Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
508 detections
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Detects unauthorized deletion, renaming, or movement of system command-line utilities (cmd.exe) located in System32 or SysWOW64, correlated with the use of standard Windows tools to delete Volume Shadow Copies. This behavior is indicative of ransomware preparation to inhibit system recovery and interfere with standard administration tasks.
Detects the specific behavior associated with the TrymeLocker malware DestroyCMD function, which involves stripping file permissions from cmd.exe using takeown and icacls, followed by the deletion or renaming of cmd.exe within the System32 or SysWOW64 directories to disable command execution.
Detects behavior indicative of Pay2Key ransomware, specifically the renaming of files with a '.3396bw_p2k' extension, the creation of 'HowToRestoreFiles.txt' ransom notes by Everything.exe, or file rename activity initiated by Everything.exe from a 7Zip SFX temporary directory.
Detects activity associated with VILE ransomware where files within the Google Chrome extensions directory are renamed with the .vile extension, indicating an ongoing file encryption process by the malware.
Detects a high volume of files being renamed to the .mkp extension within a 5-minute window, indicative of rapid Makop ransomware encryption.
Detects the creation or modification of a web shell named 'help.php' within REDCap application directories, a known persistence mechanism used by UNC6508. This rule specifically looks for file creation, modification, or renaming events for 'help.php' in paths containing 'redcap'.
Detects a web server or PHP runtime creating or renaming a PHP file inside a REDCap application directory. INFINITERED trojanised legitimate REDCap components and deployed PHP-based persistence. Production REDCap content should normally be changed through controlled deployment or upgrade activity, so unplanned PHP file creation by the serving process requires investigation.
Detects GreenBlood ransomware activity by monitoring for the creation of its specific ransom note file ('READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_FILES.txt') and the renaming of files to its characteristic encrypted extensions ('.tgbg' or '.bak'). The rule aggregates these events by device and process, triggering an alert if a ransom note is dropped or if more than 5 files are renamed with the ransomware's extensions.
This rule detects unauthorized processes attempting to create, modify, rename, or delete the 'Login Data' SQLite database files used by Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge to store saved credentials. By excluding legitimate browser processes and updates, the rule identifies potential credential theft attempts by infostealer malware or unauthorized actor tools.
This rule identifies potential ransomware activity by detecting a process performing a high volume of file rename or modification operations within a short time window. It specifically targets files with known ransomware extensions or those using randomized 6-8 character alphanumeric extensions, while excluding common administrative, backup, and temporary file operations performed by trusted software.
Detects high-volume file renaming activity where the new file extensions correspond to common ransomware patterns (e.g., .locked, .encrypted, .wncry). The rule excludes processes signed by reputable vendors to reduce noise.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of a JSP file within the 'PSEMHUB.war' directory. This activity can indicate the deployment of a web shell or other malicious code within the PeopleSoft PSEMHUB web application, often associated with server compromise.
This rule detects a high volume of file rename events where the new file extension is not a commonly known good extension. This behavior is often associated with ransomware encrypting files and changing their extensions, or other forms of data destruction. The rule filters out common system directories to reduce false positives and aggregates events by process and device to identify the source of the suspicious activity.
Detects high-volume file modifications or renames performed by a single process over a short window, affecting many unique file paths. This behavioral pattern is highly indicative of ransomware activity attempting to encrypt data for impact.
Detects the high-velocity renaming of files across user directories to append the .gentlemen extension, indicative of ransomware activity.
This rule detects unauthorized access, creation, or modification of browser-specific sensitive credential files (such as 'Login Data' or 'cookies.sqlite') by processes that are not recognized web browsers or trusted update services. This behavior is a common indicator of information-stealer malware attempting to harvest session cookies and stored credentials.
Detects the python loader renaming the LICENSE.txt file as an obfuscation technique, as observed in campaigns leveraging AI brands as bait in social engineering.
Detects the creation or modification of large Zstandard (.zst or .tar.zst) archive files (100MB or larger) within common temporary, data exfiltration, staging, or PeopleSoft-related directories. This activity can indicate an attacker archiving collected data for exfiltration or staging it for further actions.
Detects file modifications containing specific threat actor emails associated with a Makop ransomware variant. This rule looks for file rename or creation events where the filename contains 'stephanielkfujo@web.de' or 'stephanielklfujo@web.de'.
Detects creation, modification, or renaming of 'help.php' within a REDCap application path. This activity is indicative of a web shell deployment, as observed by GTIG with UNC6508 using 'help.php' for persistence and payload uploads. The combination of the campaign-specific filename and REDCap path provides a high-confidence signal.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of the 'com.finder.helper.plist' file in the '/Library/LaunchDaemons/' directory, which is a specific persistence mechanism used by the AMOS stealer malware. This rule specifically targets the root-level persistence method.
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