Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when a web server process (such as apache, httpd, or php-fpm) modifies or creates a new PHP file within common WordPress directories (plugins or themes). This behavior is often indicative of an attacker attempting to plant a web shell to gain or maintain persistent access to a compromised server.
This rule detects various common methods of achieving persistence on Linux and macOS systems. It monitors file system changes to systemd unit files and macOS LaunchAgent plist files, as well as the execution of commands related to managing systemd services and user crontab entries.
This rule monitors for processes, file names, or command lines that contain the string 'telepuz', which is indicative of a specific malware or malicious toolset. It alerts on any occurrence within process image names, process command lines, or file paths.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
Detects the creation of a specific wallpaper file ('image_danger.jpg') associated with the GigaWiper malware family, which is indicative of a system defacement attempt during the destructive phase of an attack.
Detects the creation of PNG screenshot files with a specific directory naming convention (numeric subdirectory containing numeric filename) associated with the GigaWiper destructive malware.
Detects the creation of files within the 'ProgramData\output\' directory, a pattern associated with the GigaWiper malware which utilizes this location to store captured screen recordings or screenshots during its operation.
Detects the creation or modification of a file named 'g11.sys'. This filename is often associated with the deployment of malicious or vulnerable drivers used for kernel-mode exploitation, such as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks or rootkit activity.
Detects potential screenshot activity by monitoring the creation and subsequent deletion of .png image files by the pythonw.exe process, a pattern observed in Starland RAT post-compromise activity.
This rule detects the creation or presence of a file named 'kbdus1.dll' within the Windows System32 directory. This filename is designed to look like the legitimate Windows keyboard layout DLL 'kbdus.dll' by appending a '1'. Threat actors, specifically associated with the Stupig backdoor, utilize this masquerading technique to blend in with legitimate system files and evade detection by security monitoring tools that rely on filename-based filtering.
Detects the creation of a Windows Shortcut (.lnk) file in the Startup folder using WScript.Shell, often used by the Starland RAT or similar malware to establish persistence. The rule monitors command lines for the combination of WScript.Shell invocation, the CreateShortcut method, and targeting of pythonw.exe or LICENSE.txt files.
Detects NirSoft-based credential harvesting toolkit binaries staged in user profile path csidl_profile\music\mimik\pass\, used to extract browser, VNC, email, Wi-Fi, and Credential Manager secrets
Detects various stages of the Armored Likho APT campaign using the BusySnake stealer, including lure archive delivery, NSIS droppers, LNK shortcut abuse, PowerShell-based staging, VBScript persistence, scheduled task creation, reverse SSH tunneling, and exfiltration of browser and communication artifacts.
Detects the mass creation of potential ransomware note files (e.g., decrypt.txt, recover.hta) across different directories on a single host. The rule correlates this file creation activity with the execution of common viewers (notepad.exe, mshta.exe, wordpad.exe) using the note file in the command line, while specifically excluding scenarios where standard file encryption activity is concurrent.
This rule detects file creation, renaming, or modification events targeting files associated with cryptocurrency wallets, such as wallet.dat or files containing the string 'keystore'. Accessing these files is a common technique used by malware or malicious actors to steal cryptocurrency credentials and private keys.
Detects the presence or loading of files named 'profiler16.dll' or 'loader-pool.db', which are associated with in-memory payload staging and execution techniques typically used by IDAT (a modular, multi-stage loader).
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts on disk associated with Stealth Falcon's WebDAV-based delivery and staging infrastructure. The rule looks for filenames characteristic of their simulated 'clickfix' and application update social engineering themes.
Detects the mrmustard stealer's compiled-bytecode artifacts (hw_probe.pyc, .lock_*, .ts_*) dropped in the hidden .tf_cache directory used to evade static source-code review.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
Detects obfuscated PHP code, specifically webshells, that utilize apostrophe-based concatenation (e.g., 'a'.'b'.'c') to break up strings into 1-3 character chunks. This technique is often used to evade signature-based detection.
Detects the creation of a specific wallpaper file ('image_danger.jpg') associated with the GigaWiper malware family, which is indicative of a system defacement attempt during the destructive phase of an attack.
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