Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the presence of known malicious drivers (hlpdrv.sys, rwdrv.sys) by their SHA256 hash or file path. It also identifies attempts to install these drivers via service creation commands and monitors for modifications to Windows Defender registry keys that could disable its functionality, indicating defense evasion.
Detects multiple methods commonly used for defense evasion and credential theft on Windows systems, including: enabling WDigest credential caching via Registry modification, execution of forensic tools (FTK Imager) sometimes repurposed for security tool tampering, disabling Microsoft Defender real-time monitoring or removing exclusions via PowerShell/CMD, and loading known vulnerable kernel drivers associated with BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.
Detects suspicious kernel-level activity following a potential privilege escalation event on Linux systems. The rule monitors for unauthorized kernel module loading (via non-standard paths) or direct write access to /dev/kmem, which is indicative of rootkit installation or kernel-level memory manipulation.
Detects the loading of system drivers (.sys files) that are either unsigned or have an invalid digital signature. The rule excludes drivers loaded from common Windows system directories to minimize noise. This behavior is a common indicator of rootkit installation or the use of vulnerable drivers for kernel-mode exploitation.
This rule detects the presence of known malicious drivers (hlpdrv.sys, rwdrv.sys) by their SHA256 hash or file path. It also identifies attempts to install these drivers via service creation commands and monitors for modifications to Windows Defender registry keys that could disable its functionality, indicating defense evasion.
This rule detects when five or more driver-related files (.inf, .sys, or .drv) are created or modified within a one-hour window by the same initiating process account. This behavior can be indicative of malicious driver installation, rootkit activity, or other forms of persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows service where the service type is set to 'kernel' via the sc.exe command-line utility. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to load a kernel driver or perform low-level system modifications, which is often used by rootkits or malicious drivers. The rule filters out known trusted publishers to reduce noise.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events on Linux where a non-root process creates a user namespace followed within 5 minutes by either network XFRM policy manipulation or the loading of specific kernel modules (esp4, esp6, or rxrpc). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to bypass kernel security restrictions or establish unauthorized encrypted tunnels.
This rule detects when five or more driver-related files (.inf, .sys, or .drv) are created or modified within a one-hour window by the same initiating process account. This behavior can be indicative of malicious driver installation, rootkit activity, or other forms of persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects the installation of known vulnerable kernel drivers (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver - BYOVD). These drivers are often exploited by adversaries to gain kernel-level code execution, elevate privileges, or disable security tools (EDR).
Detects the loading of specific vulnerable drivers (Huawei, Topaz Antifraud, Tower of Fantasy, K7 Security) abused by DragonForce ransomware in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software.
Detects Reynolds ransomware terminating hardcoded EDR/AV process names via its NSecKrnl kernel driver. The rule identifies process terminations of known security software executables and correlates it with the presence of the '402.sys' driver in the 'C:\ProgramData' folder, which is associated with the NSecKrnl driver used by Reynolds ransomware.
This rule detects a multi-stage Linux privilege escalation exploitation sequence often associated with kernel vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2023-32233). It identifies: 1) The creation of a user namespace to acquire CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges, 2) The use of 'tc' (traffic control) with 'pedit' actions by a non-root user, 3) The loading of the 'act_pedit' kernel module by a non-root user, 4) Execution of known proof-of-concept binaries (e.g., PACKET_EDIT_MEME, pedit_cow_demo), and 5) Post-exploit evidence cleanup involving the clearing of system page caches via 'drop_caches'.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with driver and inter-process communication, specifically targeting the creation or interaction with 'C:\ProgramData\402.sys', usage of IOCTL control code '2248E0', or activity involving the 'NSecKrnl' named pipe. These indicators are often associated with rootkit-like persistence or kernel-mode communication used by malware.
This rule detects the deployment and activity associated with the TrueSightKiller rootkit, potentially used by threat actors like SilverFox. It identifies several key indicators: the loading of 'truesight.sys' from non-standard directories, the creation of a staging file named 'ranchserv.jpg' in the Windows Temp directory by non-system processes, the presence of the 'truesight.sys' driver based on its known SHA256 hash, and the termination of security products shortly after the creation of TrueSightKiller-related artifacts.
Identifies the EDR Killer utility deleting the vulnerable .sys driver and its associated service after the EDR has been permanently blinded. This rule specifically looks for 'cmd.exe' executing commands to delete services ('sc delete') or delete .sys files ('del *.sys'), combined with a driver load event for a .sys file.
This rule detects the creation and loading of the 'NSecKrnl.sys' driver file on a system. The filename is associated with potentially malicious or unauthorized kernel-level activity, often indicative of rootkit behavior or unauthorized persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects the creation and loading of the 'NSecKrnl.sys' driver file on a system. The filename is associated with potentially malicious or unauthorized kernel-level activity, often indicative of rootkit behavior or unauthorized persistence mechanisms.
Detects the use of legitimate administrative tools (regsvcs.exe, infinstall.exe, devcon.exe) being executed with command-line arguments indicative of driver or kernel-level installations (e.g., 'kernel', 'ring0', 'driver install'). This behavior is commonly associated with the installation of rootkits or the execution of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to gain kernel-mode privileges.
Detects IronWorm rootkit activity on Linux, specifically focusing on cases where npm or node processes spawn tools like bpftool, insmod, or modprobe to load eBPF programs or kernel modules. It also flags the usage of specific IronWorm-associated filenames (q2.bpf, libbpf) within directories managed by npm or node.
Detects the installation, service creation, registry modification, and network activity associated with the Tailscale VPN tool. This rule monitors for persistent use of Tailscale, which can be utilized by threat actors to establish encrypted mesh access to internal environments.
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