Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when a single user downloads 100 or more files from SharePoint within a one-hour period. This activity could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized bulk access to sensitive documents.
Detects the download of potential second-stage malicious payloads disguised as JPEG files to the C:\Windows\ directory using the URLDownloadToFile method. This activity is associated with Operation DragonReturn, where attackers save payloads as background.jpg for later decryption and execution.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or the PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet for downloading files from the internet or local network, often used by attackers to perform ingress tool transfer or to maintain persistence via BITS jobs.
Detects a PowerShell download cradle that retrieves a payload archive from a Cloudflare R2 bucket (pub-*.r2.dev/*.zip) and reports success via an out-of-band HTTP GET to a /dl-callback/ endpoint containing a GUID, consistent with ClickFix loader behavior.
Detects the abuse of the CertUtil.exe Windows utility to download, decode, encode, or split files. This behavior is considered suspicious when initiated by common command-line shells or Office applications, which are frequently used as entry points for malicious scripts or macro-based attacks.
Detects the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as PowerShell, curl, certutil, bitsadmin, or mshta to download potential secondary payloads from self-hosted GitLab instances. This behavior is indicative of the Amadey loader chain, where compromised GitLab infrastructure is used as a repository to stage and distribute StealC or other malicious payloads.
This rule detects anomalous high-volume file download activities from Microsoft SharePoint and OneDrive for Business, which may indicate data exfiltration. The rule aggregates download events by user and IP address over 10-minute intervals and triggers when the download count exceeds 200, excluding known service/backup accounts.
This rule detects when users access or download suspicious file types (specifically .xlsm, .docm, or .ics) from Microsoft SharePoint, Teams, or Exchange, where the filenames contain keywords associated with common phishing lures such as credentials, invoices, payroll, or password resets. This monitors for indicators of potential spearphishing attempts involving malicious documents or calendar invites within the M365 environment.
Detects instances where AI coding agents, specifically Claude or Node-based environments, initiate secondary processes like git clone, package installation (pip, npm), or script execution. This behavior often suggests the agent is autonomously pulling and executing code from external repositories without explicit human approval, posing a significant risk of supply chain compromise.
Detects the execution of known malicious or hijacked npm and Go packages associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' supply chain campaign. The rule monitors for node.exe or go.exe spawning unexpected child processes like shells or download utilities (e.g., curl, powershell) and the presence of specific malicious package names in command lines.
Detects a Python loader process spawned by VS Code or Node.js environments that exhibits suspicious network activity indicative of fetching the InvisibleFerret infostealer, correlated with the installation of Python dependencies via 'pip' within a 10-minute window. This behavior is associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign.
Detects the execution of known Windows download utilities (curl, wget, certutil, bitsadmin, powershell) spawned directly from cmd.exe (batch script context). The rule focuses on commands referencing temporary directories or common download/transfer parameters, which are often indicative of staged malicious activity, such as fetching secondary payloads or tools.
This rule detects when a single user downloads 50 or more files from OneDrive within a one-hour period. This could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized bulk access to sensitive information.
This rule detects an unusual spike in large file downloads from SharePoint by a single user within a one-hour window. It specifically looks for users downloading 5 or more files, each larger than 100MB, from SharePoint.
Detects the loader using the native Windows curl.exe to retrieve a ZIP archive containing the RMM components, bypassing PowerShell execution policies. This rule specifically looks for curl.exe executing with the '-o' flag to output to a .zip file from an HTTP/HTTPS URL, and then correlates this with a file creation event for a .zip file on the same device.
Detects potential remote code execution (RCE) attempts targeting Langflow that manifest as the spawning of child shell processes or the execution of curl/wget commands to download and execute malicious scripts (specifically 'isp.sh') from the IP address 83.142.209.214. It also monitors for Python-based execution patterns using 'os.system' to drop or execute these payloads.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity potentially associated with the 'Ptero' malware family. The rule correlates several behaviors: direct invocation of PowerShell with known Ptero-related script names, execution spawned by common phishing delivery parents (such as Office applications or web scripting engines), PowerShell downloading files from Cloudflare Workers domains, and the correlation of PowerShell network download activity with subsequent registry-based persistence modifications.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities on macOS: downloading a file from a potentially malicious source using curl, mounting a disk image using hdiutil, and subsequently opening files from the mounted volume. This pattern is commonly associated with the delivery and execution of malicious payloads, such as trojanized software or malware installers.
Detects network proxy activity associated with the 'Polymarket Trap' supply chain attack, where developers are lured into cloning a fake arbitrage bot repository or fetching malicious npm packages from the wshu.net domain. The rule monitors for access to known malicious repositories (Trum3it/polymarket-arbitrage-bot) and malicious dependencies (clob-client-math).
This rule detects HTTP responses that return an Android Package (APK) file (application/vnd.android.package-archive) to a client. This is indicative of potential mobile malware delivery or unauthorized application distribution.
This rule detects multiple instances of PowerShell executing commands that include 'DownloadString' within a one-hour window on the same computer and by the same account. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to download and execute malicious scripts or files from remote sources.
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