Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects delivered emails where the subject line matches a specific pattern (five digits followed by a hyphen and text) and the attachment filename corresponds to the extracted subject text, ending with 'Document.xlsx', and the email was not quarantined post-delivery.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects inbound mail carrying an attachment from a sending server not previously
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
Detects a threat identified in Zimbra mail flow. Because Zimbra is both the mail
server and the webmail client, a threat here reaches the user directly without
passing any separate gateway — in many Zimbra deployments there is no other mail
security layer at all.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, srcip, dstip
server and the webmail client, a threat here reaches the user directly without
passing any separate gateway — in many Zimbra deployments there is no other mail
security layer at all.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, srcip, dstip
Detects a threat identified by Deep Discovery Email Inspector. DDEI detonates
attachments and inspects URLs in a sandbox, so its verdicts carry behavioural
evidence rather than signature matches — which makes them a strong input for
detections that most estates never ingest.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, threattype, srcip
attachments and inspects URLs in a sandbox, so its verdicts carry behavioural
evidence rather than signature matches — which makes them a strong input for
detections that most estates never ingest.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, threattype, srcip
Detects threats identified by Mimecast where the same sender appears repeatedly.
A single blocked message is routine; the same origin returning again and again is a
campaign specifically targeting this organisation, and the repetition is the signal
worth acting on rather than the individual block.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 24h
| groupby sender, srcip
| select sender, srcip, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
A single blocked message is routine; the same origin returning again and again is a
campaign specifically targeting this organisation, and the repetition is the signal
worth acting on rather than the individual block.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 24h
| groupby sender, srcip
| select sender, srcip, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects instances where an email previously detected as malware or phishing and quarantined is subsequently released and the recipient interacts with/clicks URLs contained within the email.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
This rule detects incoming phishing emails that use specific financial or payment-related lures (e.g., 'eft wire transfer', 'invoice receipt') in the subject line or body to entice users into clicking a link that points directly to an executable file, often disguised as a document.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
Detects a multi-stage phishing pattern attributed to Star Blizzard (also known as Callisto Group or COLDRIVER). The attack involves an initial email containing no attachments to establish trust or initiate a thread, followed by a subsequent reply-thread email containing both an archive file (ZIP/RAR) and an image file. This technique is designed to bypass email security scanners by hiding the archive password within the image attachment or obscuring the malicious payload context.
This rule detects incoming phishing emails that use specific financial or payment-related lures (e.g., 'eft wire transfer', 'invoice receipt') in the subject line or body to entice users into clicking a link that points directly to an executable file, often disguised as a document.
Detects spoofed emails carrying a .patch attachment sent to a GitLab incoming-email merge-request address. Requires Microsoft's composite authentication verdict (CompAuth: fail) -- a lower-noise spoofing signal than raw SPF/DKIM/DMARC -- and excludes sender/recipient pairs already seen corresponding with that token address in the prior 30 days to suppress recurring legitimate contributors.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
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