event IDs from the Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode/Operational event log. Event ID 2003 indicates driver loading, while Event IDs 2100 and 2102 relate to Plug and Play (PnP) or power management events, which are typically generated when a USB device is connected or disconnected.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Print Spooler vulnerability CVE-2021-1675, also known as PrintNightmare. It specifically looks for Event ID 316 in the Print Service Operational log, which indicates a driver load event. The rule further refines detection by searching for keywords such as 'UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll,', '123', '1234', or 'mimispool', which are associated with known exploitation methods for this vulnerability. Successful exploitation often involves loading malicious drivers or DLLs through the print spooler service.
Detects the remote installation of a print driver, which is a possible indication of the exploitation of PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527). The occurrence of print drivers being installed remotely via RPC functions should be rare, as print drivers are normally installed locally or through group policy.
Detects when a kernel module that does not meet WHQL (Windows Hardware Quality Labs) signing requirements is loaded into the system. This can indicate the presence of unsigned or improperly signed drivers, which might be malicious or unstable. The rule specifically looks for Code Integrity Event IDs 3082 and 3083, which signify that such a module was loaded, even if allowed due to auditing policy.
Detects the loading of an unsigned kernel module on a Windows system, which can indicate attempts to bypass security controls, establish persistence, or escalate privileges. This event is logged by Windows Code Integrity when it determines that a kernel module without a valid digital signature is being loaded.
This rule detects the installation of packet capture (pcap) drivers on Windows systems by monitoring Event ID 4697 (A service was installed in the system). The detection logic specifically looks for common filenames associated with pcap drivers such as 'pcap', 'npcap', 'npf', 'nm3', 'ndiscap', 'nmnt', 'windivert', 'USBPcap', and 'pktmon' within the ServiceFileName field. The installation of such drivers can indicate an adversary's attempt to perform network sniffing.
This rule detects when a driver is loaded from a temporary directory. Adversaries may load malicious drivers from temporary locations as part of persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion techniques. Loading drivers from temporary directories is often an unusual behavior for legitimate system operations and can indicate suspicious activity.
Detects the loading of a kernel driver that has been revoked by Code Integrity. This indicates an attempt to load a driver that is no longer trusted, potentially for malicious purposes or due to a known vulnerability. Event ID 3021 signifies a revoked driver load, while 3022 indicates a revoked driver load allowed due to a kernel mode debugger being attached.
This rule detects the loading of kernel modules using the 'insmod' command. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are code segments that can be dynamically loaded into and unloaded from the kernel. Adversaries may leverage LKMs for establishing persistence, elevating privileges, or deploying kernel-mode rootkits, as they operate with the highest system privileges (Ring 0). The detection specifically looks for the execution of 'kmod' with the 'insmod' command.
This rule detects the installation of a TAP (Tunnel Adapter) driver, specifically looking for 'tap0901' in the service's ImagePath. TAP drivers are commonly used by VPN software like OpenVPN to create virtual network interfaces, which can be leveraged for tunneling and data exfiltration. The detection aims to identify potential preparation for data exfiltration using tunneling techniques.
This rule detects the creation of the Process Monitor (procmon) driver file (.sys) by any process other than the legitimate Process Monitor executable itself (procmon.exe or procmon64.exe). This behavior can indicate an attempt to load a malicious or unauthorized driver, potentially for privilege escalation or persistence, by masquerading as a legitimate system utility.
Detects the creation of Process Explorer drivers by processes other than Process Explorer itself. This activity can indicate that hack tools or malware are attempting to use the Process Explorer driver for privilege escalation, often by dropping the driver to disk, running a service with it, and then removing it.
Detects image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity.
Detects the presence of a loaded unsigned kernel module on the system.
Detects the installation of a well-known TAP driver service. This could be a sign of potential preparation for data exfiltration using tunnelling techniques.
Detects the load of a revoked kernel driver
Detects loaded kernel modules that did not meet the WHQL signing requirements.
USB Device Plugged
Sigma
Detects plugged/unplugged USB devices
Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration using tunnelling techniques
Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
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