Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious activities related to Protected Process Light (PPL) and driver loading that could indicate privilege escalation, defense evasion, or impact. Specifically, it looks for:
1. Processes running with 'System' integrity that were initiated by a process with a lower integrity level, which could suggest an attempt to elevate privileges.
2. Driver image load events where 'ntoskrnl.exe' is the initiating process, but the driver is loaded from a location outside of the standard 'System32' or 'System32\drivers' directories. This could indicate an adversary attempting to load malicious drivers to evade detection or persist.
3. DriverLoad actions initiated by 'ntoskrnl.exe' from outside the standard 'System32' or 'System32\drivers' directories, similar to the image load events, pointing to potential malicious driver activity.
1. Processes running with 'System' integrity that were initiated by a process with a lower integrity level, which could suggest an attempt to elevate privileges.
2. Driver image load events where 'ntoskrnl.exe' is the initiating process, but the driver is loaded from a location outside of the standard 'System32' or 'System32\drivers' directories. This could indicate an adversary attempting to load malicious drivers to evade detection or persist.
3. DriverLoad actions initiated by 'ntoskrnl.exe' from outside the standard 'System32' or 'System32\drivers' directories, similar to the image load events, pointing to potential malicious driver activity.
Detects the loading of `libcef.dll` by `vcpktsvr.exe` from non-standard directories. This specific DLL Sideloading behavior is a key tactic of the malware associated with the Termncolor/Colorinal malicious Python packages, where a legitimate executable is dropped into an unusual location to load a malicious DLL.
Detects potential DLL hijacking attempts used by DarkVision RAT for privilege escalation. The malware places a malicious 'DXGI.dll' in a non-standard path to be loaded by 'WinSAT.exe'.
Detects the DLL sideloading of `jli.dll` by `java.exe` from common malware staging directories. This technique was observed being used by ReadNimeLoader as part of a BlackBasta-associated campaign.
Detects the execution of a legitimate SentinelOne executable, 'SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe', from a suspicious location (such as user profile, ProgramData, or Temp directories), which then sideloads a malicious 'SentinelAgentCore.dll'. This is a technique used by Cephalus ransomware.
This rule detects activities associated with the Charon ransomware, including DLL side-loading, process creation patterns, file modifications related to ransom notes and payload artifacts, shadow copy deletion attempts, and service creation for persistence. It also includes SHA1 hashes for known Charon ransomware executables.
This rule detects the presence and activity of PAM-based backdoors on Linux systems by looking for specific SHA256 hashes and filenames associated with known PAM backdoors. It monitors process events, general device events, file events, and image load events on Linux devices.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading attempts by monitoring the loading of specific DLLs (version.dll and rtworkq.dll) from non-standard Windows system directories. It specifically looks for these DLLs being loaded by 'icardagt.exe' or 'mfpmp.exe' processes outside of 'C:\Windows\System32\' or 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code by tricking legitimate applications into loading their malicious DLLs instead of the legitimate ones.
Detects potential exploitation of Dell ControlVault vulnerabilities (dubbed 'ReVault') by monitoring for related service crashes or the abnormal loading of the `bcmbipdll.dll` module. An attacker with local access can exploit these vulnerabilities for privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects the DLL sideloading of malicious DLLs (ffmpeg.dll, libvlc.dll) by legitimate applications (Element.exe, VLC.exe) as observed in the 'Illusory Wishes' campaign.
Detects the suspicious loading of `vss_ps.dll` by executables that are not typically associated with the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). This DLL is often abused by attackers to delete or manipulate shadow copies, which can hinder forensic investigations and data recovery efforts, commonly seen in ransomware attacks or other destructive operations. The rule filters out known legitimate processes and common program file locations to reduce false positives.
Detects DLLs loading from a spoofed Windows directory path with an extra space (e.g "C:\Windows \System32") which can bypass Windows trusted path verification.
This technique tricks Windows into treating the path as trusted, allowing malicious DLLs to load with high integrity privileges bypassing UAC.
This technique tricks Windows into treating the path as trusted, allowing malicious DLLs to load with high integrity privileges bypassing UAC.
Detects potential AppDomainManager hijacking used by the OneClik APT campaign, where legitimate .NET ClickOnce applications (ZSATray.exe, umt.exe, ied.exe) load a suspicious DLL like 'history.tlb'. This technique (T1574.014) is used to load attacker-controlled assemblies and execute malicious code.
Detects the loading of the "taskschd.dll" module from a process that located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon directory.
The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application have the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object.
Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determining if its malicious.
The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application have the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object.
Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determining if its malicious.
Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs usually located in system locations (System32, SysWOW64, etc.).
Detects sideloading of trojanized DLLs used in Lazarus APT campaign in the case of a Spanish aerospace company
Detects potential exploitation of remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2025-33053
by monitoring suspicious image loads from WebDAV paths. The exploit involves malicious executables from
attacker-controlled WebDAV servers loading the Windows system DLLs like gdi32.dll, netapi32.dll, etc.
by monitoring suspicious image loads from WebDAV paths. The exploit involves malicious executables from
attacker-controlled WebDAV servers loading the Windows system DLLs like gdi32.dll, netapi32.dll, etc.
The Fax service attempts to load ualapi.dll, which is non-existent. An attacker can then (side)load their own malicious DLL using this service.
Detects potential DLL side loading of DLLs that are part of the Wazuh security platform
Detects WMI modules being loaded by an uncommon process
Detects Microsoft Excel loading an Add-In (.xll) file
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