Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'Detects request to potentially harmful file types (.ps1, .bat, .vbs, etc.).'
This query checks devices for the presence of files that have been sent by a known malicious sender. To use this query, replace the email address with the address of the known malicious sender.
Look for links opened from outlook.exe, followed by a browser download and then a SmartScreen app warning that was ignored by the user.
Read more about these events and this hunting approach in this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/forums/editpage/board-id/WDATPActor/message-id/34.
Data availability: SmartScreen events are available only on Windows 10 version 1703 and onwards.
Tags: #EmailLink, #BrowserDownload, #SmartScreen.
Read more about these events and this hunting approach in this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/forums/editpage/board-id/WDATPActor/message-id/34.
Data availability: SmartScreen events are available only on Windows 10 version 1703 and onwards.
Tags: #EmailLink, #BrowserDownload, #SmartScreen.
'Finds PowerShell execution events that could involve a download'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Confluence and WebLogic abuse.
2019 has seen several seemingly related campaigns targeting Atlassian Confluence Server and Oracle WebLogic Server. Although these campaigns use different implants and delivery methods, they consistently use the same infrastructure, and exploit the same vulnerabilities.
The campaigns have specifically targeted:
1. CVE-2019-3396 - Software update
2. CVE-2019-2725 - Software update
The following query detects activity broadly associated with these campaigns.
2019 has seen several seemingly related campaigns targeting Atlassian Confluence Server and Oracle WebLogic Server. Although these campaigns use different implants and delivery methods, they consistently use the same infrastructure, and exploit the same vulnerabilities.
The campaigns have specifically targeted:
1. CVE-2019-3396 - Software update
2. CVE-2019-2725 - Software update
The following query detects activity broadly associated with these campaigns.
Finds PowerShell execution events that could involve a download.
BazaCall is a campaign that manipulate users into calling a customer support center, where they are instructed to download an Excel file to unsubscribe from a phony service. When the user opens the Excel file, they are prompted to enable a malicious macro that infects their device with BazaLoader.
This query hunts for an attacker-created copy of certutil.exe, a legitimate process, which the macro uses to download BazaLoader.
This query hunts for an attacker-created copy of certutil.exe, a legitimate process, which the macro uses to download BazaLoader.
LemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives. First discovered in 2019, LemonDuck has since adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations in 2021. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.
This query looks for user content downloads from dropbox that originate from a link/redirect from a 3rd party site.
File sharing sites such as Dropbox are often used for hosting malware on a reputable site.
Read more about download URL data and about this attack vector in this blog post:.
Https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Threat-Intelligence/Hunting-tip-of-the-month-Browser-downloads/td-p/220454.
Tags: #DownloadUrl, #Referer, #Dropbox.
File sharing sites such as Dropbox are often used for hosting malware on a reputable site.
Read more about download URL data and about this attack vector in this blog post:.
Https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Threat-Intelligence/Hunting-tip-of-the-month-Browser-downloads/td-p/220454.
Tags: #DownloadUrl, #Referer, #Dropbox.
This query shows the source of the AV detections (e.g., the website the file was downloaded from etc.).
Get the list of AV detections.
Get the list of AV detections.
ZLoader was delivered in a campaign in summer 2021 via malvertising. This campaign was tweeted about by @MsftSecIntel on twitter.
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
This query looks for file download events identified by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. It will require an corresponding app connector in Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/defender-cloud-apps/enable-instant-visibility-protection-and-governance-actions-for-your-apps
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/defender-cloud-apps/enable-instant-visibility-protection-and-governance-actions-for-your-apps
'Threat actors can use JPEG files to hide malware, or other malicious code from inspection. This query looks for the downloading of abnormally large JPEG files from a source where large JPEG files have not been downloaded.
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
'This query looks for messages related to file downloads of suspicious file types. This query uses the Exchange HttpProxy AOBGeneratorLog, you will need to onboard this log as a custom log under the table http_proxy_oab_CL before using this query.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
'Powercat is a PowerShell implementation of netcat. Whilst it can be used as a legitimate administrative tool it can be abused by attackers to exfiltrate data. This query looks for command line activity downloading PowerCat.'
Bazacall uses malicious Excel files to execute payloads on affected devices.
BazaCall is a campaign that manipulate users into calling a customer support center, where they are instructed to download an Excel file to unsubscribe from a phony service. When the user opens the Excel file, they are prompted to enable a malicious macro that infects their device with BazaLoader.
This query surfaces connections to the distinctive .xyz domains that the BazaCall campaign uses to host malicious Excel files.
This query surfaces connections to the distinctive .xyz domains that the BazaCall campaign uses to host malicious Excel files.
Sample query that search for .settingcontent-ms that has been downloaded from the web.
Through Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Outlook.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
Through Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Outlook.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
This query looks for a Word document attachment, from which a link was clicked, and after which there was a browser download.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
JNLP file extensions are an uncommon file type often used to deliver malware.
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