Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,543 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,478
532
344
301
286
Contributors
1,303
815
737
215
193
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
4,543
Platforms
3,841
1,049
473
39
29
Products / Services
1,835
1,138
211
183
171
MITRE Techniques
1,604
1,423
1,300
749
473
CVEs
19
17
16
11
11
IDS Classtypes
23
1
IDS Protocols
16
7
1
This rule detects the creation of specific JSP web shell filenames (1.jsp, 401.jsp, 403.jsp) and suspicious CSS files in the Ivanti EPMM web application directory. This activity is indicative of post-exploitation persistence following the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-1281 or CVE-2026-1340.
Detects creation of the LunarApplication directory used by an infostealer to stage credential and cryptocurrency theft.
Detects the creation of files in specific staging directories used by the CRESCENTHARVEST malware for collecting keylogs, browser data, and Telegram sessions before exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for 'daT.txt' in 'spool\Drivers\color', and any file creation within '\Windows\Temp\sysdriver\' or '\Windows\Temp\tdata\'.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with a malware campaign distributing a credential and crypto-wallet stealer disguised as a Windows 11 update. Detection is based on TTPs rather than IOCs for longevity: suspicious directory creation, obfuscated PowerShell execution, and registry-based persistence.
Detects the creation of specific persistence artifacts (a VBScript file and a startup shortcut) associated with the ModeloRAT payload delivered by recent ClickFix campaigns. Specifically, it looks for a VBScript file at '\WPy64-31401\python\script.vbs' or a shortcut file named 'MonitoringService.lnk' in a user's startup folder.
Detects the creation of JSP web shells or suspicious CSS files in the specific directory used by Ivanti EPMM for application distribution, a common post-exploitation step observed in this campaign.
Detects the creation of the file 'decrypted_appbound_key.txt' in the AppData\Roaming directory. This file is a specific artifact generated by the CRESCENTHARVEST malware after it successfully decrypts Chrome's app-bound encryption key, indicating browser credential compromise.
Detects the creation of specific .sys files in the C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ directory. These filenames are used by the BADIIS malware installer to stage malicious DLLs before they are moved to other locations for execution.
Detects file activity associated with the LunarApplication malware, either by the known installer hash or by creation of files/directories within its installation path. This rule combines a high-fidelity hash with a specific folder path.
Sleeper-style JSP backdoor: 403.jsp or similar with Runtime.getRuntime().exec or ProcessBuilder
Detects the creation of JSON files within the '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Arkanix_lol\' directory. This folder is used by the Arkanix Stealer to stage stolen data before exfiltration, making this activity a strong indicator of infection.
Detects the dynamic creation of a scheduled task where cmd.exe first writes an XML task definition file to disk, which is then immediately used by schtasks.exe to create the task. This is a characteristic behavior of the APT28 "Operation MacroMaze" campaign.
This rule detects various activities associated with the 'CrashFix' variant of the 'Clickfix' malware, which deploys a Python-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The detection logic covers several stages of the attack:
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
Detects the creation or execution of files, often in C:\ProgramData, with a file description of 'SimpleHelp Remote Access Client' but using non-standard or renamed filenames. This is indicative of threat actors deploying the SimpleHelp RMM tool for persistence, as observed in campaigns exploiting CVE-2026-1731 in BeyondTrust.
Identifies processes that first communicate with AI services and then perform a low-volume burst of file creation or deletion events. This behavioral pattern may indicate an AI-driven ransomware or wiper attack that is surgically targeting key data to evade traditional volume-based detection methods, as theorized by Check Point Research.
Detects files being written to USB-mounted removable drives. The rule enriches these alerts with USB device identifiers such as VID_PID, InstancePathId, and SerialNumberId, gathered from fleet-wide Plug and Play (PnP) events. This enrichment allows security analysts to cross-reference the detected USB devices against an organization's approved device exclusion list, potentially managed by solutions like Microsoft Intune, to differentiate legitimate data transfers from potential data exfiltration attempts.
Detects the creation of files with a .sys extension in the C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ directory that are actually portable executables (DLLs/EXEs). This is a staging technique used by the REF4033 group to deploy the BADIIS malware.
Detects file names associated with the Guloader Performance Report Pretext campaign.
Detects the creation of 'hvnc.py' in the Windows Startup folder, a persistence technique used by the Arkanix Stealer's HVNC module.
Detects the creation of multiple files with the same GUID-like name but different extensions (VBS, BAT, CMD, HTM, XHTML) within a short time frame in the user profile directory. This pattern is characteristic of the APT28 "Operation MacroMaze" dropper behavior.
Detects the creation of multiple files with the same GUID-like name but different extensions (VBS, BAT, CMD, HTM, XHTML) within a short time frame in the user profile directory. This pattern is characteristic of the APT28 "Operation MacroMaze" dropper behavior.
Page 186 of 217