Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unsigned processes creating directories and dropping multiple suspicious files (DLLs, executables, crypto libraries) in AppData Temp folders which may indicate malware staging behavior
This YARA rule set detects various artifacts associated with the Remcos RAT 'ClickFix' campaign. The rules identify persistence mechanisms (registry run keys or scripts involving 'Shotcut video editor', '2120206', and 'shotcut.exe' for DLL sideloading), archive or path indicators ('2120206' and 'shotcut.exe'), clipboard scripts used for dropping malware related to the Shotcut DLL sideloading technique.
Detects a Microsoft Office application creating script files with GUID-like names in the user's profile directory. This is the primary method used by the "Operation MacroMaze" macro to drop its initial set of malicious scripts onto the victim's machine.
This rule detects the installation and activation of the ClawdBot extension, likely within Visual Studio Code. It looks for the creation of specific files (extension.js, package.json, run.bat) within known VS Code extension paths and correlates this with the execution of 'Code.exe' or 'code.exe'. The rule specifically triggers when at least two of these files are found in the specified paths, indicating a potential extension installation.
Detects file creation in Windows Startup folders which is a common persistence mechanism used by malware. Focuses on executable file types (.exe, .scr, .bat, .cmd, .vbs, .lnk)
This rule detects the creation or modification of Chrome extension files (.crx) on a device, correlating it with browser extension installation/update events and file prevalence. It flags extensions that are rare, unsigned, small in size, or have suspicious IDs, indicating potential malicious activity or unauthorized installations.
Detects suspicious file staging activity in Temp directory structures commonly used for data exfiltration preparation. Includes credential folders, system information collection, and archive creation
Detects the creation of a 'startup.js' file in specific, non-standard subdirectories used by the Lazarus Group's 'Graphalgo' campaign to stage malicious payloads. These paths mimic legitimate application folders to evade detection.
Detects the creation of a JavaScript file in unusual subdirectories of the Google Chrome user data or application support folders. This behavior was observed in the 'graphalgo' campaign by the Lazarus Group to stage second-stage payloads.
Detects the execution of Active Directory enumeration tools (ADRecon, ADExplorer) that result in the creation of 'ComputerSPNs.csv'. Muddled Libra uses this file to identify critical services (Veeam, MSSQL, Exchange) for targeting via their Service Principal Names (SPNs).
Detects the creation of a mutex with a persistent suffix '!&fse?%AS!'. This string has been observed across multiple versions and campaigns of OysterLoader (also known as Broomstick/CleanUp).
Detects the creation of specific files ('result', 'result.kerb') in common user folders. These filenames are known artifacts of tools like GoSecretsDump used to decrypt the NTDS.dit database, a technique observed in Muddled Libra's playbook after they exfiltrate the database from a Domain Controller.
This detection identifies potential abuse of the Windows Package Manager (winget.exe) for malicious activities, including arbitrary command execution, execution from temporary directories, suspicious network egress, and installation of unsigned binaries from non-admin accounts.
This rule detects the deployment and potential abuse of Velociraptor, a DFIR (Digital Forensics and Incident Response) tool. It identifies Velociraptor by monitoring file creation/modification in common installation paths and for its executable name, process execution, and the creation of suspicious child processes (like PowerShell, cmd, curl, wget) by Velociraptor. The rule also attempts to correlate these activities to determine the severity of the detection, indicating potential post-exploitation activity.
This detection identifies the execution of a process from a directory that also contains a zero-byte file named 'pic1.png'. This specific behavior is a known execution guardrail for the 'Diaoyu' loader, used by the TGR-STA-1030 group to evade automated sandbox analysis.
This rule detects the creation of a zero-byte file named 'pic1.png' followed by the execution of any process from the same directory within a specified time window. This behavior is indicative of the DiaoYu Loader, which uses a zero-byte 'pic1.png' as a guardrail or check before executing its malicious payload.
Detects known malicious file hashes associated with the Clawdbot VS Code extension malware. This includes the weaponized ScreenConnect installer (Code.exe) and the Rust-based loader (DWrite.dll).
Detects the execution of an NSIS installer associated with the Silver Fox APT, which drops a legitimate executable (Thunder.exe) and a malicious DLL (libexpat.dll). This activity is the initial stage of the Silver Fox infection chain.
Detects when a web browser process creates a high-risk file type (e.g., ISO, ZIP, EXE). This behavior is a strong indicator of HTML smuggling (T1027.006), where a malicious payload is decoded from an HTML file and written to disk by the browser itself to evade network security.
Detection content for the Notepad++ supply-chain compromise and the Chrysalis backdoor, attributed to Lotus Blossom. Detection rules use KQL only.
This rule detects various activities associated with the ClawdBot campaign, which uses a fake VS Code extension to drop the ScreenConnect RAT. Detection logic includes suspicious network activity fetching malicious payloads (config.json, lightshot files, zoomupdate.msi) from known malicious domains or Dropbox, identification of known malicious file hashes, outbound connections to ScreenConnect C2 servers on port 8041, creation or start of ScreenConnect services, file dropping/staging in temporary directories, and execution of Code.exe or ScreenConnect binaries from temporary paths.
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