Aamir Muhammad
@AamirTrusted contributorCompletionist
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46 detections
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Detects potential remote code execution, web shell activity, and post-exploitation behaviors originating from PHP worker processes on internet-facing hosts, referencing patterns associated with php2shell vulnerabilities. PHP-UP-2026
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with Akira ransomware, including AD enumeration using PowerShell, data staging with WinRAR, S3 exfiltration via s5cmd, AnyDesk service installation, registry manipulation for persistence via Safe Mode, and boot configuration changes to facilitate EDR bypass. It also incorporates detection for specific IOCs like attacker jump host RDP connections and malicious file hashes.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with Akira ransomware, including AD enumeration using PowerShell, data staging with WinRAR, S3 exfiltration via s5cmd, AnyDesk service installation, registry manipulation for persistence via Safe Mode, and boot configuration changes to facilitate EDR bypass. It also incorporates detection for specific IOCs like attacker jump host RDP connections and malicious file hashes.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with Akira ransomware, including AD enumeration using PowerShell, data staging with WinRAR, S3 exfiltration via s5cmd, AnyDesk service installation, registry manipulation for persistence via Safe Mode, and boot configuration changes to facilitate EDR bypass. It also incorporates detection for specific IOCs like attacker jump host RDP connections and malicious file hashes.
Detects various stages of the Armored Likho APT campaign using the BusySnake stealer, including lure archive delivery, NSIS droppers, LNK shortcut abuse, PowerShell-based staging, VBScript persistence, scheduled task creation, reverse SSH tunneling, and exfiltration of browser and communication artifacts.
Detection logic covering multiple stages of the Gentlemen ransomware attack lifecycle, including reconnaissance, defense impairment (disabling Defender/EDR), persistence, lateral movement using GPO and PsExec, and anti-forensic activities such as shadow copy deletion and log clearing.
Detection logic covering multiple stages of the Gentlemen ransomware attack lifecycle, including reconnaissance, defense impairment (disabling Defender/EDR), persistence, lateral movement using GPO and PsExec, and anti-forensic activities such as shadow copy deletion and log clearing.
This rule detects attempts to impair defensive mechanisms by creating or modifying Quality of Service (QoS) policies that specifically target Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) processes. Adversaries may use QoS policies to throttle network traffic for security products, hindering their ability to communicate with central management or cloud services, thus impairing their effectiveness. The rule looks for command-line arguments used to create or set QoS policies (`New-NetQosPolicy`, `Set-NetQosPolicy`) that include throttling parameters (`ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond`, `AppPathNameMatchCondition`) and target common EDR/AV process names. It also detects direct registry modifications to QoS policies (`\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QOS`) that include EDR/AV process names.
This rule detects attempts to impair defensive mechanisms by creating or modifying Quality of Service (QoS) policies that specifically target Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) processes. Adversaries may use QoS policies to throttle network traffic for security products, hindering their ability to communicate with central management or cloud services, thus impairing their effectiveness. The rule looks for command-line arguments used to create or set QoS policies (`New-NetQosPolicy`, `Set-NetQosPolicy`) that include throttling parameters (`ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond`, `AppPathNameMatchCondition`) and target common EDR/AV process names. It also detects direct registry modifications to QoS policies (`\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QOS`) that include EDR/AV process names.
This rule detects attempts to disable or impair Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) solutions by abusing Quality of Service (QoS) policies. It specifically looks for two methods: 1) Process command-line execution that creates or modifies QoS policies (`New-NetQosPolicy` or `Set-NetQosPolicy`) and targets known EDR/AV process names with throttling actions. 2) Direct manipulation of the Windows Registry under `SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QoS` where the registry value data contains known EDR/AV process names. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to "choke" the telemetry stream from security products, potentially to evade detection.
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