Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of BITSAdmin to download a remote file with a potentially malicious extension. This technique is used by COLDRIVER's NOROBOT malware to retrieve subsequent stages.
Detects the execution of a shell command characteristic of APT36's use of malicious .desktop files on Linux. The command typically involves using 'curl' to download a hex-encoded payload and 'chmod' to make it executable, often within the a tmp directory.
The analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` with the `transfer` or `addfile` parameters to download a remote object. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` can be exploited to download and execute malicious files without immediate detection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to download and execute payloads, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. The rule leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. Review parallel and child processes, especially `svchost.exe`, for associated artifacts.
This rule detects a suspicious activity chain where an SVG file is created by Outlook, immediately followed by a browser downloading a potentially malicious payload (archive, executable, or script file) on the same device within a short timeframe. This pattern could indicate a social engineering attack where a user is tricked into opening a malicious SVG attachment, which then leads to the download of a secondary malicious file.
Detects the execution of Chromium-based browsers (Brave, Chrome, MS Edge, Opera, Vivaldi) in headless mode using the "dump-dom" command-line argument. This technique can be used to download files or extract content from web pages without a visible browser interface, often for malicious purposes like data exfiltration or staging.
Detects PowerShell processes executing commands that utilize `Net.WebClient` to download content, indicated by the presence of `new-object`, `net.webclient).`, and `download` keywords in the command line, along with either `string(` or `file(`. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for ingress tool transfer or to fetch additional malicious payloads.
This rule detects potential SVG-based phishing attempts originating from Microsoft Outlook. It correlates network access, file downloads, and URL click telemetry to identify instances where Outlook initiates connections to or downloads files ending with '.svg'. This is particularly relevant for detecting phishing campaigns that leverage malicious SVG files to embed JavaScript, redirectors, or Base64-encoded HTML payloads for credential harvesting or other malicious activities.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others. It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path, and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's download methods such as "DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest and its aliases "IWR" or "Curl". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity can be significant as such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.
The analytic detects the use of Windows Curl.exe to download a file to a suspicious location, such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include the -O or --output options. This activity is significant because downloading files to these locations can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.
This rule detects attempts to browse or access a predefined list of potentially malicious software packages. It monitors proxy logs for occurrences of these package names within the 'file.name' field. Further investigation of network traffic volume (bytes in/out) is recommended to ascertain if a download of the malicious package has taken place.
Detects PowerShell commands using `curl -o` to download `.dll`, `.pyc`, or other suspicious file extensions to temporary user directories. This technique was observed being used by the Confucius group to download their malware components.
This query groups all files by their originating file—such as a ZIP archive or from a Website—and includes all the files that were extracted from it. Among the benefits of Correlating File Events Using InitiatingProcessUniqueId field we can identify:
- Provides full visibility into all files related to a single action (e.g., ZIP extraction).
- Helps detect hidden or secondary malicious files that may not trigger alerts.
- Traces the origin of files—whether downloaded or extracted from another source.
- Strengthens root cause analysis and incident investigation.
- Enhances detection of multi-stage payloads or complex delivery methods.
- Builds context around suspicious activity for better decision-making.
On the other hand, we can enhance this detection by adding additional checks — for example, identifying when one of the extracted or downloaded files has a high-risk file extension.
| where FileExtension in ("exe","cmd","bat","ps1","js","vbs")
- Provides full visibility into all files related to a single action (e.g., ZIP extraction).
- Helps detect hidden or secondary malicious files that may not trigger alerts.
- Traces the origin of files—whether downloaded or extracted from another source.
- Strengthens root cause analysis and incident investigation.
- Enhances detection of multi-stage payloads or complex delivery methods.
- Builds context around suspicious activity for better decision-making.
On the other hand, we can enhance this detection by adding additional checks — for example, identifying when one of the extracted or downloaded files has a high-risk file extension.
| where FileExtension in ("exe","cmd","bat","ps1","js","vbs")
Detects the download of suspicious file types (executables, DLLs, scripts, etc.) from well-known file and paste sharing domains. The detection specifically looks for the creation of Alternate Data Streams (ADS) with a ':Zone' identifier, which indicates the file was downloaded from the internet and carries Mark-of-the-Web.
Detects the use of curl.exe to download files from known file-sharing or code-hosting domains. This activity is often associated with adversaries staging or retrieving malicious tools and scripts. The rule specifically looks for curl.exe executing with command-line arguments indicating a download operation ('-O', '--remote-name', '--output') from a list of suspicious domains, and targeting common executable or script file extensions.
Detects BITS transfer jobs downloading files from known file-sharing or code-hosting domains often abused by adversaries for staging or delivering malicious payloads. This rule specifically looks for EventID 16403 in the BITS client logs, indicating a file transfer, and checks if the remote source domain matches a list of suspicious domains.
Detects the download of suspicious file types (batch, command, PowerShell scripts) from well-known file and paste sharing domains. This rule specifically looks for the creation of Zone.Identifier alternate data streams on these file types, which indicates they were downloaded from the internet.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) to download files from known file-sharing or content delivery network (CDN) domains. It specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of file download operations, such as '.DownloadString(', '.DownloadFile(', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'iwr', and 'wget'. The rule aims to identify suspicious activity where PowerShell is leveraged to retrieve potentially malicious payloads from untrusted or commonly abused online services.
Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from known file-sharing domains using `wget.exe`. This rule looks for `wget.exe` execution where the command line includes common file-sharing or code-hosting domains, an HTTP/HTTPS URL, and flags indicating an output file (e.g., `-O` or `--output-document`). It also specifically looks for downloads of common executable or script file extensions, such as `.exe`, `.dll`, `.ps1`, `.bat`, `.vbs`, `.hta`, and `.msi`.
This analytic detects unexpected outbound network connections initiated by known webserver processes such as `httpd.exe`, `nginx.exe`, or `tomcat.exe` to common file sharing or public content hosting services like GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. Webservers are rarely expected to perform outbound downloads, especially to dynamic or anonymous file hosting domains. This behavior is often associated with server compromise, where an attacker uses a reverse shell, webshell, or injected task to fetch malware or tools post-exploitation. The detection leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module flow data, enriched with process context, to identify this highly suspicious behavior.
This power query is to detect NPM package is downloaded by the user, using the SentinelOne Singularity Power query.
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