Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,664 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
713
605
71
56
52
Contributors
726
301
301
80
71
Categories
20,401
11,795
5,864
5,145
4,864
1,664
Platforms
1,485
238
159
39
18
Products / Services
644
258
183
65
49
MITRE Techniques
639
582
377
235
191
CVEs
6
5
5
5
4
IDS Classtypes
6
IDS Protocols
5
1
Detects ABNotify.exe, running from the standard AOMEI Backupper installation path,
spawning any executable located in the html\ rendering hierarchy. This directory is
intended for rendering assets, not executables; a child process launched from here
indicates a hijacked upgrade workflow triggered through the AOMEI notification agent
with no user interaction.
spawning any executable located in the html\ rendering hierarchy. This directory is
intended for rendering assets, not executables; a child process launched from here
indicates a hijacked upgrade workflow triggered through the AOMEI notification agent
with no user interaction.
Detects the creation or modification of web script files (.aspx, .jsp) within common web application directories by unusual processes (such as command shells or download utilities) or by non-standard user accounts, indicating potential web shell deployment.
Detects execution of BlackX UEFI bootkit installer components, renamed helper binaries acting as payloads (such as jcef_helper.exe renamed to googleupdate.exe), or known malicious file hashes associated with BlackX campaigns.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem dataset to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \windows\fonts\, \users\public\). This activity can be significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in temporary file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data set to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in temporary directories (e.g., \windows\Temp\, \AppData\Local\Temp\).
This activity can be significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
This activity can be significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
Detects execution of BlackX UEFI bootkit installer components, renamed helper binaries acting as payloads (such as jcef_helper.exe renamed to googleupdate.exe), or known malicious file hashes associated with BlackX campaigns.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects Portable Executable (PE) files written to users’ Downloads directories on Windows endpoints by identifying file signatures rather than relying on file extensions. This activity may indicate potential payload delivery, malware downloads, or legitimate user-initiated downloads. Review the file path, file name, company name, SHA-256 hash, and associated endpoint and user details to determine whether the file is suspicious.
Detects Windows PE executable files written to disk with company metadata matching Sysinternals (Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com). This detection identifies the presence of Sysinternals tools on endpoints for security monitoring and investigation.
Sysinternals tools are legitimate administrative utilities but may also be leveraged by threat actors for reconnaissance, process inspection, credential access, and lateral movement. Review the file path, SHA-256 hash, user context, and associated process activity to determine whether the file is authorized or potentially suspicious.
Note: The presence of a Sysinternals executable alone does not indicate malicious activity.
Sysinternals tools are legitimate administrative utilities but may also be leveraged by threat actors for reconnaissance, process inspection, credential access, and lateral movement. Review the file path, SHA-256 hash, user context, and associated process activity to determine whether the file is authorized or potentially suspicious.
Note: The presence of a Sysinternals executable alone does not indicate malicious activity.
Detects Windows Portable Executable (PE) files (.exe) written to common user profile directories, such as Desktop, Downloads, Documents, and other user profile folders that lack company name metadata. This activity may indicate potentially untrusted executables, dropped malware, or masquerading attempts in user-writable locations.
The detection may also identify legitimate software, portable applications, development tools, and other benign files.
The detection may also identify legitimate software, portable applications, development tools, and other benign files.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects the creation or modification of web script files (.aspx, .jsp) within common web application directories by unusual processes (such as command shells or download utilities) or by non-standard user accounts, indicating potential web shell deployment.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
IOC sweep for P7 DarkSword / Coruna: known file hashes, C2/exploit-host IPs, domains and URLs against Defender device file and network events. Tightened to public IPs, connection action types, exact hosts/subdomains and path-qualified URLs; the shared AWS IP is only matched with its C2 port.
Sweeps network connection, HTTP/proxy, file, and process telemetry for exact matches against known Cling botnet indicators: dedicated STUN C2/operator IPs, Cling MIPS loader staging URLs, and known Cling sample SHA256 hashes. Tightened to exclude broad domain-level matching on stun.l.google.com (legitimate, ubiquitous Google STUN infrastructure that Cling spoofs/abuses rather than owns) and to match payload-staging hosts only by full URL rather than bare IP, reducing false positives from shared/compromised hosting and unrelated legitimate STUN traffic.
This rule performs an IOC sweep over the past 30 days using DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to detect indicators associated with PoeLLM / Canto Incognito malware campaigns, specifically scanning for known C2 IP addresses, Kryptex cryptomining pool endpoints/domains, and specific file hashes (SHA256).
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with known malicious activity. It checks for file creation, process execution, and network connections that match a defined list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5), C2 IP addresses, and malicious domains or URL patterns.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) domains, and specific download URLs associated with identified threats. It correlates these indicators across process execution, file activity, and network connection logs to identify potential compromises or malicious activity related to the aware-cr1 infrastructure.
Detects the PoeLLM ELF payload (masquerading as libgcrypt) via Italian-language poem/agent log strings and embedded LiteLLM MCP exploit strings
IOC sweep for P7 DarkSword / Coruna: known file hashes, C2/exploit-host IPs, domains and URLs against Defender device file and network events. Tightened to public IPs, connection action types, exact hosts/subdomains and path-qualified URLs; the shared AWS IP is only matched with its C2 port.
Page 1 of 80