Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
This query hunts for .lnk (shortcut) files that are either newly created or have the hidden attribute set, located in common Windows startup folders. Attackers often place LNK files in these locations to establish persistence.
Detects file creation, modification, or execution events involving the path '/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond', which is the hardcoded drop location for the macOS C++ RAT deployed by the Axios supply chain attack.
This query hunts for .lnk (shortcut) files that are either newly created or have the hidden attribute set, located in common Windows startup folders. Attackers often place LNK files in these locations to establish persistence.
Detects the creation of a file named "msbuild.exe" within the Windows Startup folder. This behavior matches the persistence and masquerading techniques used by the TeamPCP threat actor following the compromise of the telnyx PyPI package.
Detects the creation of specific log files (`ldapd*.1.gz`, `ldapd*.2.gz`) in the `/var/log/` directory. This behavior is indicative of the UNC3886 threat actor utilizing backdoored SSH clients and daemons to harvest and store XOR-encrypted credentials.
This rule detects various indicators associated with the Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. It identifies known malicious hashes, suspicious file creations in GitHub workflows, destructive commands on Linux/macOS and Windows systems, initial execution via npm preinstall scripts, and the installation of specific vulnerable application names or applications from known vulnerable vendors.
This rule detects the creation of specific files associated with the TeamPCP malware's systemd persistence mechanism. It looks for the creation of '/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py' or '/.config/systemd/user/sysmon.service' which are used to maintain access and download further stages via C2 even if the original vulnerable litellm process terminates.
Detects the creation or modification of .plist files on macOS systems. This activity can be indicative of various malicious behaviors, particularly those related to persistence or privilege escalation, as .plist files are often used to configure application settings, launch agents, or other system behaviors.
Detects the execution of Microsoft Edge in headless mode with the '--print-to-pdf' argument, saving the output to a user's Public folder. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, as seen in the Horabot spreader.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the writing of both DLL and EXE files to the same path, followed by process masquerading (where the file name differs from the original file name) and subsequent DLL side-loading. It also attempts to identify the source URL if the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) is present, indicating a downloaded file. The detection chain tracks the process that writes the files, the parent process that initiates the file write, the process that performs the DLL side-load, and finally the loaded DLLs themselves, including various module load telemetry classifications.
This rule detects artifacts associated with the Auto-Color Linux backdoor. Specifically, it looks for the presence of the malicious library 'libcext.so.2', which mimics a legitimate library, or modifications to '/etc/ld.preload' for persistence and dynamic linker hijacking. It also identifies specific file paths used by the malware, such as '/var/log/cross/auto-color' or files within '/tmp/cross/' with a 'config-err-' prefix.
This rule detects various indicators associated with the 'Fake Clawdbot VS Code Extension' malware, which is known to install the ScreenConnect Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Detection logic includes suspicious domain names, specific file names downloaded from those domains or Dropbox, known malicious IP addresses, specific SHA256 hashes of malicious files, outbound network connections on port 8041 (excluding common private/reserved IP ranges), ScreenConnect service installations/starts, and suspicious file writes or process executions from temporary directories related to ScreenConnect or 'Code.exe'.
Detects the creation or manipulation of the specific archive file (tpcp.tar.gz) used by TeamPCP to bundle stolen credentials. This rule monitors command line activity, cloud process execution, and file system events for references to 'tpcp.tar.gz'.
Detects file creation events for the TeamPCP systemd persistence mechanism, specifically looking for 'sysmon.py' or 'sysmon.service' dropped in hidden user config directories. This persistence mechanism ensures the attacker maintains access and can download further stages via C2 even if the original vulnerable litellm process terminates.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the writing of both DLL and EXE files to the same path, followed by process masquerading (where the file name differs from the original file name) and subsequent DLL side-loading. It also attempts to identify the source URL if the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) is present, indicating a downloaded file. The detection chain tracks the process that writes the files, the parent process that initiates the file write, the process that performs the DLL side-load, and finally the loaded DLLs themselves, including various module load telemetry classifications.
This rule detects various stages of the Charon ransomware deployment and activity, including the writing of ransomware-related files to disk, malicious DLL side-loading, the deployment trigger, and the creation of ransom notes or service associated with Charon.
This rule detects various activities associated with the Kimsuky JavaScript dropper, including DNS requests to known malicious domains, creation of specific files (Themes.js, L298306.tmp), execution of certutil.exe or script.exe for decoding/encoding, suspicious command-line arguments for system information or task listing, and persistence mechanisms via scheduled tasks or registry modifications related to 'Themes.js' or 'Windows Theme Manager'.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the misspelled 'Photoes' directory (e.g., \ProgramData\Photoes\). This directory is utilized by the BRUSHWORM backdoor for its main installation and by the BRUSHLOGGER keylogger for storing keystroke log files.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the misspelled 'Photoes' directory (e.g., \ProgramData\Photoes\). This directory is utilized by the BRUSHWORM backdoor for its main installation and by the BRUSHLOGGER keylogger for storing keystroke log files.
Detects the creation of a malicious Python script (`sysmon.py`) within the user's systemd directory. This specific file and path are utilized by the TeamPCP compromised Trivy binary to establish persistence on developer machines when the GITHUB_ACTIONS environment variable is not set to "true".
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