Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule identifies two distinct security threats on Windows systems: the execution or presence of files matching a known malicious SHA256 hash list, and modifications to the 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' registry key, which could indicate an attempt to weaken User Account Control (UAC) protections.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
Detects specific malicious archive payloads associated with NeedyMantis that contain a second-stage loader and spoofed system DLLs (e.g., dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll). These archives utilize XOR encoding or RtlDecompressBuffer packing and are designed for DLL sideloading.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
Detects the presence of known SHA256 hashes associated with the 'ccrtc' planter PowerShell scripts and C2 SDK JavaScript components. These files were identified as being dropped into 'C:\Windows\Temp' during the STAC4924 webshell intrusion campaign.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
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