Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Correlates a downloaded remote support installer with execution of the same file on the endpoint shortly afterwards. This rule identifies instances where a known remote access tool installer (e.g., AnyDesk, Bomgar, BeyondTrust) is downloaded and then executed on the same device within a 15-minute window, which could indicate an attacker establishing remote access.
Detects the usage of curl and tar commands in rapid succession to download and extract files. This behavior is characteristic of EtherRAT's Node.js staging process, which bypasses pre-installed dependencies.
Detects the use of certutil.exe with command-line arguments indicative of downloading files from a URL or decoding/encoding data. This utility is often abused by adversaries for ingress tool transfer or obfuscation.
Detects the loader using the native Windows curl.exe to retrieve a ZIP archive containing the RMM components, bypassing PowerShell execution policies. This rule specifically looks for curl.exe executing with command-line arguments that indicate an output file ending in '.zip' and a URL, followed by a file creation event for a '.zip' file.
Detects a script constructing a URL or request path from hostname, username, machine GUID, or volume serial information before downloading a second stage. This behavior is associated with the InstallFix malware.
Detects AutoGen Studio spawning network download utilities to fetch secondary payloads. This rule specifically looks for processes initiated by 'autogenstudio' that then execute common download tools like curl, wget, or bitsadmin.
This rule detects suspicious command-line execution originating from common web browsers. It identifies instances where a browser process launches a command-line interpreter (cmd, powershell, or wscript) and immediately invokes known download or utility commands (curl, iwr, bitsadmin, certutil), which is a common pattern for file-less or stage-two payload delivery from malicious websites.
Detects the use of `wget` or `curl` to specifically target a GitHub API endpoint with a suspicious string, indicating an attempt to download initial stage malware or tools from a dead drop. This pattern is associated with supply chain attacks where GitHub is used as a temporary hosting for malicious components.
Detects PHP or web server processes launching tools commonly used to download or upload files. This activity can indicate a web shell or other compromise where an attacker is attempting to transfer files to or from the compromised server. Investigate the transferred destination, remote endpoint, and whether the activity occurred during an approved deployment.
Detects instances where common web browsers (chrome.exe, firefox.exe, etc.) spawn command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) to execute suspicious commands or perform file downloads, often indicative of an initial stage of a drive-by download or malicious script execution.
Detects drive-by download via malicious advertisement networks
Detects the use of curl.exe to download the Python embeddable zip file directly into the C:\Users\Public directory, which is indicative of NarwhalRAT staging activity.
Detects PowerShell downloading an archive and expanding it into a user-writable directory with mining-related filenames or parameters. This behavior is indicative of cryptojacking campaigns where adversaries use compromised systems to mine cryptocurrency.
Detects certutil.exe being used to download an MSI file. This activity is often associated with adversaries using living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) to download malicious payloads.
Detects the use of curl with specific command-line flags (-kfsSL) commonly used by Amos Stealer to silently download its initial payload, bypassing TLS warnings and hiding output. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to transfer tools or malware onto a system without user interaction or visible output.
Detects non-Discord processes downloading from Discord CDN attachment endpoints (cdn.discordapp.com/attachments or media.discordapp.net). This activity is often associated with malware families like Lumma and AsyncRAT using Discord CDN to host and deliver stage-2 payloads.
This rule detects instances where 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' (VBScript interpreters) initiate processes that attempt to download files from the internet (HTTP, HTTPS, FTP) or from network shares, or execute common system utilities often used for file transfer or execution like 'net.exe', 'certutil.exe', or 'bitsadmin.exe'. This pattern is indicative of multi-stage VBScript loaders often used in phishing campaigns to retrieve and execute further malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of 'curl' with specific flags ('-kfsSL') often used for silent and insecure file downloads. This pattern has been observed in malware like Amos Stealer to download malicious payloads. The rule looks for 'curl' as the filename or at the beginning of the command line, combined with the specified flags and an HTTP/HTTPS URL.
Detects cmd.exe invoking curl.exe to download payloads from raw.githubusercontent.com, commonly used for retrieving multi-stage scripts.
Identifies the fake updater process making network connections to download heavily encrypted payload blobs (often .bin or .dat files) to evade perimeter AV. This rule specifically looks for `curl.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `certutil.exe` being used to download files with `.bin`, `.dat`, or `.enc` extensions, initiated by a process with 'setup' or 'update' in its filename.
Detects outbound network traffic from endpoints to known malicious IP addresses associated with Loader-as-a-Service (LaaS) campaigns. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for connections to specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) and checks for URL patterns commonly associated with file staging and malware loading (e.g., /drop, /stage, /loader).
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