Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
255 detections
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The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious C2 named pipes.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes, which is a technique often used by offensive tools.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by RMM tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by RMM tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation,
persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation,
persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.
Detects the creation of named pipes associated with default Cobalt Strike malleable profiles and common open-source C2 frameworks (e.g., Sliver, Havoc) via EDR pipe-creation telemetry. These pipes are frequently used for SMB beacon communication within compromised networks.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to named pipes used by potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) like VPNs or utilities like PsExec.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
Detects suspicious activity associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon communication, specifically monitoring for known default named pipes and specific user-agent strings commonly used by Cobalt Strike in HTTP/S traffic.
Detects indicators of Cobalt Strike activity, including the creation of default named pipes, process injection into common LOLBins without legitimate parent processes, and network communication patterns consistent with Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles.
This rule detects common Cobalt Strike malleable profile named pipe creation events as well as network connections initiated by common LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) that are unsigned, which is a common indicator of beaconing activity.
Detects the execution of PsExec by identifying the creation of the PSEXESVC remote service or its associated named pipe. It also identifies renamed or masqueraded PsExec binaries by checking file metadata and provides a mechanism to flag unusual source-to-target host account pairings often associated with lateral movement via SMB/Admin Shares.
This rule detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity by correlating the creation of known Cobalt Strike or Sliver framework named pipes with subsequent repeated HTTP/S network beaconing from the same process or host. The rule identifies processes establishing suspicious named pipes, then looks for persistent network connections to standard web ports (80, 443) within a 30-minute window, flagging instances where significant beaconing count is observed.
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike SMB beacon activity by identifying the creation of suspicious named pipes (commonly associated with Cobalt Strike) and correlating them with low-jitter, uniform outbound network communication patterns typical of command and control (C2) beaconing behavior.
Detects known Cobalt Strike default named pipe naming conventions and cross-process reflective DLL injection activities into common Windows host processes such as rundll32.exe, svchost.exe, and others. This rule monitors for suspicious named pipe creation events and process memory manipulation patterns indicative of beacon behavior and post-exploitation injection.
Detects suspicious activity associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon communication, specifically monitoring for known default named pipes and specific user-agent strings commonly used by Cobalt Strike in HTTP/S traffic.
Detects the creation of named pipes associated with default Cobalt Strike malleable profiles and common open-source C2 frameworks (e.g., Sliver, Havoc) via EDR pipe-creation telemetry. These pipes are frequently used for SMB beacon communication within compromised networks.
Detects the creation or connection of named pipes that match known default and common malleable C2 profile patterns used by the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation framework. These named pipes are frequently utilized by Cobalt Strike beacons for inter-process communication, SMB/TCP beacon functionality, and staging during post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike SMB beacon activity by identifying the creation of suspicious named pipes (commonly associated with Cobalt Strike) and correlating them with low-jitter, uniform outbound network communication patterns typical of command and control (C2) beaconing behavior.
This rule detects the creation of named pipes with names patterns commonly associated with post-exploitation frameworks, such as Cobalt Strike and Sliver. These frameworks frequently use specific, sometimes randomized, pipe patterns for inter-process communication, lateral movement, or command and control (C2) operations. Monitoring these pipe names can help identify malicious activity occurring within a compromised environment.
Detects the creation of specific named pipes often associated with Cobalt Strike and similar C2 frameworks used for peer-to-peer (P2P) lateral movement. The detection looks for anomalous pipe names created by processes other than standard Windows system processes (svchost, services, lsass), which is a common indicator of beacon communication relaying.
This rule detects the creation of named pipes with names that match default or commonly customized patterns used by Cobalt Strike Beacons for inter-process communication (IPC) and lateral movement. The detection specifically targets common pipe naming conventions such as those starting with 'msagent_', 'MSSE-', 'postex_', 'status_', and 'mypipe-', which are frequently observed in Cobalt Strike configurations.
Detects unusual network connections over port 445 involving SMB named pipes commonly associated with lateral movement tools or P2P beaconing. The rule identifies communication through suspicious or generic pipe naming conventions that deviate from standard system process behavior (e.g., lsass, services, svchost, System).
Detects indicators of the SparroWocky Trident loader, including specific side-loaded DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll, DukeQt.dll), encrypted payload files with custom magic headers, persistence mechanisms such as specific service names and registry keys, inter-process communication objects (mutexes, events, shared memory), and named pipes used for C2 communication.
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