Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the presence or execution of files associated with the 'MacSync' malware family, based on a list of known MD5 file hashes.
Detects the presence or execution of files associated with the 'MacSync' malware family, based on a list of known MD5 file hashes.
Detects the presence or execution of files associated with the 'MacSync' malware family, based on a list of known MD5 file hashes.
Detects the SCKit Go-based credential-stealing implant found in compromised npm and PyPI packages. The detection logic focuses on unique build-info module paths, specific C2 encryption protocol headers, and embedded campaign identifiers related to 'memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin' and 'MemoryOS' supply chain compromises.
This rule detects potentially malicious file execution by monitoring for the usage of .pif files, often disguised as image files or documents, which subsequently launch suspicious child processes such as msiexec, wscript, cscript, or rundll32. The detection logic matches on specific parent processes (e.g., browsers, email clients, file explorers) triggering the file, followed by suspicious command line arguments within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects the execution of a file named 'setup.exe' that is spawned by common interpreters (explorer.exe, msiexec.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) where the command line arguments reference archiving or compression utilities like 'foobar2000', '7z', or '7zip'. This is a common pattern for self-extracting (SFX) installers or malicious droppers attempting to execute payload components.
This rule detects executable files (ending in .exe) executing from a specific subdirectory within the user's AppData path (\AppData\Microsoft\Update\). This path is often used by adversaries to masquerade malicious activity or persistence mechanisms as legitimate update processes. The rule excludes common system service accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) to reduce noise, focusing on processes initiated by user-level accounts.
Detects the execution of the 'sckit' Go implant, a malicious binary associated with trojanized '@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin' or 'MemoryOS' packages. The rule identifies instances where this binary is spawned as a child process of a language runtime (Node.js or Python) when the execution originates from specific directory paths associated with these packages, or when the parent process command line indicates these packages are being initialized.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
This rule uses YARA to identify specific malicious files associated with the Sauron Loader malware, including the MSI installer and associated support DLLs (rnp.dll, tdwp.dll), based on their known SHA-256 hashes.
Detects known file hashes associated with the Macfinger ClickFix campaign, including instruction text, bash scripts, and AMOS malware payloads (arm64/x86_64).
Detects unpacked Sauron Loader DLL samples by identifying specific binary structures, including the magic value 0xbaadf00d and subsequent flag bytes (0x40) often found in its embedded configuration blob.
Detects unpacked Sauron Loader DLL samples by identifying specific binary structures, including the magic value 0xbaadf00d and subsequent flag bytes (0x40) often found in its embedded configuration blob.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Operation SideCopy, including specific file hashes, known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, malicious domains, and URLs. It triggers on file creation, process execution, and network connections matching these known indicators.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
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