Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when the Windows Security Event Log (Event ID 1102) has been cleared on a system. Clearing event logs is a common technique used by adversaries to remove traces of their activity and evade detection.
This rule detects suspicious post-exploitation activity originating from the BeyondTrust/Bomgar session process, `bomgar-scc.exe`. It identifies the execution of common Windows command-line interpreters and scripting environments (`cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, `pwsh.exe`, etc.) or the presence of specific command-line substrings indicative of privilege escalation, credential access, reconnaissance, lateral movement, defense evasion (like log clearing), or download/execution cradles. The rule assigns a risk score based on the detected activities and triggers an alert if the cumulative score and unique child process count exceed predefined thresholds, suggesting a high-confidence post-exploitation scenario.
This rule detects attempts to remotely clear event logs over Server Message Block (SMB) by looking for the strings "Eventlog" and "ClearEventLog" in TCP traffic destined for port 445. This activity is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove forensic evidence of their presence on a system.
Detects the clearing of Windows event logs using command line tools like wevtutil or PowerShell. This is a standard example rule.
This rule detects potential log tampering activities on Linux systems followed by service manipulation within a 20-minute window on the same host.
Detects the usage of 'wevtutil.exe' to clear critical Windows event logs (Application, Security, System, Windows PowerShell). This activity is often associated with defense evasion tactics used by adversaries, including ransomware like VECT, to remove forensic evidence.
This rule detects attempts to clear or truncate journal logs on Linux systems. Adversaries may clear logs to remove evidence of their activities.
Detects the systemic deletion of Windows event logs using a tight loop with wevtutil.exe, a defense evasion tactic used by Kyber ransomware to impair investigations.
Detects when the security event log has been cleared by an account that is not the built-in system administrator (SID ending in 500). This activity is often performed by adversaries to remove traces of their actions.
Detects the use of the `syslog` syscall with action code 5 (SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR),
(4 is SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR and 6 is SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF) which clears the kernel
ring buffer (dmesg logs). This can be used by attackers to hide traces after exploitation
or privilege escalation. A common technique is running `dmesg -c`, which triggers this syscall internally.
(4 is SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR and 6 is SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF) which clears the kernel
ring buffer (dmesg logs). This can be used by attackers to hide traces after exploitation
or privilege escalation. A common technique is running `dmesg -c`, which triggers this syscall internally.
One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution
Eventlog Cleared
Sigma
One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution
Detects the clearing of one of the Windows Core Eventlogs. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution
Cisco Clear Logs
Sigma
Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion
This rule detects suspicious modifications or creations of Linux login log files (wtmp, btmp, utmp, lastlog, utmpx, wtmpx) by processes that are not legitimate system processes typically associated with managing these logs. Adversaries may modify or clear these logs to hide their presence on a system or to manipulate login records.
Detects common late-stage ransomware indicators including the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies or the clearing of Windows Event Logs using vssadmin.exe or wevtutil.exe. These are reliable signals of imminent impact.
An attacker disables or weakens Windows auditing to reduce the visibility of system and user activity. This helps evade detection by security tools and analysts by preventing critical events from being recorded in Windows Event Logs.
Detects the deletion or clearing of critical Cisco SD-WAN log files. This is a common post-exploitation technique used by attackers to cover their tracks after compromising a device, for instance, after exploiting CVE-2026-20127. The rule identifies direct file deletions and commands used to clear or truncate log file content.
Detects clearing of Windows event logs. This can be used to hide what happened on a host.
This rule detects various stages of an attack chain, starting from an Apache ActiveMQ exploit (CVE-2023-46604) leading to LockBit-style ransomware. It identifies process creation anomalies (java.exe spawning certutil.exe for downloads), network connections to known Metasploit C2 infrastructure, the presence of specific ransomware file hashes, and attempts to clear Windows event logs, all indicative of the described attack scenario.
This rule detects various indicators associated with the SSHStalker botnet on Linux systems, including outbound IRC-like network connections, modifications to cron files for persistence, log tampering (specifically utmp/wtmp/lastlog files), and the execution of compilers from suspicious directories like /tmp or /dev/shm. Each section of the rule targets a specific behavior of the botnet.
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