Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects notification mail sent by ePO, including its recipients. Redirecting or
suppressing ePO notifications means endpoint security alerts stop reaching the team
that would act on them — the alerts still fire, nobody reads them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='EMAIL_SENT'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
suppressing ePO notifications means endpoint security alerts stop reaching the team
that would act on them — the alerts still fire, nobody reads them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='EMAIL_SENT'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
Detects mail redirection on Zimbra Collaboration. Zimbra is widely deployed in
government, education and smaller enterprises, has been the subject of repeated
mass-exploitation campaigns, and is rarely covered by commercial detection content —
the combination makes it a persistent soft target.
Redirection is the standard persistence on a compromised mailbox: it survives
password resets and quietly copies correspondence onward.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip, subject
government, education and smaller enterprises, has been the subject of repeated
mass-exploitation campaigns, and is rarely covered by commercial detection content —
the combination makes it a persistent soft target.
Redirection is the standard persistence on a compromised mailbox: it survives
password resets and quietly copies correspondence onward.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip, subject
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Detects one subject line delivered to an unusually wide internal recipient set. This
is the shape of internal phishing from a compromised mailbox, which is far more
effective than external phishing because it arrives from a trusted colleague and
passes authentication checks.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE' and action='EMAIL_DELIVERED'
| duration 1h
| groupby subject, sender
| select subject, sender, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
is the shape of internal phishing from a compromised mailbox, which is far more
effective than external phishing because it arrives from a trusted colleague and
passes authentication checks.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE' and action='EMAIL_DELIVERED'
| duration 1h
| groupby subject, sender
| select subject, sender, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
Detects mail being redirected to an external recipient. Redirection rules are the
classic persistence mechanism on a compromised mailbox: they survive password resets,
require no further access, and quietly copy correspondence to the attacker for as
long as they remain in place.
This is among the most under-monitored controls in most estates, because the rule is
set once and never fires an alert again.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
classic persistence mechanism on a compromised mailbox: they survive password resets,
require no further access, and quietly copy correspondence to the attacker for as
long as they remain in place.
This is among the most under-monitored controls in most estates, because the rule is
set once and never fires an alert again.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
Detects an unusual volume of externally directed mail from one sender. Mail is a
high-capacity exfiltration channel that is permitted by default, and a compromised
mailbox sending outward in bulk is both data loss and, where the content is phishing,
damage to the organisation's sending reputation.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_SENT_EXTERNAL'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender
| select sender, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
high-capacity exfiltration channel that is permitted by default, and a compromised
mailbox sending outward in bulk is both data loss and, where the content is phishing,
damage to the organisation's sending reputation.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_SENT_EXTERNAL'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender
| select sender, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
Detects scenarios where a user's password is reset or sessions are revoked in Azure Active Directory, followed closely by mailbox access (items accessed, sent, or deleted) from a client IP address that was never seen interacting with that mailbox prior to the password reset event.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
Detects emails that appear to have been injected or sent using the 'swaks' SMTP testing tool rather than a standard Mail User Agent (MUA). The rule identifies this activity by looking for the 'swaks' signature in the 'X-Mailer' header or by matching a specific 'Message-Id' pattern typical of swaks.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange Online inbox rules that configure automatic email forwarding or redirection to an external domain. The rule specifically flags if the action also involves deleting or hiding the message, which is a common persistence and exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks. The detection also incorporates correlation with recent high-risk sign-in activity for the associated user account.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft 365/Exchange inbox rules that suggest malicious staging or exfiltration activities. This includes rules configured for external email auto-forwarding, automatic deletion of messages, or movement of emails into hidden/system folders (e.g., RSS Subscriptions, Archive) which may be filtered based on sensitive keywords related to financial or credential theft (e.g., invoice, wire, payment).
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by correlating access to files labeled as sensitive (confidential, restricted, etc.) with a subsequent upload to a personal cloud storage provider or transmission via email to a personal domain within a two-hour window.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
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