Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when a Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) factor is deactivated or all MFA factors are reset for a user within Okta. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or disable MFA to gain persistent access to an account.
This query identifies user sign-ins leveraging legacy authentication protocols in Azure Active Directory (AAD). Legacy authentication methods, such as IMAP, POP3, Exchange ActiveSync, SMTP, and older Outlook protocols, do not support modern security features like multi-factor authentication (MFA). Their use increases the risk of account compromise, brute force attacks, and credential theft.
Monitoring for legacy authentication activity is a critical security control to detect potential unauthorized access or accounts bypassing modern security protections.
Monitoring for legacy authentication activity is a critical security control to detect potential unauthorized access or accounts bypassing modern security protections.
This detection identifies single-factor ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) logins from new countries not seen in the last 14 days for a given user+app combination. ROPC authentication does not support MFA, making it a frequent vector for attackers to bypass MFA misconfigurations and gain initial access or escalate privileges in Azure AD.
This rule detects when multi-factor authentication (MFA) has been explicitly disabled for a user in Azure Active Directory. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to bypass authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access or maintain persistence.
Detects successful authentication attempts originating from clients using legacy authentication methods, identifiable via specific user agent strings. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), potentially as part of a password spray attack. Legacy authentication protocols often do not support modern MFA mechanisms, making them a target for attackers who have obtained valid credentials through other means or are performing brute-force attacks like password spraying.
Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith. The rule specifically looks for 'UserLoggedIn' operations with 'Success' status for the Microsoft Intune Company Portal ApplicationId, while excluding a specific ObjectId often associated with mobile device enrollment to reduce false positives.
Detects successful AWS console logins that were performed without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). This alert can be used to identify potential unauthorized access attempts, as logging in without MFA can indicate compromised credentials or misconfigured security settings.
This rule identifies a critical security misconfiguration or bypass scenario within Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) where a privileged role can be activated without requiring multi-factor authentication (MFA). This can significantly increase the risk of unauthorized access and privilege escalation if an attacker compromises credentials for an account with PIM roles.
Monitors for successful device registration or join events in Azure AD where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not performed. This could indicate an adversary bypassing MFA to gain persistent access or escalate privileges by registering a new device.
Detects when users successfully authenticate to Azure AD using only single-factor authentication, indicating that MFA was not required or was bypassed. This could be due to misconfiguration, an attacker bypassing MFA, or legitimate exceptions.
Detects potential Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue attacks by identifying a high number of MFA denial events for a single user within a short timeframe. This rule specifically looks for sign-in logs where the user explicitly declined the authentication prompt, indicating a possible attempt by an attacker to bombard the user with MFA requests until they approve one.
Detects a transition from a Refresh Token (RT) to a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for the same user and device within a 24-hour window. This sequence is a strong indicator of an adversary completing a device registration flow (e.g., using ROADtx) and escalating to persistent access with a PRT, which can bypass MFA and conditional access policies. The rule specifically looks for an initial RT authentication via the Microsoft Authentication Broker, followed by PRT usage for resources other than the Device Registration Service.
This rule detects changes to user multi-factor authentication (MFA) methods within an organization. It identifies when MFA methods are added, removed, or when the default MFA method is changed. This helps audit MFA configuration changes, detect unauthorized or suspicious modifications to authentication methods, support incident response by identifying the actor and timestamp of the change, and ensure compliance with security policies requiring strong authentication.
This rule monitors changes to users' Authenticator app registrations within Azure Active Directory. It detects unauthorized device additions or removals, which can be used by adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication or maintain persistent access to compromised accounts. The rule parses audit logs for 'Update user' operations specifically targeting 'StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail' to identify both added and removed Authenticator app devices.
This rule detects suspicious Okta login attempts where a user successfully passes the initial authentication factor but then fails or abandons a subsequent Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, originating from a new IP address, device (user agent), and city combination. It filters out events from known corporate VPN IP addresses to reduce false positives.
This rule detects attempts to disable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) within Microsoft 365 services. Specifically, it looks for audit log entries containing the operation 'Disable Strong Authentication.' This action could be performed by an attacker to maintain persistent access to compromised accounts by removing an important security layer.
This rule detects successful device registrations to the 'Device Registration Service' in Azure Entra. It specifically looks for sign-in events where the ResourceDisplayName is 'Device Registration Service', the ErrorCode is '0' (indicating success), and the ConditionalAccessStatus is not '1' (which typically means that conditional access did not block the authentication flow for device registration).
The rule is pivotal for hunting devices registered for persistence, post-successful phishing campaign execution, where >= 1 accounts were compromised.
The rule is pivotal for hunting devices registered for persistence, post-successful phishing campaign execution, where >= 1 accounts were compromised.
Detects when a user's phone authentication method is changed or added, followed shortly by a successful MFA-based sign-in for that same user. This pattern can indicate a SIM swap attack where an adversary socially engineers a helpdesk or convinces a mobile carrier to port a user's number to an adversary-controlled SIM card. This allows the adversary to intercept MFA codes sent via SMS or phone call and gain unauthorized access.
The analytic detects when a Duo policy is created or updated to allow network-based bypass of two-factor authentication (2FA). It identifies this behavior by searching Duo administrator logs for policy creation or update actions where the networks_allow field is present, indicating that specific networks have been permitted to bypass 2FA requirements. This is achieved by parsing the event description and filtering for relevant policy changes, then aggregating the results by user and administrator details. Detecting this behavior is critical for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because allowing network-based 2FA bypass can significantly weaken authentication controls, potentially enabling unauthorized access if a trusted network is compromised or misconfigured. Attackers or malicious insiders may exploit this policy change to circumvent 2FA protections, increasing the risk of account takeover and lateral movement within the environment. Prompt detection enables SOC analysts to investigate and respond to potentially risky policy modifications before they can be leveraged for malicious purposes.
The analytic detects instances where a Duo user's status is changed to "Bypass" for 2FA, specifically when the previous status was "Active." This behavior is identified by analyzing Duo activity logs for user update actions, extracting the status transitions, and filtering for cases where a user is set to bypass multi-factor authentication. This is a critical event for a Security Operations Center (SOC) to monitor, as bypassing 2FA significantly weakens account security and may indicate malicious insider activity or account compromise. Attackers or unauthorized administrators may exploit this change to disable strong authentication controls, increasing the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data. Early detection of such changes enables rapid investigation and response, helping to prevent potential breaches and limit the impact of credential-based attacks.
The following analytic detects when a Duo user generates a bypass code, which allows them to circumvent multi-factor authentication (2FA) protections. It works by monitoring Duo activity logs for the 'bypass_create' action, renaming the affected object as the user, and aggregating events to identify instances where a bypass code is issued. This behavior is significant for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because generating a bypass code can enable attackers, malicious insiders, or unauthorized administrators to gain access to sensitive systems without the required second authentication factor. Such activity may indicate account compromise, privilege abuse, or attempts to weaken security controls. Early detection of bypass code generation is critical, as it allows the SOC to investigate and respond before an attacker can exploit the reduced authentication requirements, helping to prevent unauthorized access, data breaches, or further lateral movement within the environment. Monitoring for this action helps maintain strong authentication standards and reduces the risk of credential-based attacks.
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