Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
338 detections
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Detects a high volume of authentication failures followed by a successful authentication from the same source IP address against edge devices like FortiGate or Palo Alto GlobalProtect within a specific time window.
Detects instances where the Claude Code AI assistant CLI or related node processes spawn command-line shells (such as cmd, powershell, bash, sh, zsh), followed by system firewall rule modifications on the same device within a 4-hour window.
Detects successful administrative login events originating from IP addresses outside of configured trusted management networks on Fortinet devices.
Detects successful Palo Alto GlobalProtect VPN authentications where no Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge or related text is recorded in the firewall logs, and no corresponding successful MFA sign-in event is found in Entra ID (SigninLogs).
Detects a burst of denied requests at the load balancer. The appliance sits in front
of the application and sees attempts the application never receives, which makes it
an early warning layer that most estates collect and never query.
Onboarding: BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 859).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webserver where sourcename='BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER'
and action='REQUEST_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, useragent
| select srcip, useragent, distinct_count(url)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
of the application and sees attempts the application never receives, which makes it
an early warning layer that most estates collect and never query.
Onboarding: BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 859).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webserver where sourcename='BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER'
and action='REQUEST_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, useragent
| select srcip, useragent, distinct_count(url)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
Detects a substantial outbound transfer from a Meraki-protected site. Branch
locations have predictable, modest traffic profiles, which makes a sustained upload
unusually visible against that baseline compared with the same transfer leaving a
datacentre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
locations have predictable, modest traffic profiles, which makes a sustained upload
unusually visible against that baseline compared with the same transfer leaving a
datacentre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
Detects when a single rules or all of the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall
Detects an unusual rate of terminated connections at the BIG-IP. Mass termination
can indicate resource exhaustion, a denial of service in progress, or an attacker
disrupting the application tier — and the load balancer sees it before the
application does.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='CONNECTION_TERMINATED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app
| select srcip, dstip, dstport, app, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
can indicate resource exhaustion, a denial of service in progress, or an attacker
disrupting the application tier — and the load balancer sees it before the
application does.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='CONNECTION_TERMINATED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app
| select srcip, dstip, dstport, app, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
Detects a source generating blocked packets across many destination ports. Branch
edge firewalls see lateral scanning between sites that a central firewall never
observes, because that traffic does not traverse the core.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
edge firewalls see lateral scanning between sites that a central firewall never
observes, because that traffic does not traverse the core.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
The following analytic identifies ICMP traffic to external IP addresses with total bytes (sum of bytes in and bytes out) greater than 1,000 bytes.
It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to detect large ICMP packet that aren't blocked and are directed toward external networks. We use All_Traffic.bytes in the detection to capture variations in inbound versus outbound traffic sizes, as significant discrepancies or unusually large ICMP exchanges can indicate information smuggling, covert communication, or command-and-control (C2) activities.
If validated as malicious, this could signal ICMP tunneling, unauthorized data transfer, or compromised endpoints requiring immediate investigation.
It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to detect large ICMP packet that aren't blocked and are directed toward external networks. We use All_Traffic.bytes in the detection to capture variations in inbound versus outbound traffic sizes, as significant discrepancies or unusually large ICMP exchanges can indicate information smuggling, covert communication, or command-and-control (C2) activities.
If validated as malicious, this could signal ICMP tunneling, unauthorized data transfer, or compromised endpoints requiring immediate investigation.
The following analytic detects outbound connections to commonly abused file sharing and pastebin-style hosting domains.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
Detects potential unauthorized or suspicious configuration changes related to packet sniffer objects and associated authentication or management ports on FortiGate firewalls across multiple devices.
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and monitors destination ports against a list of non-standard, high-risk port values often used in post-exploitation scenarios.
Adversaries frequently configure tools like netcat, Meterpreter, or other backdoors to listen or connect over uncommon ports such as 4444 or 2222 to bypass standard monitoring and firewall rules.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and monitors destination ports against a list of non-standard, high-risk port values often used in post-exploitation scenarios.
Adversaries frequently configure tools like netcat, Meterpreter, or other backdoors to listen or connect over uncommon ports such as 4444 or 2222 to bypass standard monitoring and firewall rules.
Detects a source generating blocked packets across many ports at a Meraki site.
Scanning between branch sites never traverses the core firewall, so without the
branch appliance's own logs this activity is invisible from the centre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
Scanning between branch sites never traverses the core firewall, so without the
branch appliance's own logs this activity is invisible from the centre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
Detects a large outbound transfer measured at the Versa edge. Branch sites typically
send modest volumes, so a sustained upload from one is either a backup nobody
documented or data leaving a location with the least security coverage in the
estate.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS'
and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
send modest volumes, so a sustained upload from one is either a backup nobody
documented or data leaving a location with the least security coverage in the
estate.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS'
and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
Detects clusters of high-volume external source IPs from multiple countries sweeping the same financial web services within an hour.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Detects potential unauthorized or suspicious configuration changes related to packet sniffer objects and associated authentication or management ports on FortiGate firewalls across multiple devices.
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