Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,545 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,480
532
344
301
286
Contributors
1,303
815
737
215
193
Categories
20,459
11,842
5,879
5,158
4,866
4,545
Platforms
3,841
1,051
473
40
29
Products / Services
1,837
1,138
211
183
171
MITRE Techniques
1,604
1,424
1,300
750
473
CVEs
19
17
16
11
11
IDS Classtypes
23
1
IDS Protocols
16
7
1
Detects HTML content that mimics Cloudflare CAPTCHA challenges to perform social engineering (ClickFix). The rule specifically identifies the combination of fake CAPTCHA UI text, connection to suspicious domains (DDR patterns), and JavaScript snippets used to fetch and execute secondary payloads or redirects.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with Akira ransomware, including AD enumeration using PowerShell, data staging with WinRAR, S3 exfiltration via s5cmd, AnyDesk service installation, registry manipulation for persistence via Safe Mode, and boot configuration changes to facilitate EDR bypass. It also incorporates detection for specific IOCs like attacker jump host RDP connections and malicious file hashes.
Detects persistence and configuration activity associated with the CornFlake RAT, including the creation of malicious Windows services (e.g., 'svchost32', 'Cloud Sync Service'), registry run key modifications, and the presence of specific file artifacts like 'sync.dat' and malicious executables within AppData directories.
Detects the creation of an executable file named 'stealer.exe' within the Windows Startup folder. This activity is indicative of the Stealer/1.0 malware establishing persistence, ensuring execution upon user logon.
This rule detects modifications or creation of files named 'crond' in standard system paths ('/usr/bin' or '/usr/sbin') that occur within a 4-second window of an 'ssh' binary file event. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment where an adversary replaces or modifies a system daemon while simultaneously interacting with SSH services.
This rule detects potentially malicious modifications to PostgreSQL configuration files or the creation of new library files (.so or .dll) by the PostgreSQL service process. It also flags when the PostgreSQL service process is initiated with command-line arguments referencing 'shared_preload_libraries', which can be abused to load arbitrary code or malicious extensions into the database engine.
Detects malicious markdown files (SKILL.md) that impersonate agent instruction files. These files contain hidden-content constructs (like CSS display:none, HTML comments, or invisible Unicode characters) combined with common command execution patterns (like curl, wget, or PowerShell encoded commands), characteristic of infostealer campaigns targeting AI agent platforms.
CVE-2026-65400 affects the macOS Screen Sharing service and can allow an attacker on the network to authenticate without valid credentials. Huntress' research goes further, describing the pre-authentication path and opportunities to obtain root-level file access and ultimately code execution. First thing first: patch. Update affected devices to macOS Tahoe 26.6.1, Sequoia 15.7.9, or Sonoma 14.8.9. Apple released these versions on August 6 to address CVE-2026-65400. If patching is not immediately possible, disable Screen Sharing. After patching, we still need to answer the hunter's question: was any of this activity already happening before the update? The KQL below hunts across Microsoft Defender XDR telemetry for activity around the observed attack path: Screen Sharing file activity, SSH sessions, privileged file writes, LaunchDaemon persistence, process masquerading, Packet Filter changes, XMRig artefacts and related network activity. One process particularly worth reviewing is SSFileCopyReceiver / SSFileCopySender. Huntress notes that these are privileged Screen Sharing helpers, and their research highlights root-context activity and filesystem operations as useful hunting opportunities.
Detects instances where processes other than the primary web browsers (Chrome, Brave, Firefox) create, rename, or modify sensitive browser data files like 'Cookies' or 'Login Data'. This behavior is indicative of credential theft or data exfiltration attempts where an adversary is accessing browser-stored information.
Detects files that present a valid PNG magic header at the start but contain embedded PostScript instructions. This pattern is commonly used to exploit vulnerabilities in image processing libraries like Ghostscript or ImageMagick, which may attempt to process the file as PostScript despite the misleading header.
Detects the creation of an NTUSER.MAN file followed by an update or creation of a registry run key (Run or RunOnce) on the same device within a 60-minute window. NTUSER.MAN is a mandatory user profile file that, when present, can be used to override user settings and persist malicious configurations or startup entries.
This rule detects suspicious file system activity (creation, modification, or renaming) performed by the ESET Remote Administrator (ERA) Agent process, excluding files within standard ESET installation and ProgramData directories. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to leverage the legitimate ERA agent to perform unauthorized file operations or masquerading as the agent.
Detects the execution of MEGAsync binaries (MEGAsync.exe, MEGAupdater.exe, or MEGAsyncSetup64.exe) from suspicious locations typically used for staging (Temp, Downloads, Public folders), or the creation of MEGAsync configuration and state cache files in the local AppData directory. This pattern is consistent with an adversary setting up a legitimate cloud storage client for data exfiltration.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving common web browser credential files (Cookies, Login Data) being read, created, modified, or renamed by processes associated with iCloud synchronization paths on macOS. This behavior is indicative of potentially malicious processes attempting to exfiltrate browser-stored session information or credentials.
Detects the creation of a shortcut file named 'SystemIn.lnk' using PowerShell, a technique associated with the QUICSILVER malware to establish persistence. The rule monitors for PowerShell command-line arguments involving 'WScript.Shell' and 'CreateShortcut' alongside the specific file name.
Detects the use of curl.exe to download a file named 'update_ms.msi' and save it to the 'C:\ProgramData\' directory. This activity is indicative of the msaRAT loader, a component often associated with Chaos ransomware, using the curl utility to drop malicious installer packages for execution.
Detects behavior where the ERAAgent process writes a file to disk and executes that same file shortly after (within 5 minutes). This pattern is consistent with staged payload delivery, decompression, or assembly often observed in malicious activity, specifically referencing SLEEPWALKER malware patterns.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving common web browser credential files (Cookies, Login Data) being read, created, modified, or renamed by processes associated with iCloud synchronization paths on macOS. This behavior is indicative of potentially malicious processes attempting to exfiltrate browser-stored session information or credentials.
This rule performs a two-layer hunt for the ShieldBreak/RoguePlanet (CVE-2026-50656) exploit. Layer 1 detects potential privilege escalation by identifying Windows Error Reporting processes (WerFault, WerFaultSecure, or WerMgr) running as SYSTEM that initiate suspicious child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe. Layer 2 identifies the presence of known exploit artifacts including 'ShieldBreak.exe', 'Warden.dll', and the 'eicar_com.zip' test file via process execution or file creation events.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of .plist files within the /Library/LaunchAgents/ directory on macOS. This directory is a common location used by adversaries to establish persistence, as files placed here are automatically loaded and executed by the system upon user login.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with Akira ransomware, including AD enumeration using PowerShell, data staging with WinRAR, S3 exfiltration via s5cmd, AnyDesk service installation, registry manipulation for persistence via Safe Mode, and boot configuration changes to facilitate EDR bypass. It also incorporates detection for specific IOCs like attacker jump host RDP connections and malicious file hashes.
Page 78 of 217