
Jacob Young
@jacobyoungsecCompletionist
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16 detections
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Detects the creation or modification of a registry run key in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the name 'MicrosoftUpdate' and data containing 'system.bat'. This is a common technique used by adversaries to establish persistence, ensuring their malicious code executes upon user login.
This rule detects the presence of KVM-over-IP devices and spoofed USB peripherals, which are commonly associated with illicit remote access, particularly by DPRK IT workers.
Detects WMI-based process execution (T1047) where a script interpreter (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) executes a JavaScript or script file, followed within 30 seconds by WmiPrvSE.exe spawning PowerShell. This reconstructs the broken process chain created when scripts use WbemScripting.SWbemLocator and Win32_Process.Create() to proxy execution through WMI.
Why suspicious: Legitimate use of WMI to spawn interactive shells is rare. This technique is specifically used to sever the parent-child process relationship between the initial script host and PowerShell, evading parent-process-based EDR detections and allowlist rules.
Observed in: Remcos RAT campaigns using VHDX-packaged JavaScript loaders, but the technique is not exclusive to this malware family.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
Why suspicious: Legitimate use of WMI to spawn interactive shells is rare. This technique is specifically used to sever the parent-child process relationship between the initial script host and PowerShell, evading parent-process-based EDR detections and allowlist rules.
Observed in: Remcos RAT campaigns using VHDX-packaged JavaScript loaders, but the technique is not exclusive to this malware family.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
This rule detects activities associated with the StrikeShark SharkLoader malware, specifically its attempts to suppress Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and tamper with event logs. It identifies the use of 'wevtutil.exe' to clear security logs, 'auditpol.exe' to disable audit categories, the loading of specific DLLs ('SyncRes.dat', 'DscCoreR.mui', 'SystemSettings.dll') from suspicious AppData paths, and processes originating from these suspicious AppData paths spawning 'wevtutil.exe' or 'auditpol.exe'.
Detects the SharkLoader 'Perfect DLL Hijacking' technique where SystemSettings.exe loads a malicious DLL from user-writable AppData directories and then manipulates LdrpLoaderLock to spawn a malicious thread. This is identified by SystemSettings.exe loading DLLs from specific AppData subfolders (e.g., xwreg, xgdf) and subsequently creating a remote or local thread.
Nightmare Eclipse (also known as Chaotic Eclipse) publicly released MiniPlasma, a zero-day local privilege escalation exploit granting SYSTEM-level access, exploiting a previously believed-patched flaw rooted in the Cloud Filter driver's HsmOsBlockPlaceholderAccess routine. As part of post-exploitation activity, the technique involves launching a process named wermgr.exe (Windows Error Reporting Manager) from a directory other than its legitimate system paths — a masquerading technique (T1036.005) used to blend in with normal Windows telemetry while evading naive name-based allowlisting. This detection identifies that specific anomaly: process creation events where the image name is wermgr.exe but the launch path falls outside System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS, servicing, or Windows Update staging directories. This rule should be paired with the registry IoC (symbolic-link creation under CloudFiles\BlockedApps) and scheduled-task abuse (QueueReporting) for full chain coverage, since the process-creation anomaly alone is a downstream artifact rather than the initial exploitation step.
This rule detects network communication to known Command and Control (C2) domains associated with the StrikeShark campaign. It uses a static list of domains identified in a Kaspersky report. While IOC-based, it's intended for immediate deployment for retrospective analysis and near-term threat hunting. The list of domains should be updated as new indicators emerge.
Detects Kerberos AS-REQ (Event 4768) using certificate-based pre-authentication (PKINIT / PA-PK-AS-REQ) with AES256 encryption. This represents the second stage of a Shadow Credentials attack, where an adversary authenticates using a rogue key credential they previously wrote to msDS-KeyCredentialLink. The rule filters out legitimate PKI-issued certificates from specified CAs and computer accounts.
Detects Event 5136 where msDS-KeyCredentialLink is added to an AD object, indicative of Shadow Credentials abuse via Whisker/DSInternals. The rule filters out MSOL_ sync accounts and computer-to-computer self-writes to reduce false positives.
Detects SystemSettings.exe running from user-writable AppData or ProgramData directories, or SystemSettings.dll being loaded by SystemSettings.exe from these locations. This behavior is indicative of SharkLoader DLL sideloading, often used as a first stage in attacks.
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