Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Matches known VectraRAT sample SHA-256 hashes and the ClickFix distribution domain (verify-cloud.digital) recovered from pivoting across exposed VectraRAT distribution infrastructure
Matches known VectraRAT sample SHA-256 hashes and the ClickFix distribution domain (verify-cloud.digital) recovered from pivoting across exposed VectraRAT distribution infrastructure
Matches known SilverFox malware payload samples by SHA256 hash
This rule detects the sequence of an external file download over HTTP, followed by the immediate creation and execution of an executable file (.exe, .dll, .scr) on the endpoint. It specifically filters out common system installers (e.g., msiexec.exe, trustedinstaller.exe) to reduce noise, focusing on potentially malicious payloads delivered via network channels.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Matches known HOOKEDGE malware samples attributed to BlueDelta (APT28) via SHA256 hash comparison
Matches known HOOKEDGE malware samples attributed to BlueDelta (APT28) via SHA256 hash comparison
Detects the execution of processes named 'DriverInstaller.exe' or 'Automata-20.exe', the invocation of cmd.exe as a child process of these executables, or network requests originating from these processes to GitHub API and raw content endpoints. This pattern is indicative of potential initial access, tool staging, or malicious payload retrieval.
Detects potential CrimsonRAT backdoor binaries on Windows systems by identifying characteristic obfuscated ASISFH command tokens, embedded C2 infrastructure strings, and specific dropper file artifacts associated with Transparent Tribe (APT36).
Detects a Golang-based remote access trojan (RAT) attributed to the Transparent Tribe (APT36) threat group. The rule identifies the malware based on distinctive fitness-themed C2 API endpoints, specific function names, hardcoded authentication secrets, and embedded Go runtime markers, while also monitoring for associated persistence registry keys and file paths.
Detects the execution of a process named 'UBP.Exe' located within a 'UBP-Asset' directory at the root of a drive. This behavior is associated with the KRSID ransomware distribution campaign, which impersonates Union Bancaire Privée to lure victims into executing the fraudulent binary.
Detects the KRSID Rust-based ransomware binary by matching against known file hashes or by identifying specific command-line arguments and embedded file/log indicators commonly used by the malware.
Detects execution of processes associated with QuasarRAT or references to its configuration files, originating from or involving files and processes named 'UBPUpdater.exe' or 'UBPPatch.Psh'. Also identifies network connections via FTP or involving configuration files ('config.Ini') initiated by these specific processes, which may indicate malicious activity, command and control, or data exfiltration.
Detects Java-based Metasploit/Meterpreter payload files (.class/.jar) dropped post-exploitation, as observed following PaperCut RCE exploitation chain
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for known indicators of compromise associated with the Casbaneiro/Ousaban banking trojan. It identifies activity across network connections (IPs and domain patterns), DNS queries for specific C2 domains, and the presence or execution of known malicious file hashes (e.g., PDF lures, HTA, AutoIt scripts, and payload binaries).
Detects Koktevrat Android RAT APK artifacts via obfuscated component class names (JyfNnJyj, GtVyayDo) and the Stage 2 package identifier com.kowo.ciligeci
Detects Mimikatz binary or in-memory module used for credential harvesting following PaperCut RCE exploitation
Detects execution of potentially suspicious processes ('Launcher.exe' or 'GapiUpdate.exe') originating from ClickOnce-related processes ('dfsvc.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' with 'dfshim.dll'). ClickOnce is often abused to proxy execution of malicious code, allowing adversaries to execute applications from user-writable directories without administrative privileges.
Detects execution of potentially suspicious processes ('Launcher.exe' or 'GapiUpdate.exe') originating from ClickOnce-related processes ('dfsvc.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' with 'dfshim.dll'). ClickOnce is often abused to proxy execution of malicious code, allowing adversaries to execute applications from user-writable directories without administrative privileges.
Detects NeedleStealer Rust-based stealer binaries via Go module path strings, C2 domain, build tag, and embedded browser wallet extension identifiers
This rule detects potential masquerading activity where an executable is signed by 'Discord Inc' or 'Lenovo' but the image path does not correspond to expected legitimate installation directories or filenames. It flags processes that claim a trusted publisher identity while residing in suspicious or unexpected locations.
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