Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

1,664 detections

Detects 32-bit PE files that are packed using UPX and utilize specific file names (1.exe or xeno.exe) associated with the SalatStealer credential harvester. The rule also checks for a zeroed compile timestamp in the PE header, which is a common characteristic of this malicious file.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution or file activity associated with the 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' installer. This rule monitors both process creation and file system activity to track the presence and usage of this specific installer executable, which may indicate the installation of potentially unauthorized or untrusted software.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
This rule detects instances where Adobe Acrobat (Acrobat.exe) is launched by an unusual or potentially obfuscated process (GRrte.exe), specifically when loading a PDF file from a temporary user directory. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious document execution where a PDF is used as a delivery mechanism for malware.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
203
Detects 32-bit Windows PE files packed with UPX that exhibit a zeroed compile timestamp, a characteristic often associated with staged SalatStealer or XenoRAT binaries observed in Operation CameraSwarm.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects known malicious SilverFox trojan payloads by matching their SHA256 file hashes. This rule operates on file hashing metadata to identify specific binary artifacts associated with the SilverFox threat actor, regardless of the delivery mechanism or download source.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
Detects the PUROSANGUE malware loader, which achieves execution by being sideloaded as 'vsdbg.dll' alongside a legitimate debugger executable. The detection leverages YARA rules focusing on specific artifacts such as a hardcoded build path, a custom Base16 alphabet, and a structural anomaly in the PE file's .reloc section compared to the declared base relocation directory size, alongside known malicious hash values.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects malicious activity related to the exploitation of MpDlpService.exe. It looks for the execution or presence of known malicious file hashes associated with this threat, including a P-stage script, payload files, and a malicious mpclient.dll. Additionally, it identifies instances where the legitimate MpDlpService.exe binary is executed from a non-standard, suspicious directory, which is a common indicator of side-loading or persistence techniques.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Hunters
1 month ago
000
This rule detects malicious activity related to the exploitation of MpDlpService.exe. It looks for the execution or presence of known malicious file hashes associated with this threat, including a P-stage script, payload files, and a malicious mpclient.dll. Additionally, it identifies instances where the legitimate MpDlpService.exe binary is executed from a non-standard, suspicious directory, which is a common indicator of side-loading or persistence techniques.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule monitors for execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, and network connections to a known malicious domain associated with Vultr storage. It aggregates file creation, process execution, and network connection events to detect potential threat activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
407
This rule detects the creation of executable files (.exe or .dll) within the 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\' directory by processes other than trusted Windows OS installation or servicing components. This activity is indicative of potential malware staging, side-loading, or persistence mechanisms where an adversary drops malicious payloads into a trusted system directory to evade detection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects the execution of processes named 'UpdateAssistant.exe', 'AppUpdateHelper.exe', or 'SysMaintenance.exe' from specific common application directories that are either unsigned or lack a valid Microsoft digital signature. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate system update components to evade detection.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects suspicious PE files that masquerade as Mozilla Firefox by using Firefox-related product names and metadata, but lack valid Mozilla Corporation code-signing signatures and are located within the ProgramData directory.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
003
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
003
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
103
Detects a sequence of suspicious process executions related to the 'RemoteAgent' application, specifically monitoring for MSI-based installations, NSSM service management, and API checks across a device. The rule aggregates distinct process events per device and flags if two or more distinct indicators are identified within a 14-day window.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
103
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
003
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
003
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
104
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
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