Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects indicators of a malicious driver or associated activity named 'pcdhost.sys'. The rule monitors for the installation of this driver via 'sc.exe', registry modifications related to this filename, the creation of this file on disk, and specific suspicious process command-line artifacts ('AtLorenBase', 'MANPO: ReadModule', 'PERS: FAIL', 'RUNPE:', 'POST: hollow=') typically associated with malware or offensive toolkits.
Detects the loading of known vulnerable drivers (e.g., ProcessMonitorDriver.sys, inpoutx64.sys) associated with 'The Gentlemen' RaaS group, used in BYOVD attacks to elevate privileges and terminate security products.
Detects the loading of system drivers (.sys files) that are either unsigned or have an invalid digital signature. The rule excludes drivers loaded from common Windows system directories to minimize noise. This behavior is a common indicator of rootkit installation or the use of vulnerable drivers for kernel-mode exploitation.
This rule detects the installation or modification of kernel-mode drivers on Windows systems. It identifies potential driver installation activities using 'sc.exe' to create a service with a kernel-type driver image, or by monitoring Registry 'ImagePath' updates for services that point to '.sys' files, a common method for rootkit or malicious driver persistence.
This rule detects activities associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, including the loading of known vulnerable drivers, the installation or configuration of drivers via system services, and the execution of tools known to facilitate driver-based kernel manipulation.
This rule detects the 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) technique by monitoring for the creation of new kernel-mode drivers in temporary locations (followed by an immediate registration as a service) that correlate with known vulnerable drivers. It checks file system events for driver drops and links them to service installation events (EventCode 7045) within a 5-minute window.
This rule monitors for the creation of a new .sys file outside of the standard Windows system driver directories (System32 or SysWOW64) within a 15-minute window of a corresponding registry update to the 'ImagePath' of a service. This sequence is indicative of a persistence mechanism involving the installation of a potentially malicious kernel-mode driver, often used by rootkits or malware to achieve high-privilege execution.
Detects process creations (EventID 4688) where the command line contains keywords indicative of loading or installing kernel modules or drivers. This activity can be associated with privilege escalation or persistence techniques used by adversaries.
Detects indicators of 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks or suspicious kernel driver installations. The rule monitors for known vulnerable driver files being written to disk, unauthorized creation of .sys files in temporary directories, the installation of new kernel driver services via System Event ID 7045 (referencing temp paths or known malicious drivers), and the use of the sc.exe utility to create services with a kernel driver type.
Detects the execution of QEMU processes, the presence of suspicious virtual disk files (e.g., .qcow2, .db) in unexpected locations, and the installation of Virtio drivers. These patterns may indicate an adversary is deploying hidden virtual machines to bypass host-based security controls.
This rule detects potential tampering with security agents by monitoring for the load of suspicious drivers (Sysmon Event ID 6) immediately followed by the termination of known security software processes (Sysmon Event ID 5) or signs of security service disability (Windows Security Center 5004) or unauthorized raw disk access (Sysmon Event ID 9). This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass EDR or AV solutions by loading a malicious kernel driver to blind them.
This rule detects potential tampering with security agents by monitoring for the load of suspicious drivers (Sysmon Event ID 6) immediately followed by the termination of known security software processes (Sysmon Event ID 5) or signs of security service disability (Windows Security Center 5004) or unauthorized raw disk access (Sysmon Event ID 9). This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass EDR or AV solutions by loading a malicious kernel driver to blind them.
Detects post-exploitation activities related to the CVE-2026-45257 BUMSRAKETE vulnerability on FreeBSD. The rule monitors for kernel module loading using kldload from suspicious directories, kldstat execution, unauthorized root-level crontab modifications, and suspicious root-level shell execution spawned from non-standard parent processes, all of which indicate potential persistence or rootkit installation following a local privilege escalation.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows service where the service type is set to 'kernel' via the sc.exe command-line utility. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to load a kernel driver or perform low-level system modifications, which is often used by rootkits or malicious drivers. The rule filters out known trusted publishers to reduce noise.
Detects behaviors associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, including the dropping of .sys driver files into non-canonical directories, the registration and execution of kernel services via sc.exe, the use of fltMC to load filter drivers, and the loading of driver modules from non-standard locations.
Detects the dropping, service creation, or execution of known vulnerable drivers and associated BYOVD tools. These tools are used by The Gentlemen RaaS group to escalate privileges to kernel level and terminate endpoint security products.
Detects Mimikatz-based credential dumping against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The rule identifies this activity by monitoring for renamed or known Mimikatz binary names, execution of specific credential-harvesting command-line arguments (such as sekurlsa::logonpasswords or privilege::debug), output redirection to credential-related files, or the loading of the Mimikatz kernel driver (mimidrv.sys).
Detects CldFlt.sys driver load activity coinciding with SyncRootManager registry modifications by non-standard processes, indicating potential RedSun exploitation of CVE-2026-41091 via the Cloud Files filter driver path. This correlation suggests an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges by manipulating system components related to cloud file synchronization.
Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver.
With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode.
This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers.
If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers.
This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode.
This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers.
If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers.
This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
Detects the deployment, registration, and loading of known vulnerable drivers (e.g., mhyprot2.sys, gdrv.sys, rtcore64.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This rule monitors file creation, module loading, service registration via sc.exe, and registry modifications associated with service installation.
Detects the loading of known vulnerable drivers (rwdrv.sys, hlpdrv.sys) used for potential Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, accompanied by evidence of antivirus tampering through process execution or the creation of suspicious directories related to AV killing utilities.
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