Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects EDRKiller.exe or WarsawKiller.exe binaries and the associated wsftprm.sys BYOVD driver used by The Gentlemen threat actor to terminate security product processes
Detects EDRKiller.exe or WarsawKiller.exe binaries and the associated wsftprm.sys BYOVD driver used by The Gentlemen threat actor to terminate security product processes
This rule detects indicators of the Rapuncel browser injection by monitoring for the creation of a known malicious DLL hash on disk, identifying non-standard parent processes invoking elevation_service.exe, and detecting the loading of unrecognized DLLs into Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser processes.
Detects the presence of the CastleLoader intermediate loader binary on disk, associated with the SloppyRAT infection chain. The rule identifies specific file content patterns, including hardcoded strings such as 'CastleLoader', 'CastleRAT', specific user-agents, and embedded Python code used for base64/zlib decoding of further payloads.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and the execution or presence of files matching known hashes associated with the 'PhantomC2' threat group or malware family. It correlates data from DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify potential compromise.
This rule detects the presence of specific SilverFox malware payload files by matching their SHA256 hashes against known indicators of compromise. This identification is typically used for file integrity monitoring, endpoint scanning, or gateway-based file filtering to prevent malicious code execution.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
This rule detects the presence of the Amatera (ACR Stealer) loader by identifying characteristic indicators, including specific Telegra.ph dead-drop URLs, domain-fronting artifacts using github.com, and hardcoded C2 IP addresses. It also identifies credential theft targeting by searching for artifacts related to password managers such as KeePass, Bitwarden, WinAuth, and Authy, combined with the presence of C2 communication indicators.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
Detects the PolinRider/GHAPPIER campaign signature of a malicious loader payload silently appended to the end of a legitimate project configuration file
Detects the PolinRider/GHAPPIER campaign signature of a malicious loader payload silently appended to the end of a legitimate project configuration file
Detects the PolinRider/GHAPPIER campaign signature of a malicious loader payload silently appended to the end of a legitimate project configuration file
Detects the PolinRider/GHAPPIER campaign signature of a malicious loader payload silently appended to the end of a legitimate project configuration file
Detects the GHAPPIER loader identified across 65 public npm/GitHub repositories and 22 developer accounts, based on its embedded remote-fetch/eval pattern and campaign markers
Detects the GHAPPIER loader identified across 65 public npm/GitHub repositories and 22 developer accounts, based on its embedded remote-fetch/eval pattern and campaign markers
Detects OtterCookie JavaScript-based RAT/infostealer malware artifacts associated with WaterPlum/Contagious Interview campaign
Detects file artifacts referencing InvisibleFerret, a Python-based backdoor used by WaterPlum/North Korean IT worker actors for persistent access to victim networks
Detects file artifacts referencing InvisibleFerret, a Python-based backdoor used by WaterPlum/North Korean IT worker actors for persistent access to victim networks
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