Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors DNS query logs for requests to specific domains associated with malicious activity. It aggregates these requests by endpoint to identify potential command and control (C2) communication or beaconing behavior.
Detects DNS lookups or network connections from common web browsers to known malicious or suspicious domains (short.gy and chongdaotang.net), which are associated with legal-threat lure phishing campaigns designed for credential harvesting.
This rule detects the execution of VBScript files using wscript.exe or cscript.exe that are closely followed by network connections to known public IP geolocation services (ip-api.com, ipinfo.io, api.country.is). It further enhances the detection by checking if a secondary process is spawned from the same host, which may indicate a payload retrieval or execution phase typical of malware staging.
Detects anomalous, high-volume data transfers to Telegram API endpoints (api.telegram.org, specific IP ranges), which is indicative of data exfiltration by malware such as KuinaExtractor. The rule monitors for cumulative outbound traffic exceeding 500MB within a 1-hour session window per process.
Detects DNS queries and network connection attempts to a set of known malicious domains associated with the threat actor UNC1151 (Ghostwriter). This rule monitors both DNS resolutions and direct network connection attempts to these indicators of compromise (IOCs), which are commonly used in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects network activity originating from popular web browsers (Chrome, Chromium, Edge, Brave) directed towards known malicious or suspicious browser extension domains. This rule flags beaconing, API requests, and remote configuration fetches associated with potentially malicious or unwanted browser extensions.
This rule monitors network logs (proxy, DNS, network) for connections to domains associated with the Unistream SDK. This SDK has been identified as a component of the BadBlocker malicious Chrome extension family, which facilitates unauthorized background activity. The rule serves as an indicator of potential command and control (C2) communication from a compromised host.
This rule monitors network logs for potential malicious activity by analyzing subdomain cardinality and identifying known phishing domains. It flags apex domains that exhibit high subdomain rotation (5 or more distinct subdomains within an hour), indicative of fast-flux DNS techniques, or that match a static list of known malicious/phishing infrastructure.
This rule monitors for two types of anomalous network behavior: first, it identifies connections to known domains from IP addresses not previously associated with those domains over a seven-day lookback period. Second, it identifies HTTP proxy responses (from Zscaler or Squid) where the content-length significantly deviates from the historical baseline for specific URLs. These patterns are potential indicators of C2 channel shifts or data exfiltration via web protocols.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with the Qilin ransomware, beginning with suspicious VPN authentication (potential credential stuffing or bypass), moving through lateral movement attempts (SMB/RDP/WMI), and culminating in ransomware behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, mass file encryption, and ransom note creation.
Detects outbound network connections to common Azure-related domains originating from suspicious file paths such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData subdirectories. This behavior is indicative of potential malware or unauthorized scripts executing from temporary user locations to reach out to cloud infrastructure.
Detects network and DNS activity involving domains known to be used by the threat actor APT28 for command and control, specifically for hosting WebDAV payloads, malicious LNK files, and weaponized documents.
This rule detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication activity by identifying instances of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). It monitors DNS query responses for patterns consisting of 8 to 16 lowercase alphabetic characters followed by common TLDs (com, net, org, ru, cc, su). An alert is triggered if 5 or more unique suspicious domains are queried by the same device within a one-hour window.
This rule detects network connections made to specific non-standard ports (7777, 8080, 8443) where the remote URL contains substrings associated with proxy or tunneling activities ('proxy', 'tunnel', 'hide'). This behavior is commonly associated with malware attempting to evade security controls by routing traffic through unauthorized intermediaries or obfuscated tunnels.
This rule detects network connections where an 'access_token=' string is present in the additional fields of network events, excluding common legitimate authentication domains like Google, Microsoft, and GitHub. This could indicate the exposure of sensitive access tokens over the network.
This rule detects network connections to FTP servers (port 21) where the remote URL contains keywords associated with NetWare or Novell, along with suspicious whitespace patterns. This could indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability related to whitespace handling in NetWare FTP servers, potentially the 'Squidbleed' vulnerability.
This rule detects suspicious process command lines that indicate potential tunneling activity. It looks for commands containing 'tunnel', '--url', and '--logfile', while excluding legitimate 'cloudflared.exe' processes. This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish covert communication channels or exfiltrate data.
This rule detects DNS queries to domains associated with tunneling tools (Ngrok, Tailscale) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (FleetDeck, TacticalRMM, Level.io, Pulseway, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, RustDesk, Atera, Remcos) known to be used by threat actors like Scattered Spider/Muddled Libra for covert persistent connectivity, remote access, and lateral movement. The rule categorizes the detected tools into 'Tunneling' or 'RMM'.
Detects Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) lateral movement activity by monitoring for mmc.exe and dllhost.exe network connections to non-local endpoints or when these processes are spawned by suspicious parent processes typically associated with command execution or malicious behavior.
This rule detects network communication to known Command and Control (C2) domains associated with the StrikeShark campaign. It uses a static list of domains identified in a Kaspersky report. While IOC-based, it's intended for immediate deployment for retrospective analysis and near-term threat hunting. The list of domains should be updated as new indicators emerge.
This rule monitors DNS queries and network connections for access to a set of known domain names associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. It correlates data from DNS events, device network logs, and virtual machine network connections to identify potential interactions with malicious phishing sites typically used to capture user credentials or session tokens.
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