Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects web servers, PHP processes, or shell processes spawning fetch utilities such as wget or curl to communicate with a specific malicious payload IP address (162.35.99.94), often indicative of web shell exploitation or post-exploitation file download activity.
Detects cmd.exe launching curl.exe with TLS verification disabled, redirect following, an output file, and forced hostname-to-IP resolution, or the PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest with a certificate-check bypass switch, often associated with malicious trojan droppers.
Detects attempts to download the cache_base file using various command-line utilities (wget, curl, node fetch) on a single device, correlating multiple download methods within a 10-minute window or matching known malicious mirror IOCs.
Detects when a user authenticates via device code flow or performs device registration/ownership addition, followed by a bulk download of SharePoint or OneDrive files (25 or more distinct files) within a 60-minute window. This behavior can indicate session hijacking or unauthorized access where an attacker uses device code phishing to gain access and quickly exfiltrate cloud documents.
Detects command-line execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA) spawned via Windows Explorer containing download primitives and URLs, followed by immediate external network connections.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell downloads an .msi file from Azure Blob storage (blob.core.windows.net), followed by msiexec.exe spawning PowerShell on the same device within 30 minutes.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell downloads an .msi installer file from Azure Blob Storage, followed closely by msiexec.exe spawning a PowerShell process on the same device.
Detects instances where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave) is observed on a device shortly before an explorer.exe-initiated PowerShell, PWSH, or CMD process executes a command containing download strings or script execution patterns (such as DownloadString, Invoke-WebRequest, IEX, or encoded commands) referencing URLs.
Detects web server processes (apache2, httpd) spawning a Unix shell (sh, dash, bash) which subsequently executes curl, wget, or php to perform an external HTTP fetch or download. This behavior is commonly associated with PHP or web application post-exploitation callbacks (webshells).
Detects when AI coding agent processes (such as Claude, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Codeium, or Aider) spawn command shells or download utilities with command lines indicative of downloading and executing external payloads.
Detects cmd.exe launched from the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe
parent) downloading a payload with a living-off-the-land transfer utility such as
certutil, bitsadmin or curl. ClickFix pasted commands frequently chain cmd.exe with
these built-in binaries to fetch the secondary malware stage.
parent) downloading a payload with a living-off-the-land transfer utility such as
certutil, bitsadmin or curl. ClickFix pasted commands frequently chain cmd.exe with
these built-in binaries to fetch the secondary malware stage.
Detects potential data exfiltration and credential hunting where an endpoint downloads a database backup using presigned URLs or cloud storage signatures within 6 hours of searching local files for API keys or private keys.
Detects PowerShell using System.Net.WebClient DownloadFile or related commands to fetch tool dependencies (such as 7z, MSTSCLib, ffmpeg) from GitHub repositories associated with the 'websalat' naming convention, indicative of Salat Stealer or similar tool-loading activity.
Detects PowerShell being launched directly from the Windows Run dialog
(explorer.exe parent) with a hidden window and a download/execution cradle in the
command line. This is the core artifact of ClickFix campaigns, where the victim is
lured to an Amazon-themed decoy page, copies a pasted command, and executes it from
Run to retrieve and run the next-stage malware.
(explorer.exe parent) with a hidden window and a download/execution cradle in the
command line. This is the core artifact of ClickFix campaigns, where the victim is
lured to an Amazon-themed decoy page, copies a pasted command, and executes it from
Run to retrieve and run the next-stage malware.
Correlates internet-origin executable creation with subsequent execution by Windows shell processes using matching device, file path and SHA1 hash within a five-minute timeframe.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell or PWSH executes a web download referencing an .mp4 file using download cmdlets, followed within 1 hour by the execution of NetSupport Manager components (client32.exe or pcictlui.exe) from a user-writable path.
Detects the download of potentially suspicious executables, scripts, or archives originating from code hosting platforms like GitHub, GitLab, and various mirrors where files have low prevalence and lack valid signatures.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Correlates a device code flow sign-in event with bulk file downloads from SharePoint or OneDrive by the same user account within a 1-hour window. This behavior can indicate potential account compromise or misuse where an adversary uses device code phishing to authenticate and subsequently exfiltrate sensitive files.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
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