Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,664 detections
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Detects the Akira ransomware binary staged as C:\storage\win.exe and identified by its known SHA256 hash
Detects the GOST tunnel binary deployed as svchost.exe from a staging directory, identified by its known hash, or by an unsigned PE importing config.dll with a matching MZ header and embedded config.dll reference (reduces FPs from legitimately signed software that imports a DLL of the same name)
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule performs indicator-based detection for the SectopRAT malware. It monitors network activity for connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and backup domains, as well as file and process creation events matching known malicious SHA256 hashes associated with the malware.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
Detects indicators associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix campaign across process, network connection, DNS, and HTTP telemetry: known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, the chattypetty.com domain, and known payload-hosting URLs.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
Detects architecture-specific Mach-O 64-bit AMOS Stealer binaries dropped by the Macfinger ClickFix first-stage shell script, requiring multiple distinctive C2 endpoint strings alongside Mach-O magic and size constraints to reduce false positives
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) domains, and specific download URLs associated with identified threats. It correlates these indicators across process execution, file activity, and network connection logs to identify potential compromises or malicious activity related to the aware-cr1 infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) domains, and specific download URLs associated with identified threats. It correlates these indicators across process execution, file activity, and network connection logs to identify potential compromises or malicious activity related to the aware-cr1 infrastructure.
This rule detects known malicious activity including network connections to a specific C2 IP address (69.48.229.140), downloading files from specific C2 URLs, the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256), and communications involving specific actor-associated email addresses.
Detects a potential web shell deployment by identifying a web server process creating or modifying a file in common web directory locations, followed shortly (within 10 minutes) by the execution of that same file.
Detects indicators associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix campaign across process, network connection, DNS, and HTTP telemetry: known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, the chattypetty.com domain, and known payload-hosting URLs.
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
Detects the PoeLLM ELF payload (masquerading as libgcrypt) via Italian-language poem/agent log strings and embedded LiteLLM MCP exploit strings
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