Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,664 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
713
605
71
56
52
Contributors
726
301
301
80
71
Categories
20,427
11,813
5,871
5,145
4,864
1,664
Platforms
1,485
238
159
39
18
Products / Services
644
258
183
65
49
MITRE Techniques
639
582
377
235
191
CVEs
6
5
5
5
4
IDS Classtypes
6
IDS Protocols
5
1
Detects StealC-related .NET payload protected with ConfuserEx, requiring the sample-specific mutex string, AES key material, and multiple anti-debugging indicators together to avoid matching benign ConfuserEx-obfuscated applications
Detects StealC-related .NET payload protected with ConfuserEx, requiring the sample-specific mutex string, AES key material, and multiple anti-debugging indicators together to avoid matching benign ConfuserEx-obfuscated applications
Detects known PowerShell dropper and embedded StealC payload binaries used in the ClickFix infection chain via exact SHA256 hash equality only
Detects compromised versions (2.35 and 2.36) of the 'Admin Menu Editor Pro' WordPress plugin that were distributed via the official update infrastructure. These versions include embedded web shell code, as indicated by the presence of both plugin identification strings and common PHP execution or command-line utility functions used in backdoors.
Detects the execution of PrintSpoofer or its derivatives, often used to perform privilege escalation on Windows systems by abusing the Print Spooler service. The rule also covers the download of the tool via PowerShell.
Detects the presence of XMRig cryptocurrency miner ELF binaries by scanning for unique structural strings and configuration flags indicative of XMRig operations. This rule uses YARA to inspect binary file contents, enabling detection of miners regardless of their on-disk filename or obfuscation techniques such as hiding them within dotfiles.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
Detects instances of an executable named msedge.exe running from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This is a suspicious location for a browser executable, often used by malware to masquerade as legitimate software to evade detection.
Detects the execution of the MovieReaper malware loader, which masquerades as 'msedge.exe' within the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This technique is used to bypass anti-sandbox checks by respawning as a legitimate-looking process in a persistent location after initial environment analysis is completed.
Detects when common torrent client applications spawn a child process that is an executable. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads delivered or masqueraded as files within torrent environments.
Detects the execution of suspicious executables spawned from common torrent client applications. This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes or processes launched by torrent clients with suspicious naming patterns typically associated with pirated software or malware masquerading as media files (e.g., tags like 1080p, x264, bluray in executable names).
Detects the execution of known malicious loader files associated with the MovieReaper campaign. The rule identifies processes based on specific MD5 hashes, or by detecting obfuscated naming conventions where an executable file is disguised as a movie file by appending excessive padding or specific descriptors to the filename, often used to bypass user suspicion when distributed via torrent repositories.
This rule monitors for execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, and network connections to a known malicious domain associated with Vultr storage. It aggregates file creation, process execution, and network connection events to detect potential threat activity.
This rule monitors endpoint network events, file operations, and process executions for known malicious indicators (domains and file hashes) associated with Kremlin activity. It detects connections to suspicious remote domains and the existence or execution of specific malicious file hashes.
Detects Mimikatz binary or in-memory module used for credential harvesting following PaperCut RCE exploitation
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
Page 34 of 80