Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of TieringEngineService.exe in the System32 directory, which is indicative of potential Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) via junction redirection, as observed in the RedSun exploit (CVE-2026-41091). The rule specifically excludes activities originating from the Windows WinSxS directory to reduce false positives from legitimate system updates.
Detects the creation of CRYPTBASE.dll outside of the standard Windows system directories. This indicates an attacker staging the DLL for sideloading to exploit CWE-427 upon application execution.
Detects the creation or modification of specific LaunchAgent plist files used by the arm64 and x86_64 variants of SStar Agent malware on macOS for persistence. The rule looks for file events (creation, modification, rename) within the /Library/LaunchAgents/ directory, specifically targeting 'com.wpnuersvc.agent.plist' and 'com.googleupdate.sstaragent.plist' filenames.
This rule detects suspicious file renaming activities indicative of ransomware. It specifically looks for files that previously had common document extensions (.doc, .xls, .ppt) being renamed to extensions commonly associated with encryption by ransomware (.encrypted, .locked, .crypted, .ecc). The rule triggers if 20 or more such renames occur within a 5-minute window on a single device.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'btasc.cfg', a configuration file specifically associated with the JFMBackdoor malware. This file is used to store encrypted configuration data necessary for the backdoor's operation.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of the TieringEngineService.exe executable within the System32 directory. This activity is associated with the RedSun exploit (CVE-2026-41091), which leverages Defender remediation redirection to plant a malicious binary. The rule specifically filters out legitimate Windows update operations originating from the WinSxS directory to reduce false positives.
Detects creation or manipulation of the ROTATE subdirectory within the Skylight Metrics Agent path by non-SYSTEM accounts. CVE-2026-7791 exploitation requires replacing the legitimate ROTATE directory with a junction point targeting the attacker's desired write location. The Skylight service then follows the junction during its log rotation, writing attacker-controlled files to the target with SYSTEM privileges. Any non-SYSTEM interaction with this specific path warrants investigation.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume of file creation or renaming events where the new file names end with common ransomware extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.crypted'. It aggregates these events over 5-minute intervals and triggers if 50 or more such files are observed on a single device.
This rule detects suspicious file renaming activities indicative of ransomware. It specifically looks for files that previously had common document extensions (.doc, .xls, .ppt) being renamed to extensions commonly associated with encryption by ransomware (.encrypted, .locked, .crypted, .ecc). The rule triggers if 20 or more such renames occur within a 5-minute window on a single device.
This rule detects suspicious file activity indicative of ransomware by monitoring for a high volume of file creations or renames where the filenames contain common ransomware-related extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.ransom'. It aggregates these events over a one-hour period per device and triggers if 20 or more such events occur.
This detection identifies suspicious child process execution spawned from Notepad++ (notepad++.exe), which may indicate exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-48778 and CVE-2026-48800. These vulnerabilities involve potential arbitrary code execution through malicious manipulation of Notepad++ configuration (config.xml) and shortcut (shortcuts.xml) files.
The rule detects abnormal execution of system binaries such as PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, Rundll32, and Regsvr32 launched from Notepad++, which is not expected in normal user activity. Such behavior may indicate successful exploitation, plugin abuse, or post-exploitation execution triggered via malicious configuration or user interaction.
This detection is intended for identifying early indicators of code execution chains originating from Notepad++.
The rule detects abnormal execution of system binaries such as PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, Rundll32, and Regsvr32 launched from Notepad++, which is not expected in normal user activity. Such behavior may indicate successful exploitation, plugin abuse, or post-exploitation execution triggered via malicious configuration or user interaction.
This detection is intended for identifying early indicators of code execution chains originating from Notepad++.
Detects the creation or modification of specific LaunchAgent plist files used by JINX-0164's AUDIOFIX and MINIRAT malware for persistence on macOS. The rule monitors for file creation, renaming, or modification events within the /Library/LaunchAgents/ directory, specifically targeting plist files with names known to be used by this malware.
This rule detects modifications, creations, or renames of the Google Chrome 'Secure Preferences' file on macOS. This activity can be indicative of malware, such as FlutterShell, attempting to alter browser settings or inject malicious configurations for persistence or other malicious purposes.
Detects file creation, modification, or renaming events in the suspicious '%AppData%\WinDataScope' directory. This directory is hardcoded in the FrostyNeighbor dropper for staging PicassoLoader, indicating potential malware activity.
Detects the creation or modification of VS Code tasks or Claude Code settings referencing suspicious setup scripts, indicating persistence mechanisms used by the Mini Shai-Hulud worm. This rule specifically looks for modifications to configuration files like `.vscode/tasks.json` or `.claude/settings.json` by processes with command lines containing known malicious script names, or the direct dropping of these malicious scripts into IDE directories.
Detects the creation or modification of VS Code tasks or Claude Code settings referencing suspicious setup scripts, indicating persistence mechanisms used by the Mini Shai-Hulud worm. This rule specifically looks for modifications to configuration files like `.vscode/tasks.json` or `.claude/settings.json` by processes with command lines containing known malicious script names, or the direct dropping of these malicious scripts into IDE directories.
This rule detects file creation, modification, or renaming events related to 'TieringEngineService.exe' in the 'C:\Windows\system32\' directory, or process execution of 'TieringEngineService.exe' running as the 'SYSTEM' account. This activity could indicate suspicious system-level operations or potential abuse of a legitimate Windows component.
Detect changes in auditd configuration files
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of directories related to the malicious 'plain-crypto-js' npm package within a 'node_modules' folder. This activity is indicative of a supply chain compromise where a legitimate package (Axios) was found to include this malicious dependency.
This rule detects the creation, writing, or renaming of specific files associated with the compromised Axios npm package versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4. Upon installation, the postinstall script of these compromised packages deploys dropper scripts to download and install a remote access trojan on Mac, Linux, or Windows endpoints. The rule specifically looks for file paths indicative of these dropper activities across different operating systems.
Detects the creation of a file named "msbuild.exe" within the Windows Startup folder. This behavior matches the persistence and masquerading techniques used by the TeamPCP threat actor following the compromise of the telnyx PyPI package.
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