Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
24 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15
9
Contributors
23
1
Categories
20,417
11,806
5,870
5,145
4,864
Platforms
14
6
3
2
1
Products / Services
5
5
4
3
2
MITRE Techniques
6
4
2
2
2
CVEs
2
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
8
3
2
1
1
IDS Protocols
5
4
2
2
1
Detects legacy RFB security-type 2 (VNC password) authentication negotiation against macOS Screen Sharing from external sources, indicating legacy-VNC administration or abuse of the CVE-2026-43760 legacy-auth path that retains root file-copy authority.
Detects the CVE-2026-65400 pre-auth bypass exploitation of macOS Screen Sharing via an oversized RFB SRP (security-type 36) authentication frame length field, correlated with the connection subsequently reaching an authenticated state.
Detects DNS resolution, network connections, or email-embedded URLs matching known JWR phishing framework hosting domains and IP addresses, including banking/government/logistics brand-impersonation lookalikes and smishing-delivered typosquats.
Detects an egress transfer of 100-120KB to known ACRStealer C2 IPs (45.155.68.45, 104.21.70.245) immediately followed within 60 seconds by an ingress transfer of 4-8MB, matching the campaign's post-collection exfiltration-then-payload-ingress pattern.
Detects the JWR phishing kit's WebSocket upgrade request to its hardcoded C2 path pattern combined with a JWRCVV-format session token, identifying the framework's persistent live-operator channel.
Detects completed RFB/VNC protocol handshakes to internal macOS Screen Sharing hosts (TCP/5900) from external networks, thresholded to separate reconnaissance/scanning from single stray connections. Early-warning exposure signal for CVE-2026-65400 targeting.
Detects outbound TCP traffic to known PurpleDelta-associated infrastructure IP addresses on common remote-access/web ports (80, 443, 3389), indicating potential communication with North Korean IT-worker facilitator infrastructure. Scope is limited to static IP indicators from Appendix A; does not cover Astrill VPN egress ranges or shell-company recruitment domains (minicursor[.]com), which would require separate signatures.
Detects DNS resolution and subsequent TLS connection to the ACRStealer Telegram-based Dead Drop Resolver domain (res.explicittweak.cc), used to fetch C2 configuration via Telegram's IP range.
Correlates DNS/network requests to newly observed domains matching JWR's brand-plus-suffix generation pattern across .top/.cfd/.info/.cc TLDs, requiring multiple distinct hostnames sharing the same brand token within a short window to flag likely batch-registered phishing infrastructure.
Detects execution of RClone from non-standard directories or outbound transfer to cloud endpoints outside an approved destination list, consistent with Gunra's pre-encryption data-exfiltration tooling.
Detects Impacket-style (wmiexec, secretsdump, atexec, psexec.py, smbclient.py) and PsExec SMB admin-share lateral movement, excluding approved IT admin accounts and management servers.
Detects a DNS query with a high-entropy label repeated identically as both subdomain and domain (e.g. X.X), used by ACRStealer as a connectivity/canary check prior to establishing C2.
Detects OpenSSH installation on Windows hosts, unexpected internal SSH sessions, and SSH tunnels terminating at an external (non-RFC1918) destination — particularly from SSL-VPN admin hosts — excluding documented DevOps CI/CD runners and known bastion hosts.
Detects encapsulated C2 traffic over non-standard ports and DNS/HTTP tunneling patterns using entropy/volume thresholds and sustained-pattern requirements to avoid matching ordinary long DNS queries, excluding known legitimate tunneling tools/VPN endpoints.
Detects use of default SSL-VPN administrator credentials from external or unusual source geographies after production provisioning, where account-lockout controls are absent — the initial-access vector observed in Gunra intrusions.
Detects large-volume outbound TLS transfers scoped to mega.nz/mega.io SNI/destination, tuned against a typical daily-use baseline so routine small file-sharing does not trigger, consistent with Gunra's confirmed exfiltration of up to tens of terabytes to Mega.
Network signature for the specific WebSocket/admin-API request sequence used to exploit the FortiOS/FortiProxy authentication-bypass vulnerabilities CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472, as leveraged by Gunra ransomware affiliates for initial access.
Detects certutil.exe -urlcache usage or PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest retrieving main.exe/cryptor.exe or similarly named payloads, followed by execution of the downloaded file, excluding downloads from an allowlist of approved internal software-distribution domains.
Network detection for Sliver C2 framework beaconing, tightened to require JA3/JA3S fingerprints and certificate-field patterns characteristic of Sliver's default TLS templates rather than generic self-signed certificates.
Detects FileZilla FTP client traffic patterns and large single-session outbound FTP transfers to external hosts above a tuned threshold, weighted more heavily outside business hours, excluding known internal FTP servers/vendors and approved data-transfer partners.
Network signature matching known Gunra C2 IP addresses, the datapub.news leak/paste domain, and Gunra-associated .onion leak/negotiation sites.
Page 1 of 2