Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects malicious artifacts and behaviors associated with TA4922 (Atlas RAT, SilentRunLoader, RomulusLoader), including known malicious file hashes, DLL sideloading patterns masquerading as legitimate graphics libraries, and unauthorized execution of Python interpreters from user-writable directories.
Detects processes executing from user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) that create files in Temp or AppData directories, specifically excluding common browser processes. This behavior is consistent with the post-exploitation activity of remote access trojans (RATs) such as Atlas RAT or Gh0stRAT, which may log keystrokes to a local file.
Detects suspicious eBPF activity characteristic of the IronWorm rootkit, including unauthorized pinning of BPF objects, loading of libbpf from non-standard user-writable directories, and malicious anti-debugging enforcement where unauthorized processes terminate security or diagnostic tools.
macOS malware used by JINX-0164 against cryptocurrency developers
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Detects a non-browser process reading browser profiles, cookies, form stores, or session files from Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Opera browsers. The rule specifically looks for file events (creation, writing, deletion) on browser-related files like 'Cookies', 'Login Data', 'Web Data', 'History', or 'Local State' within browser user data directories, where the process performing the action has a filename matching common RAT patterns like 'banana', 'client', 'update', or 'service'.
Detects potential execution of a Tox ransomware negotiation channel by monitoring for processes that exhibit a high rate of file writes (potential encryption activity) in conjunction with command-line arguments containing specific patterns such as a 76-character string or the 'tox://' URI scheme, which are associated with Tox ransomware client activity.
This rule detects the execution of common archival utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR, RAR, ZIP) with parameters indicative of password-protected archive creation. It specifically flags instances where a user account, with no recorded prior history of running these utilities in the last 30 days, creates a large archive (exceeding 1GB) spanning multiple directories. This pattern is commonly used for data staging and preparation prior to exfiltration.
This rule monitors for indicators of unauthorized Tor usage or anonymization activity, including non-standard Tor executable paths, suspicious library loads, the creation of Tor configuration files (torrc), non-browser processes communicating over known Tor ports, and DNS queries for .onion domains. It also specifically monitors for potential data exfiltration via the temp.sh file-sharing service from non-browser applications. The rule aggregates these suspicious signals over a 24-hour period to calculate a risk severity score based on the frequency and variety of indicators detected.
This rule detects the BQT.exe (BQTLock ransomware) process attempting to access web browser credential files (Chrome, Firefox, Opera) or creating a password staging file in the Windows Temp directory. This behavior is indicative of credential theft performed by the ransomware prior to or during the encryption process.
Detects persistence and execution behaviors associated with the MYRA Linux RAT. The rule monitors for the installation of a malicious library (.libcache.so) via shell profile modifications, and subsequent execution attempts where a process masquerades as 'systemd-userdbd' while utilizing 'LD_PRELOAD' and fileless execution techniques (memfd_create/fexecve).
Detects persistence and fileless execution techniques associated with the MYRA Linux RAT. This includes monitoring for the creation of persistence files such as /usr/local/lib/.libcache.so for LD_PRELOAD hijacking and /etc/profile.d/.sh.local for shell-based persistence. It also monitors for suspicious process execution patterns where 'node' spawns a 'systemd-userdbd' masquerading process or invokes syscalls indicative of fileless execution, specifically memfd_create or fexecve.
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-8088, where WinRAR writes a nested .vbs payload directly to the Startup folder via NTFS ADS path traversal.
This rule detects potential supply chain compromise involving typosquatted npm packages. It monitors for the execution of npm packages with names closely resembling legitimate libraries (e.g., 'thirdweb', 'rainbownkit'), followed by suspicious post-install scripts that attempt to initiate network connections to known malicious domains or modify sensitive files.
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
Identifies .lnk files dropped into Startup folders, a persistence technique tied to WinRAR exploitation.
Identifies the creation of PowerShell or batch files in unusual ProgramData subdirectories by command-line interpreters, which may indicate malware staging or persistence preparation.
Detects the creation of PowerShell or batch scripts within the C:\ProgramData directory, which is a common location abused by malware for payload staging and persistence. The rule specifically looks for file creation events where the initiating process is cmd.exe or powershell.exe and the file extension is either .ps1 or .bat.
This rule detects suspicious file creation or modification events in the root directory (C:\) for files commonly associated with boot sectors, such as 'bootsect.bak', 'bootloader', 'MBR', and 'VBR'. Such modifications can indicate ransomware activity or other forms of boot integrity compromise.
Correlates the EDR kill sequence with the attacker utilizing wevtutil to clear the Security and System event logs to cover their tracks. This rule detects the execution of 'wevtutil.exe' with the 'cl' (clear log) command targeting 'System' or 'Security' event logs, joined with the creation of a '.sys' file, which could indicate a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack attempting to disable EDR and clear logs.
Detects instances where DllHost.exe creates potentially malicious executable or script files in sensitive Windows system directories (e.g., \Users\Public\, \ProgramData\). This is often an indicator of WSL2 filesystem proxying, where a Linux process running within a WSL2 distribution performs file operations on the Windows filesystem that are attributed to the DllHost.exe process on the Windows host, potentially allowing for evasion of local security controls.
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